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EC Merger Control: 10th anniversary 
conference -14/15 September 2000 
Alexander SCHAUB, Director-General of 
Competition DG, 
Carina JOERGENSEN, Ewoud SAKKERS, 
Neil MARSHALL and Karen WILLIAMS 
Introduction 
A conference, attended by over 400 people, took place in the 
Brussels' Metropole Hotel on the 14th and 15th September to 
celebrate the 10th anniversary of the introduction of European 
merger control. Introducing the conference, Mr Romano Prodi, 
the President of the European Commission, took the opportunity 
to stress the importance that the Commission places on the role of 
DG COMP in maintaining competitive markets around the globe. 
He described the Merger Regulation as not only one of the 
Commission's "great success stories of the last decade" but also 
as "a cornerstone" of the Community's competition policy and 
re-affirmed the Commission decision to increase the resources 
available to merger control as soon as possible. 
The conference was organised by members of the Merger Task 
Force in association with the International Bar Association (IBA), 
and attracted speakers of the highest calibre, including three 
previous Competition Commissioners, Peter Sutherland, Lord 
Brittan and Karel Van Miert, senior representatives of 
competition authorities in both Europe and the United States, top 
practitioners and representatives from business. There was a 
similar spread of people in the audience, including 
representatives from over 35 countries, including all Member 
States, the accession countries, and others, such as the US, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia and South Korea. 
ARTICLES 
Over the two days 'of the 
conference, chaired by J William 
Rowley QC, Chairman of the 
IBA's section on Business Law, 
and Colin Overbury, the first 
Director of the Merger Task 
Force, the speakers and 
participants in the open sessions 
covered a wide spectrum of 
issues and not only provided an 
excellent opportunity to take a 
retrospective look at the 
experience gained during the 
regime's first ten years, but also 
provided a forum to highlight 
issues and challenges which the 
Commission needs to address for 
the future. The conference 
started with debate on the 
increasingly global context 
within which competition 
authorities exist, moved onto 
several important contributions 
examining the Commission's 
substantive developments, and 
ended with an examination of 
various procedural aspects of 
how the Merger regime currently 
operates and how it could and 
should operate. Mr Monti, who 
gave the conference's closing 
address, welcomed the "richness 
and depth" of all the 
contributions from speakers and 
participants in the open sessions 
alike. 
Merger Control in 
International Context 
an 
Globalisation continues to create 
many challenges for merger 
control authorities around the 
world and the importance of 
these challenges was stressed by 
all the contributors. In this 
opening session which was 
moderated by Sir Christopher 
Bellamy (Head of the UK 
Competition Tribunal) the 
Director-General of DG COMP, 
Alexander Schaub, opened by 
highlighting potential dangers 
which can arise from global 
mergers in highly concentrated 
industries and the growing 
necessity for the Commission to 
analyse these mergers from the 
perspective of oligopolistic as 
well as single firm dominance. 
He also elaborated on the 
bilateral co-operation, in 
particular with the US 
authorities, which has evolved 
significantly in recent years. 
This was a theme taken up by 
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the 
US FTC, who stressed the 
benefits of this close co­
operation which has led to 
considerable convergence 
between authorities on both 
substantive and procedural 
matters. In his address Mario 
Siragusa, a leading competition 
lawyer, set out how bilateral co­
operation should function 
optimally from the practitioner's 
point of view. 
Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney-
General of the US DoJ, agreed 
that bilateral co-operation is an 
excellent template but by itself is 
insufficient to cope with present 
and future challenges posed by 
global mergers. He therefore 
called for a Global Competition 
Initiative along the lines set out 
in the ICPAC recommendations 
made earlier this year. Jacques 
Bougie, CEO of Alean 
Aluminium Ltd, gave weight to 
the benefits that such an 
initiative could bring by 
highlighting the transactional 
costs involved in filing global 
mergers, and stressing that legal 
uncertainty is the "number one 
enemy" of business. 
In providing an investment 
bank's perspective on this issue, 
Peter Sutherland, now Chairman 
and Managing Director of 
Goldman Sachs, also emphasised 
the need for legal certainty and 
for strengthened co-operation on 
both a bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
basis. He also stated that, 
together with an independent 
central bank and a strong 
securities regulator, strong and 
independent competition policy 
is one of the three critical 
components of a successful 
economic model, and that in his 
view, DG Competition has to 
date "amply fulfilled its part of 
the equation". 
Many of the challenges raised by 
these contributors were 
acknowledged by Commissioner 
Monti in his closing speech. In 
particular, he emphasised the 
importance placed on the bi­
lateral arrangements between the 
EU and the US and Canada 
which have formed the model 
for arrangements with the EU's 
other trading partners and 
stressed that these will remain 
"fundamental" in the future. At 
the same time, the 
Commissioner welcomed Joel 
Klein's call for a move towards 
multi-lateralism as a constructive 
step to address the concerns 
raised by both business and the 
legal 'community about the 
potential for inconsistent 
decisions across the globe, and 
the spiralling costs incurred in 
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making multi­national merger 
filings. 
Recent developments in EC 
Merger Control Law 
In the first afternoon session, 
moderated by Philippe 
Chappatte, Götz Drauz, Director 
of the Merger Task Force, 
discussed the Commission's 
assessment of dominance, and in 
particular developments in 
dealing with oligopolies, vertical 
mergers and potential 
competition, all of which have 
been relevant in recent Phase II 
cases. In relation to the first of 
these, Mr Drauz emphasised 
how the Commission has sought 
to apply oligopoly theory in its 
analysis of oligopolistic 
situations, in order to distinguish 
between "good" oligopolies, 
namely those markets which 
may have only a few players but 
which are intensely competitive, 
and "bad" oligopolies which will 
engender anti­competitive 
outcomes. Mr Drauz also stated 
that it is the Commission's 
intention to refine and further 
develop its policy in this difficult 
area through individual cases 
and to enhance legal certainty 
through issuing a notice dealing 
with the assessment of 
oligopolistic dominance under 
the ECMR. 
In commenting on these issues, 
Frédéric Jenny, Vice­President 
of the Conseil de la Concurrence 
in Paris, outlined the theoretical 
perspective for assessing 
oligopolies, while Jochen 
Burrichter, a leading competition 
lawyer, raised the issue of the 
extent to which other members 
of an oligopoly should be 
involved in the administrative 
procedure of a notified merger. 
The session ended with a lively 
open discussion, including a 
number of interesting questions 
from the floor. 
Remedies: Finding the Right 
Cure 
Barry Hawk was moderator for 
the third main session of the 
conference which addressed the 
issue of remedies and the 
difficulties faced in trying to find 
solutions to particular 
competition problems in the 
context of merger investigations. 
Claude Rakovsky, Head of Unit 
in the Merger Task Force, 
described how the Commission's 
practice is evolving. His talk 
covered both procedural and 
substantive issues, the most 
important of which are as 
follows. First, when companies 
propose remedies it is vital that 
they be designed to address the 
competition problems that have 
been identified. Second, the 
burden of proof rests with the 
companies proposing the 
remedies to provide proof that 
they will be effective. Mr Monti 
took this further, highlighting 
that for the Commission to 
accept remedies, it must be 
persuaded that a purchaser will 
not only need to be independent 
and viable, but that it will need 
to have the right incentives to 
compete. Mr Monti also stressed 
that since complexity leads 
directly to uncertainty, the 
solutions proposed cannot be 
more complex than the problems 
they are designed to address. 
Kevin Arquit, Chair of the 
Antitrust and Trade Law 
Committee of the IBA, outlined 
developments in the practice of 
the US authorities over the years 
and presented a critical 
assessment on the findings of the 
recent FTC study on its 
divestiture process. Juan 
Rodriguez, Β Ρ Amoco's 
Antitrust Counsel, gave the 
acquirer's perspective and 
highlighted that companies need 
to anticipate from the outset that 
remedial relief may be necessary 
and to consider what 
implications this may have. 
Cornells Canenbley discussed 
certain problems in the context 
of remedies. He described the 
practice under German merger 
control law and emphasised how 
important it is that merger 
decisions in the US and in 
Europe should be taken at 
approximately the same time. 
Rachel Brandenburger 
questioned, in particular, 
whether it might not be 
appropriate to consider the 
possibility to "stop the clock" to 
enable both the merging parties 
and the Commission more time 
to propose and discuss 
appropriate remedies. 
Lord Brittan closed the first day 
and ex­Commissioner Karel van 
Miert opened the second day 
with personal accounts of their 
times as Commissioners with 
responsibility for Competition 
policy and in particular merger 
control. Lord Brittan was 
Commissioner at the time the 
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Merger Regulation was adopted 
and first came into force, while 
Karel Van Miert was 
Commissioner from 1993 to 
1999. 
Judicial Review 
Guilliano Marenco, Principal 
Adviser of the Legal Service of 
the European Commission, 
explained the role of the 
European Court of Justice in the 
development of EC merger 
control in the very limited 
number of merger cases that has 
been appealed so far. Kali & 
Salz is the only judgement where 
a Commission's decision has 
actually been annulled. 
The importance of this issue of 
judicial review was shown by 
the number of times it was 
raised, both by the speakers and 
from the floor. Mr Monti stated 
that a properly functioning 
judicial review system is 
essential to ensure that the 
Commission maintains a high 
level of quality in its decisions. 
He also expressed the view that 
the Court would have all the 
Commission's support to debate 
any modifications of current 
procedures that the Court itself 
considers necessary to improve 
its role. 
The future of EC Merger 
Control 
The final session provided a 
forum to present issues for the 
Merger Review, and was 
moderated by Jacques 
Bourgeois. Paul Malric-Smith, 
Head of Unit in the Merger Task 
Force, introduced the main 
findings of the Commission's 
2000 report to the Council on the 
application of the thresholds in 
the Merger Regulation which 
effectively act as the gateway to 
the Commission's "one-stop-
shop" for examining mergers. 
This was followed by a series of 
short presentations and a panel 
discussion on issues which could 
form part of the Commission's 
review of the current merger 
regime. Ulf Böge, President of 
the Bundeskartellamt, encour-
aged the Commission not to 
focus on the thresholds issue, but 
rather to concentrate on 
improving the referral processes 
between the Commission and 
Member States. These already 
exist in the Merger Regulation 
under Articles 9 and 22. Alec 
Burnside titled his contribution 
"Bumps in the level playing 
field" which set out a critique of 
the procedural framework and its 
practical consequences for 
notifying parties. Morris 
Tabaksblat, President of the 
European Round Table of 
Industrialists, expressed his 
desire for the Commission to 
widen its review to look not just 
at procedural issues, but also 
substantive ones, such as 
defining geographical markets. 
F. Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Head 
of Unit in the Merger Task 
Force, concluded the session 
with a discussion of some non-
threshold related issues which 
could be reviewed, for example 
whether the notion of a 
concentration is sufficiently 
wide. 
Mr Monti stressed that the 
Review would be all-
encompassing and emphasised 
that, in order for the Merger 
Review to produce successful 
and well-balanced solutions, the 
Commission will rely heavily on 
active participation and co-
operation from all the companies 
and authorities concerned. 
The main challenges for a new 
decade of EC merger control 
In a wide ranging speech that 
covered all of the issues raised 
during the conference, Mr Monti 
went to considerable lengths to 
address the points raised by the 
previous speakers. Many of 
these have been highlighted 
above. In addition, he stated that 
the breadth and depth of the 
discussions showed how much 
the regime has matured in recent 
years. The Commissioner 
emphasised that he believes the 
EC merger regime is widely 
respected and that he as 
Competition Commissioner is 
committed to ensure that this 
will continue into the future. 
Conclusion 
The conference provided an 
excellent opportunity not just to 
take a retrospective look at the 
first ten years of EC merger 
control, but also to look to the 
future. The quality of the 
contributions from the various 
speakers and other participants 
has produced a number of 
initiatives and ideas that will be 
explored by the Commission 
over the forthcoming months. 
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The application of the guidelines on 
fines: an overview 
Miguel Ángel Peña Castellot, Comp-A-1 
Section I 
Introduction 
After 21/2 years of application of 
the Guidelines on fines', and 14 
cases2 where fines have been 
Guidelines on the method of setting 
fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 
(2) of Regulation N° 17 and Article 
65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty. OJ C9/3 
of 14.1.98. 
Alloy surcharge. Commission 
Decision of 21.1.98 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of 
the ECSC Treaty. OJ LI00/55 of 
1.4.98. 
Volkswagen. Commission Decision 
of 28.1.98 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 81 (ex Article 
85) of the EC Treaty. OJ LI 24/60 of 
25.4.98. 
AAMS. Commission Decision of 
17.6.98 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 82 (ex Article 
86) of the EC Treaty. OJ L252/47 of 
12.9.98. 
TACA. Commission Decision of 
16.9.98 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 (ex 
Articles 85 and 86) of the EC 
Treaty. OJ L95/1 of 9.4.99 
British Sugar. Commission Decision 
of 14.10.98 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 81 (ex Article 
85) of the EC Treaty. OJ L76/1 of 
22.3.99. 
Pre­insulated Pipes. Commission 
Decision of 21.10.98 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 81 
(ex Article 85) of the EC Treaty. OJ 
L24 of 30.1.99. 
Greek ferries. Commission decision 
of 9.12.98 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 (ex Ariele 85) of 
the EC Treaty. OJ LI09/24 of 
27.4.98 
imposed ­ including record fines 
on a single company 
(Volkswagen) and on a cartel 
(TACA), it is an appropriate 
time to give a short overview of 
all decisions adopted so far3 in 
order to show how the 
Guidelines are being applied in 
practice. 
This article tries to do so in the 
following way. Section II 
Virgin­ΒΑ. Commission Decision of 
14.7.99 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty. OJ L30/1 of 4.2.00. 
World Cap 98. Commission 
Decision of 20.7.99 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty. OJ L5/55 of 8.1.00 
FEG ­TU. Commission decision of 
26.10.99 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
OJL39/1 of 14.2.00. 
Seamless Steel Tubes. Commission 
decision of 8.12.99 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty (case 1V/35.860). Not yet 
published. 
FETTCSA. Commission decision of 
16.5.00 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
(case IV/34.018). Not yet published. 
Amino Acids. Commission decision 
of 7.6.00 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (case Comp/36.545). 
Not yet published. 
Nathan ­ Bricolla. Commission 
decision of 5.7.00 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (case Comp/36.516). 
Not yet published. 
3 Mid­September 2000. 
explains in some detail the steps 
to be followed in a given case to 
set the level of fines in 
accordance with the Guidelines. 
Section III lists conclusions in 
the decisions adopted so far on 
the assessment of the three 
elements that define "gravity" 
and deals also briefly with 
duration. Section IV deals with 
aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances. Finally, Section 
V examines how the excessive 
duration of the Commission's 
proceedings is being taken into 
account in the calculation of 
fines. 
The description that follows is 
more of a qualitative than a 
quantitative nature. Hence, final 
amounts of fines are not 
included. In addition, this article 
does not discuss the elements on 
which the decision to impose a 
fine in a given case is based (i.e. 
what makes the Commission go 
beyond a declaratory negative 
decision). Finally, this article 
will be followed by another one 
dealing with the application of 





The calculation of the fine in a 
decision follows several steps: 
A. Gravity 
First a starting amount is decided 
on the basis of the overall 
4 Commission Notice on the non­
imposition or reduction of fines in 
cartel cases. OJ C207/4 of 18.7.96. 
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gravity of the infringement. The 
determination of the overall 
gravity depends on the nature of 
the infringement, the geographic 
market affected and the impact 
of the infringement on the 
market. Three non-overlapping 
ranges for likely starting 
amounts are defined in the 
Guidelines: Minor (€ 1 000 to 
€ 1 million), serious (€ 1 million 
to € 20 million) and very serious 
(over € 20 million). In cartel 
cases involving firms of very 
different sizes, the starting 
amount could be differentiated 
taking into account the relative 
sizes of the cartel members5. 
Sometimes, in order to achieve a 
sufficient degree of deterrence, 
the starting amount correspon­
ding to a multi-product/ 
multinational finn could be 
increased. This has been done so 
far by means of applying a 
multiplying factor to the starting 
amount for such a firm6. 
5 In order to do so, a limited number 
of groups are defined in accordance 
with the distribution of turnovers in 
the relevant market (usually: large 
firms, medium firms, small firms). 
Firms are then put in one of the 
groups. Finally a series of 
weightings are first defined - largely 
on the basis of the relationship 
between the market share of the 
largest company in the cartel and a 
measure of market share 
representative of the firms 
belonging to a given group - and 
then applied to each group. 
" This was first applied in the Pre-
insulaled pipes case, where ABB's 
starting amount was increased by 
250%. 
B. Duration 
Additional amounts are added to 
the starting amount in view of 
the duration of the infringement. 
The Guidelines include three 
categories of increases regarding 
the duration (short, medium and 
long duration). However, in 
many cases so far, a 10% 
increase per year has been added 
for infringements that lasted 
more than a year. 
C. Basic amount 
The addition of the starting 
amount and the increase 
resulting from duration 
constitutes the basic amount of 
the fine per company. 
D. Aggravating and attenua­
ting circumstances 
The basic amount is then first 
increased should aggravating 
circumstances exist and then 
reduced should attenuating 
circumstances exist7. In practice, 
a percentage increase, reflecting 
aggravating circumstances, is 
applied to the basic amount. 
Then a percentage decrease, 
reflecting attenuating circums­
tances, is deducted from the 
previous amount. The result is an 
individual modification to the 
basic amount of the fine. 
Whereas "gravity" and "duration" 
refer to the infringement as a whole, 
"aggravating" and "attenuating" 
circumstances deal with the specific 
role performed by each firm 
participating in the infringement. 
E. Leniency 
In cartel cases only8, the 
following step is to apply, where 
there is active and continued co­
operation by firms with the 
Commission in order to establish 
the infringement, a further 
percentage reduction in 
application of any of the sections 
of the Leniency Notice. 
F. Excessive duration of the 
Commission's proceedings 
A further reduction (in 
accordance with current practice 
€100 000 per firm) may be 
applied where the proceedings in 
a case have exceeded a period of 
time that could be considered 
reasonable and the Commission 
is responsible for that delay. 
G. Adjustment to 10% to 
overall turnover 
This preliminary final amount is 
lastly compared with the overall 
turnover of firms in order to 
verify whether the 10% upper 
threshold in Article 15(2) of 
Regulation 17 is not exceeded. If 
so, the amount is replaced by 
that corresponding to 10% of 
overall turnover. 
Section III 
Assessment of gravity and 
duration 
This section summarises how 
gravity and duration have been 
Active co-operation with the 
Commission in other types of cases 
can be regarded as an attenuating 
circumstance where appropriate. 
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assessed in negative decisions 
with fines. The table shows cases 
ordered by category of gravity 
and in chronological order 
within the category. 
The table does not include the 
case World Cup 98 in which a 
symbolic fine of € 1000 was 
imposed. In doing so the 
Commission recognised, among 
other considerations, the 
importance of security 
considerations for the 
organisation of very important 
sport events. A symbolic fine 
was also imposed on Bricolux in 
the Nathan-Bricolux case. The 
reasons for doing so in the latter 
case were as follows: the small 
size of Bricolux; its full co-
operation with the Commission 
(including the submission of 
pieces of evidence without 
which the infringement could not 
have been established); the 
limitation to one competing 
distributor of the retaliatory 
Assessment of Gravity 
measures requested of Nathan; 
and the discretion of the 
Commission regarding symbolic 
fines. 
The table does not mention 
duration. As indicated above, in 
many cases an increase of 10% 
per year has been applied in 
those cases where the duration of 















Virgin - BA 
Nature 
Particularly serious 
(obstruction of parallel 
exports and of cross 
deliveries within the 
dealer network) 
Very serious abuse 
Very serious (cartel) 
Very serious (cartel 
intended to jeopardise 
the proper functioning 
of the single market) 
Very serious (price 




Very serious (abuse) 
Serious (abuse) 
Very serious (price 
cartel) 






Italy, but also 
Germany and Austria 
Very serious 
Substantial part of the 
EU 





Very serious (more 
than 1 Member State) 
Serious (UK) 
Limited part of the 






Evidence of list 
price increases 
The specific impact 
of the infringement 
on the market has 
been limited 
The cartel had an 
impact 






to prove a very 
serious impact 
Limited 
Assumed effects on 
UK economy. 


























agreement not to 
discount) 




The Netherlands (or 
even some regions 
only) 
North Europe - Far 
East sea routes 
France and French 
speaking Belgium 
Raised barriers to 
entry to the Dutch 
market 
Agreement was 
very short lived. 
FETTCSA 
agreement 








Aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances 
This section describes 
aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances applied in 
negative decisions with fines 
adopted to date. 
Following the entry into force of 
the Guidelines on fines, 
aggravating and/or attenuating 
circumstances have been applied 
in the following cases: Alloy 
Surcharges, Volkswagen, British 
Sugar, Pre-insulated Pipes, 
Greek ferries, FEG-TU, 
Seamless Steel Tubes, 
FETTCSA, Amino Acids and 
Nathan-Bricolux9. 
Where possible, the percentages or 
amounts applied will be mentioned. 
However, in several cases only 
global percentages by company are 
mentioned in the decision, without 
further differentiation between 




The following aggravating 
circumstances have been applied 
in the above cases: 
A.l attempts to obstruct the 
Commission 
This circumstance was first 
applied in the Pre-insulated 
Pipes case, and was part of the 
global 30% increase imposed on 
the Henss firm. 
In Greek Ferries, an increase of 
10% was imposed on Minoan for 
the same reason. 
A.2 role of leader/instigator/ 
major player 
In the Alloy Surcharge case, an 
increase of 25% was imposed on 
Usinor in view of the fact that it 
played a major role in the 
concerted action. It was that 
company that made the 
calculation of the surcharge and 
sent it - together with the 
conclusions of the meeting - to 
all producers involved. 
In British Sugar, British Sugar 
was subjected to an increase for 
being the instigator and driving 
force behind the infringement. 
This aggravating circumstance, 
together with the other two 
mentioned below, resulted in a 
75% increase to that firm's fine. 
In Pre-insulated Pipes, ABB 
was found to be the 
instigator/ring leader of the 
cartel. This aggravating 
circumstance, together with the 
other three mentioned below, 
resulted in a 50% increase to that 
firm's fine. In the same case, 
Henss also received an increase 
for being the first lieutenant to 
ABB in the enforcement of the 
cartel. 
In Greek Ferries, Minoan also 
received a 25% increase for 
being the instigator of the cartel. 
Finally, in the Amino Acids case 
both ADM and Ajinomoto were 
subjected to a 50% increase for 
acting as leaders of the lysine 
cartel. 
A.3 retaliatory measures 
Volkswagen received a 20% 
increase resulting from two 
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aggravating circumstances. First, 
Volkswagen took advantage of 
its power over its dealers to 
enforce the measures adopted to 
impede sales of its cars in Italy 
to foreigners. Secondly, 
Volkswagen terminated several 
dealership contracts and 
threatened many other dealers. 
Furthermore, part of the increase 
of the original fine imposed on 
most companies in the Pre-
insulated Pipes case was due to 
their active participation in the 
retaliatory measures and the 
boycott against Powerpipe. 
A.4 other 
This category has in fact been 
used in three of the above cases: 
• The second aggravating 
circumstance in Volkswagen 
was the fact that the company 
did not put an end to the 
infringement despite two 
warning letters sent by the 
Commission in 1995. 
• In British Sugar, the fact that 
British Sugar had violated 
first Article 82 and then 
Article 81 in the same market 
was considered an 
aggravating circumstance. 
• In addition, the fact that 
British Sugar acted in a 
manner contrary to the 
wording in its compliance 
program resulting from the 
previous Article 82 case, 
where the compliance 
program was considered an 
attenuating circumstance, was 
concluded to be a separate 
aggravating circumstance. As 
indicated above, the three 
aggravating circumstances 
resulted in a 75% increase of 
the fine. 
• In Pre-insulated Pipes, the 
deliberate continuation of the 
infringement after the 
initiation of the Commission 
proceedings was considered 
an aggravating circumstance 
which resulted in a 20% 
increase for all participating 
companies. 
B. Attenuating circumstances 
The following attenuating 
circumstances have been applied 
in the cases mentioned above: 
B.l passive role/"follow my 
leader" 
This circumstance was first 
applied in the Pre-insulated 
Pipes case. Each of Ke-Kelit and 
Sigma received a 66% reduction 
of the fine for their minor role in 
the cartel (together with the fact 
that their participation was 
limited to countries - Austria and 
Italy respectively - where district 
heating was of a very low 
importance). 
It was also applied in Greek 
Ferries where most companies 
(apart from the instigator and the 
two other most active members 
of the cartel) benefited from a 
15% reduction for their passive 
role. 
In Amino Acids, Sewon 
benefited from a 20% reduction 
of the increase that would 
otherwise have resulted from the 
duration of its involvement in 
the lysine cartel. The 
Commission accepted that from 
a given point in time, the firm 
changed its behaviour from an 
active to a passive member of 
the cartel. That meant in practice 
that the 40% increase resulting 





In the Pre-insulated Pipes case, 
KWH was granted a 20% 
reduction for not participating in 
the retaliatory measures and the 
boycott against Powerpipe. 
B.3 termination of the 
infringement as soon as 
the Commission 
intervenes 
This circumstance was used for 
the first time in FETTCSA. All 
the shipping lines were granted a 
20% reduction for terminating 
the infringement as soon as the 
Commission sent a warning 
letter. 
All companies participating in 
the lysine cartel (Amino Acids) 
benefited from a 10% reduction 
for the early tennination of the 
infringement. 
In Nathan-Bricolux, Nathan was 
granted a reduction for 
modifying its distribution 
agreements just after it received 
the statement of objections. This 
was part of the 40% reduction 
that the company was granted. 
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Β. 4 existence of reasonable 
doubts on whether the 
conduct is an 
infringement 
In Greek Ferries, all companies 
were granted a 15% discount for 
the confusion created by the 
Greek Government, which, for 
domestic ferry routes within 
Greece, had been promoting 
agreements similar to the cartel 
agreement (relating to 
Italy/Greece ferry services) that 
was prohibited in the decision. 
B.5 effective co-operation 
with the Commission 
outside the scope of the 
Leniency Notice 
In the Nathan-Bricolux10 case, 
the Commission reduced the fine 
imposed on Nathan because the 
firm co-operated with the 
Commission by providing, at the 
Commission's request, 
fundamental pieces of evidence 
without which the infringement 
could not have been established. 
The same co-operation was 
provided by Bricolux, and that 
factor was one of the 
considerations that led the 
Commission to impose a 
symbolic fine on that firm. 
B.6 Other 
ABB was allowed a € 5 million 
reduction of its fine in view of 
the monetary compensation it 
had already paid to Powerpipe. 
Furthermore, the critical 
situation of a particular sector 
Fine imposed on Nathan. Bricolux 
received a symbolic fine 
has been used twice - in cases 
concerning steel - since the entry 
into force of the Guidelines: 
• In the Alloy Surcharge case, 
the very critical situation of 
the stainless steel sector 
justified a reduction of the 
basic amount of 10% to all 
other producers involved. 
• In the Seamless steel tubes 
case, the Commission 
acknowledged that the steel 
pipe and tube industry had 
been in crisis for a long time. 
And that since 1991 in 
particular, the situation in the 
sector had deteriorated, 
which, combined with the 
growing influx of imports, 
had resulted in capacity 
reductions and plant closures. 
These considerations 
warranted a reduction of 10% 
in the basic amounts for all 
the companies involved. 
Section V 
The excessive duration of the 
Commission's proceedings 
The long duration of the 
Commission's proceedings is not 
a reason not to impose a fine, 
provided that the lapse of time 
does not exceed the limitation 
period for competition 
proceedings laid down by 
Council Regulation 1988/74." 
Article 1 of the Regulation 
provides that the Commission's 
power to impose fines is subject 
to a five-year limitation period in 
respect of Articles 81(1) and 82 
of the Treaty. The period begins 
to run on the day on which the 
11 OJ L319, 19.11.1974, p. 
infringement is committed or, in 
the case of continuing or 
repeated infringements, on the 
day on which it ends. It may, 
however, be interrupted or 
suspended, pursuant to Article 2 
or 3 respectively of the 
Regulation. Under Article 2(3) 
of the Regulation, the limitation 
period shall expire at the latest 
on the day on which a period 
equal to twice the limitation 
period has elapsed. 
However, the long duration of 
the Commission's proceedings, 
when such a delay is the 
responsibility of the 
Commission, has been used to 
reduce fines. In the FEFC 
decision of 1994, the first 
decision applying Regulation 
1017/68 to the members of a 
liner shipping conference, the 
Commission did consider the 
excessive duration of the 
proceedings in that case as one 
of the elements on which it 
based the imposition of symbolic 
fines12 of ECU 10 000 for each 
participant, despite the very 
serious nature and long duration 
of the infringement in that case. 
Subsequently, it has become part 
of the established case-law of the 
Court of Justice and of the Court 
of First Instance that the 
Commission must act within a 
reasonable time in adopting 
decisions following administra-
i o 
'~ This amount cannot be considered 
"symbolic" under the Guidelines, 
which now limit the "symbolic" fine 
to an amount off 1,000. 
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tive proceedings relating to 
competition policy13. 
Since the entry into force of the 
Guidelines, the long duration of 
the Commission's proceedings 
has been applied in two cases 
(FEG-TU and FETTCSA). In 
both cases, the firms involved 
were granted a reduction of 
€ 100 000 each. 
Section VI 
Conclusions 
The fact that the Guidelines on 
fines are working in a 
satisfactory way to establish the 
amount of fines was recently 
confirmed by the judgment of 6 
July 2000 by the Court of First 
Instance on the Volkswagen 
case, which basically supported 
the Commission findings and 
conclusions (leaving aside the 
fact that the Commission did not 
provide enough evidence to 
support the alleged duration of 
the infringement). This 
judgement was the first to deal 
with fines set under the 
Guidelines. It is the first in a 
series that are due in the next 12 
months. 
See the judgments of the Court of 
Justice in Case C-l 85/95 Ρ 
Baustahlgewebe [1998] ECR 1-8485 
and of the Court of First Instance in 
Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 
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OPINION AND COMMENTS 
In this section DG COMP officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It is 
important to recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials 
concerned. They have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be 
relied upon as a statement of the Commission's or DG COMP 's views. 
Crises bancaires : un bilan de 
l'application des règles de 
concurrence en matière d'aides d'Etat. 
Leçons de la crise du Crédit Lyonnais 
N. PESARESI - DG Comp H-3 
ET C. de LA ROCHEFORDIERE - DG Comp C-1 
Introduction 
Les années 1990 se caractérisent 
par une modification profonde 
pour le secteur bancaire 
européen. A la suite de 
l'adoption des directives 
européennes en matière 
bancaire14 le cadre législatif et 
réglementaire des systèmes 
bancaires nationaux subit des 
changements importants : les 
séparations institutionnelles 
entre les établissements et les 
contraintes opérationnelles 
tombent progressivement, les 
marchés se décloisonnent, le 
progrès technologique ouvre des 
nouvelles possibilités 
commerciales, les équilibres 
consolidés et les positions 
acquises sont bousculés, les 
pressions concurrentielles 
augmentent partout en Europe 
Il s'agit d'un ensemble très large de 
directives d'harmonisation. Les plus 
importantes, pour ce qui nous 
concerne, sont probablement les 
directives n° 89/299 du 17 avril 
1989, sur les fonds propres des 
établissements de crédit, n° 89/647 
du 18 décembre 1989 sur un ratio de 
solvabilité pour les établissements 
de crédit, et n° 89/646 du 15 
décembre 1989, dite «deuxième 
directive de coordination ». 
avec l'achèvement du marché 
unique des capitaux. 
L'exigence d'une restructuration 
de chaque banque et de 
l'ensemble du secteur est rendue 
plus urgente par la crise 
économique du début des années 
1990. Le retard pris par certains 
établissements, notamment les 
banques publiques, dans leur 
adaptation au nouvel 
environnement bancaire, a des 
conséquences parfois 
dramatiques. Certains Etats 
membres15, comme la France et 
l'Italie, vivent des crises aiguës, 
pour un ensemble de causes, 
notamment l'éclatement de 
bulles spéculatives et l'influence 
des pouvoirs publics sur le 
secteur bancaire, impliquant un 
certain laxisme de la gestion des 
établissements bancaires publics 
dû à la garantie implicite de 
l'Etat, prêteur en dernier ressort. 
La Commission, confrontée à 
ces crises, doit alors créer une 
jurisprudence sur l'application 
5 D'autres Etats membres, comme les 
pays nordiques, ont vécu des crises 
importantes, mais avant leur entrée 
dans l'union européenne. 
de l'article 87 (anciennement 92) 
dans de telles situations. 
L'analyse qui suit retrace 
brièvement la ligne qu'a 
progressivement définie la 
Commission dans le traitement 
de ces crises, principalement 
celle du Crédit Lyonnais. Elle se 
fonde sur les décisions d'aides 
d'Etat en matière bancaire 
adoptées par la Commission 
dans la dernière décennie. Il 
s'agit d'une période 
suffisamment longue, 
caractérisée par une nombre 
significatif de crises bancaires 
accompagnées par des aides 
d'Etat, nous permettant de tirer 
quelques enseignements utiles. 
Ce bilan ne saurait être exhaustif 
et ne traite que les aspects les 
plus importants. D'autres aspects 
complexes ou spécifiques, tels 
que le caractère d'aides ou, le 
cas échéant, la compatibilité des 
mécanismes de fonds de garantie 
des dépôts avec les règles du 
traité, ne peuvent pas être 
examinés dans le cadre de cet 
article et devront éventuellement 
par la suite faire l'objet 
d'analyses séparées. 
Les principales crises 
La Commission a examiné sur la 
période 1990-1999 environ une 
dizaine de crises bancaires ayant 
reçu un support externe. Les cas 
principaux sont repris dans le 
tableau suivant: 
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Tableau I : Cas principaux d'aides d'Etat examinés par la Commission (1990-1999). 
Banque Date Total du Aide Forme du soutien 




Comptoir des Entrepreneurs 
(FR) 
Crédit Lyonnais I 
(FR) 
Crédit Lyonnais II 
(FR) 
Crédit Lyonnais III 
(FR) 
GAN - CIC 
(FR) 




Crédit Foncier de France 
(FR) 
Banco di Napoli 
(IT) 












































Augmentation de capital +prêt 
du Fonds de garantie des dépôts 
Augmentation de capital et 
défaisance 
Augmentation de capital et 
défaisance 
Modification de la défaisance -
extension des pertes de la 
défaisance 
Extension des pertes de la 
défaisance 
Augmentation de capital et 
garantie 
Augmentations de capital 
Augmentation de capital 
Augmentation de capital et 
garantie 
Augmentation de capital et 
défaisance 
Augmentation de capital + 
couverture pertes de liquidation 
(') La première date est celle de la mise en place du plan d'aides, la seconde celle de la décision de la Commission. 
La plupart des cas examinés 
concernent des établissements 
publics (Crédit Lyonnais, 
Société Marseillaise de Crédit, 
GAN, Comptoir des 
Entrepreneurs) ou tombant sous 
l'influence des pouvoirs publics 
(CFF, Banco di Napoli et Banco 
di Sicilia). La Commission a été 
également amenée à évaluer le 
sauvetage de la banque privée 
Banesto par le Fonds de Garantie 
des Dépôts espagnol, mais elle a 
conclu que la banque n'avait pas 
reçu d'aides d'Etat16. 
Dans un certain nombre de cas, 
concernant de facto toujours des 
banques privées, l'institution en 
difficulté est laissée partir en 
faillite17 ; dans d'autres cas18, 
' " Communiqué de presse IP/94/1226 
du 15 décembre, 1994. 
' ' Voir par exemple Barings au 
Royaume Uni et la Banque Pallas 
Stern en France. 
'° Voir par exemple en Espagne le 
sauvetage de Banesto par le Fonds 
celle-ci reçoit un soutien à des 
conditions acceptables pour un 
investisseur privé opérant dans 
une économie de marché19. Par 
de Garantie des Dépôts. Ce cas 
représente un point de comparaison 
important pour la Commission, 
puisqu' il montre qu'il est possible 
d'éviter des crises bancaires 
majeures sans avoir nécessairement 
recours à des aides d'Etat. 
La définition d'aide d'Etat implique 
que l'entreprise reçoit un soutien 
qu'un investisseur privé n'aurait 
jamais octroyé en raison de ses 
perspectives de rentabilité 
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contre, face aux crises bancaires, 
le recours aux aides d'Etat, pour 
sauver des institutions 
défaillantes et pour en 
accompagner la restructuration 
est la solution la plus fréquente 
dans le cas de crises touchant des 
banques publiques. Il n'est 
toutefois pas toujours inévitable. 
Les cas tombant sous le coup de 
l'article 87 du Traité ne 
concernent que des banques 
auxquelles l'Etat octroie un 
avantage distorsif pour la 
concurrence. 
Dans de telles circonstances, les 
critères appliqués par la 
Commission sont indiqués dans 
les lignes directrices sur les aides 
au sauvetage et à la 
restructuration des entreprises en 
difficulté20. Il s'agit, notamment, 
d'assurer que l'aide soit limitée 
au strict nécessaire, subordonnée 
à la réalisation d'un plan de 
restructuration en mesure 
d'assurer le retour à la viabilité 
dans un laps de temps 
raisonnable, et à la fourniture de 
contreparties suffisantes pour 
compenser les concurrents pour 
les distorsions causées par l'aide. 
1.0.0.0. Le cas Crédit 
Lyonnais 
Le cas du Crédit Lyonnais est 
emblématique non seulement par 
sa gravité, puisque l'aide à la 
banque, de plus de 100 milliards 
de francs français, aura dépassé 
insuffisante ou de ses risques trop 
élevés. 
2 0 Voir JO C 368 du 23.12.1994 et, 
pour la dernière version, JO C 288 of 
09.10.1999. 
tous les records en la matière dans 
la Communauté, mais aussi par la 
complexité du problème posé et la 
combinaison d'aides de sauvetage 
et d'aides à la restructuration. Il a, 
plus que tout autre, contraint la 
Commission à mieux définir sa 
politique en matière d'aides dans 
ce secteur, notamment lors de 
crises bancaires brutales et 
imprévues. Aussi constate-t-on, à 
la lecture des décisions sur le 
Crédit Lyonnais adoptées par la 
Commission en 1995 et 1998, 
qu'elle fait une large part à des 
considérations à caractère général 
sur les justifications possibles des 
interventions publiques dans les 
crises bancaires, leurs modalités 
et leurs effets di storsifs pour le 
reste du secteur bancaire. Ces 
décisions constituent à bien des 
égards des textes ayant valeur de 
lignes directrices en matière 
d'aides au secteur bancaire, dans 
les cas de restructurations de 
banques en difficulté. 
Le Crédit Lyonnais est, à la fin de 
1993, le premier groupe bancaire 
européen en termes d'actif total 
(presque 2.000 milliards de FF). Il 
compte alors plus de 71.000 
employés, 900 agences en Europe 
hors France et 800 dans le reste 
du monde. Son actionnaire 
majoritaire est l'Etat français, 
directement ou indirectement par 
l'intermédiaire du groupe public 
Thomson et de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations. 
A la suite de pertes importantes 
enregistrées en 1992 et en 1993, 
risquant de provoquer une 
insuffisance de fonds propres au 
regard des exigences 
réglementaires prudentielles 
européennes21, l'Etat décide dans 
un premier temps de procéder à 
une augmentation du capital de 
4,9 milliards de francs, effective 
fin 1994, puis de prendre à sa 
charge les provisions pour risques 
estimées à environ 42,7 milliards 
de francs sur des actifs 
immobiliers non performants 
transférés dans une société 
spécifique de cantonnement. 
Toutefois, la crise est à cette 
époque gravement sous estimée : 
elle n'est pas due seulement aux 
pertes très importantes de la 
banque sur ses actifs immobiliers, 
mais aussi aux pertes 
considérables générées par les 
prises de participations 
hasardeuses prises par la banque 
dans tous les secteurs de 
l'économie à la fin des années 
1980 et au tournant des années 
1990. De plus, l'activité de la 
banque en France, en raison de la 
lourdeur des frais généraux, n'est 
pas rentable et fait preuve de sa 
vulnérabilité face au retournement 
de conjoncture de 1992-1993, qui 
provoque la première récession 
dans l'hexagone depuis 1945. 
Début 1995, il apparaît que les 
pertes ont été très sous-estimées, 
que les nouvelles provisions 
nécessaires et les pertes qui 
s'ensuivront mettent en péril la 
solvabilité de la banque : en 
l'absence d'aides, il n'y aurait 
alors pas d'autre alternative que la 
liquidation de la banque, option 
unanimement écartée par les 
responsables des pouvoirs publics 
2 1 L'insuffisance des provisions 
passées pour l'exercice 1992 fait 
aujourd'hui l'objet de procédures 
pour présentation de faux bilan 
instruites par la justice française. 
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français. L'Etat met alors en place 
un nouveau plan de redressement, 
avec la création d'une autre 
structure spécifique dite de 
défaisance, composée d'une part 
d'une structure de cantonnement, 
le Consortium de Réalisation 
(CDR). destinée à reprendre les 
actifs compromis du Crédit 
Lyonnais, y inclus les actifs 
immobiliers déjà mentionnés, et 
d'autre part d'une holding, la 
SPBI, ensuite transformée en 
l'Etablissement Public de 
Financement ec de Participation 
(EPFR), chargée d'assurer le 
financement de la défaisance par 
des fonds d'origine budgétaires. 
Ainsi, 190 milliards d'actifs 
« douteux » du Crédit Lyonnais 
sont sortis du bilan de la banque 
avec 55 milliards de francs de 
passifs qui leur sont attachés. 
O R G A N I G R A M M E DE LA S T R U C T U R E DE D E F A I S A N C E 
R e c a p i t a l i s a t i o n 
C R E D I T 
L Y O N N A I S 
E T A T D o t a t i o n s b u d g é t a i r e s 
Prê t 145 m i l l iards F R F 
Fi l ia le à 1 0 0 % 
A p p o r t d 'ac t i f s 1 90 M F 
E P F R 
Prêt I 4 · Pe r tes 
145 M d s I 
C D R 
c a n t o n 
D E F A I S A N C E 
Pour lui permettre d'acheter les 
actifs au Crédit Lyonnais, le CDR 
reçoit un "prêt participatif' de la 
part de l'EPFR, qui à son tour se 
refinance auprès du Crédit 
Lyonnais à travers un emprunt à 
concurrence d'un montant 
maximum de 145 milliards de 
francs. Par le mécanisme du prêt 
participatif les pertes du CDR 
ainsi que le coût du portage des 
actifs sont imputés à la charge de 
l'EPFR, donc en dernier ressort de 
l'Etat. En contrepartie il est alors 
prévu que l'EPFR bénéficie du 
produit d'une « clause de retour à 
meilleure fortune » sur les 
résultats futurs de la banque. Le 
tableau ci-dessus donne une 
représentation simplifiée du 
schéma de la défaisance. 
La Commission conduit début 
1995 une première investigation 
sur les aides au Crédit Lyonnais. 
Les autorités françaises nient que 
leur intervention constitue une 
aide d'Etat, parce que le plan en 
permettrait l'autofinancement. La 
Commission n'étant pas du même 
avis, elle exige la présentation 
d'un plan de restructuration du 
Crédit Lyonnais. Les autorités 
présentent finalement un plan 
portant sur plusieurs mesures de 
recentrage stratégique, de cession 
de filiales, de réduction des coûts, 
de maîtrise et contrôle des risques. 
Ces mesures devaient permettre 
au Crédit Lyonnais d'afficher des 
résultats positifs à partir de 1995 
et une rentabilité sur les fonds 
propres supérieure à 12% à la fin 
de 1999. Vu l'importance des 
coûts du système pour l'Etat 
globalement estimés à 45 
milliards de francs, la 
Commission exige une réduction 
avant fin 1998 d'au moins 35% de 
la présence commerciale de la 
banque à l'étranger. Les autorités 
françaises s'y engagent, et 
prévoient en particulier une 
réduction de la présence 
commerciale du Crédit Lyonnais 
hors de France en Europe de 50% 
en termes de bilan. 
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Compte tenu de ces engagements, 
ce premier épisode de la crise se 
conclut sur une décision favorable 
de la Commission, qui décide22 le 
26 juillet 1995 d'approuver sous 
condition les aides octroyées par 
l'Etat français au Crédit Lyonnais 
en 1994 et 1995 en les 
considérant comme compatibles 
avec le marché commun23. La 
décision de la Commission de 
1995 prévoit que si les coûts du 
système sont dépassés, il y aura 
lieu de réexaminer l'importance 
de la réduction de la présence 
commerciale du Crédit Lyonnais, 
disposition qui prendra par la 
suite un caractère crucial. Afin 
d'éviter des conflits d'intérêt dans 
la gestion des actifs cantonnés, 
elle impose une stricte séparation 
entre la gestion de la banque et du 
CDR, qui est alors une filiale à 
100% du Crédit Lyonnais, non 
consolidée dans les comptes de la 
banque parce que ses pertes sont 
imputées à l'Etat : cette coupure 
chirurgicale fera par la suite 
l'objet de nombreuses critiques en 
raison du manque de préparation 
des nouvelles équipes du CDR et 
de la perte de mémoire 
institutionnelle sur les actifs 
cantonnés qui résulte de cette 
séparation. 
Dès l'année qui suit, le 
redressement de la banque 
s'avère plus difficile que prévu, 
et les pertes très sous-estimées. 
Mi-septembre 1996, les autorités 
11 J.O.L 308 du 21.12.1995, p. 92. 
2 j Sur la base de l'article 87 (auparavant 
article 92), paragraphe 3, lettre c) du 
Traité CE, et notamment avec les 
lignes directrices communautaires 
pour les aides d'Etat au sauvetage et à 
la restructuration des entreprises en 
difficulté. 
françaises notifient « en 
catastrophe » à la Commission 
de nouvelles aides d'urgence en 
faveur du CL, pour un montant 
de presque 4 milliards de francs 
français, en lui demandant de les 
approuver en quelques jours 
pour que la banque puisse 
rapidement afficher des comptes 
bénéficiaires et ainsi rassurer les 
marchés financiers. Sans de 
telles aides, une nouvelle 
dégradation de la notation de la 
banque par les agences de rating 
semble inévitable. Une telle 
dégradation apparaît redoutable 
et peut provoquer rapidement la 
défiance des marchés et 
l'insolvabilité de la banque. Des 
conséquences négatives pour 
d'autres établissements 
financiers français ne sont pas à 
exclure, et le spectre d'une crise 
systémique est évoqué. 
Les mesures envisagées 
consistent en un rehaussement de 
la rémunération du prêt du 
Crédit Lyonnais à l'EPFR et en 
l'abandon d'une partie du plan 
de restructuration de 1995 qui 
prévoyait la souscription de 10 
milliards d'obligations coupon-
zéro par l'EPFR. En fait, face 
aux résultats moins bons que 
prévus sur les autres activités, le 
mécanisme de rémunération du 
prêt à l'EPFR fait peser sur le 
Crédit Lyonnais une charge nette 
importante, d'un montant de 
plusieurs milliards de francs par 
an. Cette « punition de la 
banque » en vue de la faire 
contribuer au coût du sauvetage, 
voulue par le ministère des 
finances, et qui comporte un 
élément d'incertitude contingent 
à l'évolution des taux, apparaît a 
posteriori comme une erreur 
majeure du plan de sauvetage de 
la banque de 1995. 
Compte tenu des particularités du 
secteur bancaire ainsi que la 
situation du Crédit Lyonnais, la 
Commission décide dans 
l'urgence, le 25 septembre 1996. 
quelques jours après la 
notification des aides de 
sauvetage et sous une pression 
unique dans des décisions de ce 
type, que les aides d'urgence en 
faveur de la banque peuvent être 
déclarées compatibles avec le 
marché commun car elles 
respectent les principes 
fondamentaux de l'encadrement 
pour les aides au sauvetage en ce 
qu'elles n'ont d'autre effet que le 
maintien du status quo ante24. 
Bien que les procédures aient été 
respectées, et la Commission se 
soit assurée de l'avis formel du 
Gouverneur de la Banque de 
France sur l'urgence, la nécessité 
et la pertinence des mesures 
d'urgence en faveur du Crédit 
Lyonnais, les conditions quasi 
chaotiques dans lesquelles il faut 
prendre cette décision, sans que 
les autorités aient préalablement 
informé la Commission alors 
qu'elles étaient au courant depuis 
le printemps de la même année de 
la gravité de la situation, 
laisseront des traces : elles ne 
seront pas sans conséquences sur 
les suites de l'instruction de 
l'affaire Crédit Lyonnais à la 
Commission et justifient la 
fermeté et l'impatience croissante 
du commissaire Van Miert sur 
cette affaire. 
Commence alors le troisième et 
dernier acte de l'affaire Crédit 
2 4 J.O.C 390 du 24.12.1996, p. 7. 
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Lyonnais : en même temps 
qu*elle approuve les mesures de 
sauvetage, la Commission décide 
de rouvrir le dossier23 pour 
l'extension des mêmes mesures 
au-delà de 1996, étant donné leur 
effet sur la restructuration du 
Crédit Lyonnais, en se réservant 
le droit d'examiner la 
compatibilité de toute mesure 
d'aide et de restructuration en 
faveur du Crédit Lyonnais, y 
compris celles qui avaient fondé 
la décision de 1995. Trois 
problèmes majeurs sont alors 
posés: l'évaluation des aides, 
l'analyse du nouveau plan de 
viabilité de l'entreprise et la 
recherche de contreparties 
adéquates face au montant des 
aides. 
L'évaluation exacte des aides est 
difficile dans le cadre de la mise 
en place d'un système de 
défaisance, qui pai" sa nature a 
pour but de reporter la charge 
budgétaire en étalant sur plusieurs 
années les moins-values et les 
pertes dont une partie n'est même 
pas chiffrable. De plus, alors que 
la procédure est en cours et que le 
nouveau plan de restructuration 
n'est toujours pas notifié à la 
Commission, on apprend au 
printemps 1997 que les pertes du 
CDR, initialement prévues à 60 
milliards de francs dans le plan de 
1995, seront finalement de l'ordre 
de 100 milliards de francs : d'un 
seul coup les aides font un bond 
de 40 milliards de francs, toutes 
les prévisions les plus pessimistes 
sont dépassées, et ce alors qu'un 
précédent ministre de l'économie, 
M. Alphandéry, avait annoncé 
--' la procédure prévue à l'article 88 
(auparavant article 93) du Traité 
que le sauvetage du Crédit 
Lyonnais ne coûterait « pas un 
sou » au contribuable. 
La Commission arrive finalement 
en 1998 à la conclusion que les 
aides supplémentaires en faveur 
du Crédit Lyonnais ne peuvent 
être estimées qu'à l'aide d'une 
très large fourchette, d'environ 
53-98 milliards de francs en 
valeur actualisée, qui s'ajoutent 
aux 45 milliards approuvés en 
1995 et aux 4 milliards approuvés 
en 1996. La largeur de cette 
fourchette est due au caractère 
incertain du montant des pertes 
in fine à la charge du CDR, sur 
lequel les autorités françaises 
n'ont pas su prendre aucun 
engagement de plafonnement (la 
garantie de l'Etat sur l'EPFR est 
illimitée). Elle a aussi pour la 
Commission un caractère 
conservatoire pour éviter, 
comme en 1995, une sous-
estimation, et faire en sorte que 
cette décision sur le Crédit 
Lyonnais soit bien la dernière 
qu'elle ait à prendre. Les 
estimations de la Commission 
sont vivement contestées par les 
autorités françaises, comme en 
témoigne le texte de la 
décision26 de mai 1998. Une 
estimation élevée à titre 
conservatoire (c'est le rôle de la 
valeur supérieure de la 
fourchette retenue par la 
Commission) a toutefois 
l'avantage de donner une 
sécurité juridique aux aides 
accordées à la banque. Sinon 
chaque dépassement du montant 
approuvé implique ex post une 
réouverture de la procédure. Un 
2 6 Cf JO L 221 du 8.8.1998, section 7. 
élément très important vient 
toutefois réduire la valeur des 
aides estimée par la 
Commission : compte tenu du 
schéma très particulier de la 
défaisance qui alloue à l'EPFR 
les revenus prévisibles de la 
privatisation de la banque, la 
valeur de la participation de 
l'Etat au sein du Crédit Lyonnais 
est prise en déduction du 
montant brut des aides. 
En deuxième lieu, il faut dans le 
courant du deuxième semestre 
1997 procéder à une évaluation 
particulièrement attentive du plan 
de restructuration et des 
perspectives de viabilité de la 
banque : les autorités françaises 
ont en effet, après de nombreuses 
tergiversations, enfin notifié en 
juillet 1997 le plan demandé en 
septembre 1996 par la 
Commission. La Commission 
décide de s'appuyer dans son 
analyse sur les conseils d'une 
banque d'affaires internationale, 
Lehman Brothers, qui est chargée 
d'examiner le plan de 
restructuration présenté par les 
autorités françaises, en ce qui 
concerne la viabilité de la banque 
et les contreparties possibles aux 
aides. La banque d'affaires 
confirme fin 1997 que le 
redressement du Crédit Lyonnais 
est possible et fournit une 
estimation révisée de la rentabilité 
attendue de la banque compte 
tenu du plan d'aides. Sur cette 
base, la Commission considérera 
par la suite qu'une partie des aides 
préconisées pai" les autorités 
françaises n'est pas strictement 
nécessaire et a, par conséquent, 
limitera la « neutralisation » 
voulue par les autorités françaises 
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des effets financiers liés au prêt 
du Crédit Lyonnais à l'EPFR. 
Finalement, la Commission 
recherche, face à des aides si 
importantes, des contreparties 
significatives ­ tout en s'assurant 
qu'elles ne mettent pas en péril 
la viabilité de l'entreprise ­
destinées à apporter aux 
concurrents de l'entreprise aidée 
une compensation atténuant les 
effets distorsifs des aides. Il 
s'agira fin 1997 et début 1998 du 
point d'achoppement principal 
d'un accord sur le nouveau plan. 
La Commission lors des 
discussions avec les autorités 
françaises considère alors en 
première analyse que la totalité 
des activités du Crédit Lyonnais 
en Europe (hors de France), soit 
620 milliards de francs, doit être 
cédée ou fermée au titre de 
toutes les aides reçues par le 
Crédit Lyonnais. Ce montant, 
qui inclut les cessions de 310 
milliards de francs imposées au 
Crédit Lyonnais au titre de la 
décision de 1995, se traduit par 
une réduction de plus du tiers du 
bilan du Crédit Lyonnais, tel 
qu'il était évalué au 31 décembre 
1994. Il est finalement convenu 
dans la décision du 20 mai 1998 
que, bien que l'essentiel du 
réseau européen de la banque de 
détail doive être cédé, le Crédit 
Lyonnais pourra cependant 
garder ses activités de marché 
(Londres et Francfort) et ses 
activités de gestion privée 
(Suisse et Luxembourg). A la 
place, les autorités françaises 
prennent des engagements de 
cessions et fermetures en France 
et dans le reste du monde, pour 
un montant équivalent. Ce 
processus de réduction du bilan 
de la banque est par la suite 
complètement mis en œuvre 
dans les deux années qui suivent 
Un effort supplémentaire de la 
banque sur son réseau en France 
est demandé en vue de libérer 
des parts de marché pour les 
concurrents dans l'hexagone, 
plus particulièrement touchés par 
les distorsions de concurrence 
provoquées par les aides. Le plan 
de restructuration présenté par 
les autorités françaises en juillet 
1997 impliquait une réduction à 
2.146 en l'an 2000 du nombre 
des points de vente de la banque 
en France, soit une réduction de 
6,6% par rapport au nombre de 
points de vente de 1996. La 
Commission finit par obtenir une 
réduction supplémentaire de 
presque 296 points de vente, 
correspondant à une réduction 
totale du réseau d'agences du 
Crédit Lyonnais en France de 
l'ordre de 20% par rapport au 
niveau de 1996. 
Afin de maintenir un effet de 
bridage sur le CL, plusieurs 
mesures sont également prévues, 
notamment le plafonnement à 
3,2% par an de la croissance du 
bilan consolidé (à périmètre 
constant) du CL entre la fin de 
l'année 1998 et la fin de l'année 
200127. 
Enfin, les autorités françaises 
s'engagent à privatiser la 
banque : la Commission n'a pas 
fait de la privatisation un 
préalable aux discussions qu'elle 
a eues avec les autorités, mais 
27 J.O. L221 du 8.8.1998. 
considère dans sa décision de 
mai 1998 qu'il s'agit d'une 
mesure importante pour mettre 
fin aux rapports incestueux entre 
la banque et les pouvoirs publics, 
s'étant traduits par une garantie 
de facto de toute le bilan de la 
banque aux frais de l'Etat et 
donc des contribuables. A la 
suite de la décision, la procédure 
de privatisation du CL est lancée 
début 1999. Les autorités 
françaises annoncent le 27 mai 
1999 la composition du noyau 
dur: Crédit Agricole (10%), 
AGF (6%), AXA (5.5%), 
Commerzbank (4%), BBV 
(3.7%) Banca Intesa (2.7%). Le 
placement sur le marché 
d'environ 50% du capital est 
achevé début juillet 1999 avec 
trois mois d'avance sur la limite 
prévue par les engagements de la 
France. La souscription du titre 
rencontre un grand succès, 3,4 
millions de particuliers s'étant 
portés acquéreurs. En 1999, la 
banque affiche un bénéfice net 
de 553 millions d'euro et un taux 
de retour sur fonds propres de 
10%. 
Ainsi prend fin la plus grande 
crise bancaire de l'histoire de la 
Communauté. 
1.0.0.1. L'application aux 
banques des règles 
sur les aides d'Etat 
L'application aux établissements 
de crédit du droit de concurrence 
concernant les aides d'Etat a été 
au départ influencée par ce qui, à 
tort ou à raison, fait considérer le 
secteur bancaire comme différent 
des autres. Longuement 
réglementé dans chaque détail, 
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peu exposé à la concurrence 
internationale, utilisé comme 
instrument de politique 
économique, le secteur bancaire 
européen n'a pas connu avant les 
années 1990 de crises majeures 
ayant un impact au niveau 
communautaire. L'article 87 du 
Traité a été par conséquent 
appliqué très rarement. La 
libéralisation des mouvements 
des capitaux, les nouvelles règles 
prudentielles et les progrès 
technologiques ont eu pour effet 
d'augmenter considérablement 
l'impact distorsif sur la 
concurrence d'une aide à une 
banque, même de taille modeste. 
Les crises des années 1990 sont 
un test décisif pour la politique 
de la Commission en matière 
d'aides d'Etat, mais aussi vis-à-
vis du secteur bancaire. A cette 
fin, le Commissaire Van Miert 
décide en 1994 de constituer un 
groupe de « Sages », de trois 
hauts dirigeants de banques 
centrales, pour examiner les 
problèmes des crises bancaires, 
leur impact sur le système 
économique et l'application des 
règles de concurrence aux 
établissement de crédit, 
notamment quand ils traversent 
une crise mettant en cause leur 
survie. Les « Sages » soulignent 
que les règles de concurrence 
telles qu'elles sont appliquées 
par la Commission dans d'autres 
secteurs peuvent s'appliquer aux 
établissements de crédit, tout en 
tenant compte des éléments 
spécifiques de ce secteur et 
notamment du risque d'un effet 
de contagion que la crise d'une 
banque peut avoir pour les autres 
établissements financiers. La 
Commission, sur cette base, 
considère qu'en principe les 
entreprises bancaires doivent être 
regardées comme des entreprises 
comme les autres, et la politique 
de concurrence à leur égard 
banalisée. De ce point de vue les 
différentes décisions individuelles 
prises par la Commission ont un 
caractère didactique, car elles 
exposent l'évolution de la 
politique de l'institution à l'égard 
des crises bancaires et des 
méthodes envisagées pour les 
résoudre. 
On notera d'abord que la 
Commission ne nie jamais les 
particularités du secteur bancaire, 
mais qu'elle considère que ces 
mêmes particularités ont pour 
conséquence d'augmenter le 
niveau distorsif des aides et donc 
de rendre plus important une 
application stricte des règles de 
concurrence. En effet, dans le 
secteur bancaire les conséquences 
d'un comportement fautif ou trop 
risqué d'un établissement ne se 
manifestent comptablement 
qu'après un certain laps de 
temps, laissant ainsi à la banque la 
possibilité de poursuivre des 
politiques hasardeuses pendant 
une assez longue période28. Les 
distorsions sont plus aiguës du fait 
que la nature particulière d'une 
institution financière de taille 
importante peut rendre une 
liquidation plus difficile, voire 
impossible (argument connu 
comme « too big to fail ») en 
raison des remous que créerait 
une telle liquidation sur les 
marchés. L'asymétrie des 
-a On notera que le cycle des crises 
bancaires est toujours décalé de 
quelques années par rapport au cycle 
économique général. 
conditions d'entrée et de sortie du 
secteur bancaire qui en résulte est 
de nature à provoquer un 
encombrement artificiel du 
secteur, avec des pressions 
accrues sur les marges et la 
rentabilité des établissements 
sains. 
Pour ces raisons, il est essentiel 
que les aides à une banque en 
difficulté soient conditionnées à 
des mesures de restructuration 
radicales, ayant pour but à la fois 
le redressement de l'entreprise et 
l'adaptation de son système de 
« corporate governance ». A cet 
égard il est nécessaire que les 
actionnaires supportent les 
conséquences financières de la 
crise, qu'il y ait un changement 
du management de l'entreprise, de 
son système de contrôle, et dans 
bien des cas de sa propriété. En 
outre, des contreparties 
particulièrement importantes sont 
nécessaires pour compenser les 
concurrents des effets distorsifs 
accrus des aides. 
L'ampleur unique des pertes 
occasionnées par le sauvetage du 
Crédit Lyonnais s'explique en 
partie par la carence des moyens 
de contrôle de l'Etat actionnaire 
sur l'entreprise et le retard avec 
lequel les premières mesures 
importantes de restructuration 
ont été prises. Ainsi que la 
Commission l'a noté dans sa 
décision de 1998, cette carence 
de gouvernement d'entreprise a 
été accentuée par la « confusion 
des rôles de l'Etat actionnaire, 
de / 'Etat entrepreneur, de / 'Etat 
providence et de l'Etat 
régulateur, confusion qui a 
conduit l'Etat actionnaire à 
laisser dégénérer une situation 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 19 
» OPINION AND COMMENTS 
d'une gravité inédite, contraire à 
ses intérêts patrimoniaux ». 
Dans le cas d'espèce, le soutien 
implicite ou explicite de l'Etat a 
eu pour effet de permettre au 
Crédit Lyonnais de se lancer 
dans la politique hasardeuse et à 
entreprendre avec retard et sans 
la détermination nécessaire son 
redressement. Une telle 
protection est d'autant plus grave 
qu'elle se répercute en chaîne sur 
le comportement des acteurs : elle 
limite l'incitation normale pour 
les créanciers à contrôler le 
comportement de leurs débiteurs, 
pennettant ainsi aux 
établissements de ne plus être 
soumis au contrôle et à la sanction 
normale des marchés et ayant 
pour conséquence "d'inciter à une 
mauvaise gestion des 
établissements de crédit" 29. 
L'ampleur de la crise du Crédit 
Lyonnais s'explique certes par la 
convergence entre la crise de 
l'immobilier, la crise de 
conjoncture de 1992-93 et 
l'apparition des pertes sur les 
participations de la banque : mais, 
à la racine, elle est largement 
imputable à cet effet pervers ou 
aléa moral (« moral hazard »). Les 
agences de rating elles-mêmes ont 
en permanence tenu compte de la 
garantie implicite de l'Etat sur la 
banque pour ne pas dégrader 
encore plus sa notation, qui, si tel 
avait été le cas, aurait été 
déclassée en « speculative 
grade », ce qui veut dire que le 
29 Comme affirmé par le Parlement 
européen et le Conseil de l'Union 
européenne dans la directive 
94/19/CE (J.O. L 135 du 31.5.1994, 
p. 5) du 30 mai 1994, relative aux 
systèmes de garantie des dépôts. 
Crédit Lyonnais aurait 
immédiatement fait face à une 
crise d'illiquidite en raison de la 
défiance des marchés. 
Il convient également de 
souligner que l'effet distorsif des 
aides sur la concurrence ne 
concerne pas seulement la 
politique passée de 
l'établissement bénéficiaire des 
aides, mais peut également créer 
des anticipations sur l'avenir. La 
répétition de l'aide peut générer 
un réel laxisme et des attentes 
d'aides futures par le 
"management" de la banque, ce 
qui peut produire de nouveaux 
effets distorsifs sur la 
concurrence : alors qu'il était 
évident que la restructuration du 
réseau du Crédit Lyonnais en 
France était très insuffisante, que 
ses frais généraux étaient 
beaucoup trop élevés pour la 
rendre compétitive, et que des 
mesures beaucoup plus radicales 
auraient été nécessaires, il semble 
que personne ne doutait au sein de 
la banque en 1996, lors qu'il est 
apparu que des aides 
supplémentaires seraient nécessai-
res, que « l'Etat ferait son 
devoir », et les faits ont donné 
raison à de telles attentes. Avec la 
peur d'un conflit social, il s'agit 
de l'explication principale de 
l'attentisme du management de la 
banque face aux mesures qui 
s'imposaient pour rétablir 
rapidement la rentabilité de 
l'exploitation en France. 
Toute solution durable pour le 
système bancaire public, en 
France comme en Italie, devait 
donc passer par une réforme du 
système d'ensemble de 
gouvernement d'entreprise 
("corporate governance") des 
établissements en crise et par une 
solution au problème d'aléa moral 
provoqué par le soutien en dernier 
ressort de l'Etat. Dans la plupart 
des cas, en France comme en 
Italie, la Commission a considéré 
que les engagements de 
privatisation et de contraction 
drastique de la taille des 
établissements pris par le 
Gouvernement apportaient une 
solution durable aux déficiences 
du gouvernement d'entreprise 
constatées dans le passé. 
Dans sa décision de mai 1998 sur 
le Crédit Lyonnais, la 
Commission indique que la 
politique qu'elle préconise pour la 
résolution des crises bancaires 
vise à accroître la responsabilité 
des dirigeants des banques, 
publiques comme privées. Pour 
cela, indique-t-elle, « // importe 
non seulement que les autorités 
responsables fassent clairement et 
publiquement savoir que les 
établissements de crédit seront 
normalement soumis aux 
sanctions du marché et que les 
banques, pas plus que les autres 
entreprises, ne sont pas à l'abri 
d'une liquidation (...), mais aussi 
que l'Etat actionnaire agisse en 
conséquence lors du traitement 
des crises bancaires, et sans 
opérer de discrimination entre les 
banques publiques et les banques 
privées. Une telle politique doit 
être accompagnée de mesures de 
protection des petits déposants 
par des instruments tels que les 
fonds de garantie des dépôts-^0. 
3 0 La directive 94/14/CE sur les 
systèmes de garantie des dépôts 
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Elle requiert aussi des stratégies 
d'accompagnement de processus 
de liquidation ordonnée des 
établissements bancaires 
défaillants, visant à circonscrire 
les crises et à éviter leur 
propagation au niveau du reste du 
secteur financier et de 
l'économie. La Commission 
considère que les Etats membres 
disposent d'instruments, tels que 
¡es garanties temporaires de 
passif permettant d'encadrer de 
tels processus de liquidation 
ordonnée et permettant le cas 
échéant d'éviter le développement 
d'une crise systémique^ ' ». 
Complémentarité des règles de 
concurrence et de régulation 
prudentielle 
En 1995, en présentant les 
raisons de la première 
recapitalisation du Crédit 
Lyonnais de fin 1994, les 
autorités françaises avaient 
souligné l'obligation de 
respecter la contrainte 
réglementaire de fonds propres 
pour justifier l'opération au 
regard des objectifs poursuivis 
par les politiques communau­
taires : elles concluaient que les 
règles communautaires en 
matière d'aides d'Etat ne 
pouvaient aboutir à un résultat 
contraire à une obligation 
résultant de la régulation 
prudentielle du secteur imposée 
par le droit bancaire 
communautaire. En septembre 
1996, lors de la notification des 
prévoit que les Etats membres 
mettent en place de tels instruments, 
J.O.L135 du 31.5.1994, p. 5. 
3 1 JOL22I du 8.8.1998, ρ 67. 
aides d'urgence, les autorités ont 
de nouveau justifié l'opération 
au regard de la réglementation 
prudentielle : sans ces aides 
d'urgence, le CL n'aurait plus 
été en mesure de respecter les 
obligations prudentielles 
bancaires. Rappelons que la 
directive du Conseil relative à un 
ratio de solvabilité des 
établissements de crédit32 a 
introduit en droit communautaire 
les règles prudentielles définies 
dans le cadre du travail initié par 
la Banque des Règlements 
Internationaux et ayant abouti à 
la définition d'un ratio 
prudentiel, défini comme le ratio 
des fonds propres sur les actifs 
pondérés par leur niveau de 
risque. Ce ratio doit être de 8% 
au minimum. Les fonds propres 
« durs » (dits tier one) doivent 
eux être d'un minimum de 4% 
des actifs pondérés. 
Cet argument, qui aboutissait à 
introduire une contrainte 
exogène à la politique de la 
concurrence en vue soit de 
disqualifier le caractère d'aide 
d'une opération d'injection de 
fonds propres dans une banque 
sous­capitalisée, soit de la 
déclarer ex­ante compatible avec 
le Traité avant tout examen des 
conditions prévues dans 
l'encadrement sur les aides au 
sauvetage et à la restructuration, 
a été écarté par la Commission. 
Dans la décision de 1998, elle 
rappelle qu'une injection de 
fonds publics dans une banque 
est une aide si, dans des 
3 2 Directive 89/647/CEE du Conseil du 
18 décembre 1989, JO L 336 du 
3.12.1989, pl4. 
circonstances similaires, un 
investisseur privé n'aurait pas 
jugé qu'un tel investissement lui 
apportait une perspective de 
rémunération normale. Rien dans 
le droit de la concurrence ni dans 
le droit bancaire n'interdit de 
mettre une banque en 
liquidation, si de telles 
perspectives de rentabilité 
n'existent pas, même compte 
tenu des projets de 
restructuration de l'établissement 
concerné. La Commission a noté 
dans sa décision du 20 mai 1998 
que tel était également l'avis de 
l'autorité de surveillance 
bancaire française, la 
Commission Bancaire, qui dans 
son rapport de 1995 avait 
considéré qu 'une restructuration 
ordonnée du système bancaire 
français implique que les 
établissements de crédit, qui sont 
des entreprises comme les 
autres, et qui de ce fait ne 
doivent pas être à l'abri des 
sanctions du marché, puissent 
disparaître^. 
Compte tenu de ces éléments, la 
contrainte de fonds propres 
introduite par la réglementation 
prudentielle bancaire européenne 
doit être envisagée uniquement 
dans l'hypothèse de la continuité 
d'exploitation de l'entreprise 
bancaire bénéficiaire34, si sa 
licence bancaire est maintenue, 
et sachant qu'une autre 
alternative, celle du retrait de la 
licence et de la liquidation, 
JJ* Commission bancaire, rapport 1995, 
p.13. 
j 4 Décision sur les aides au Crédit 
Lyonnais du 20 mai 1998, JO 221 
du 8.8.98 ρ 62. 
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demeure toujours possible. La 
Commission en a déduit que les 
autorités nationales ne sauraient 
opposer au respect de l'article 87 
du traité une contrainte issue du 
droit prudentiel. 
11 est intéressant de noter que le 
débat sur les obligations de 
recapitalisation d'une banque en 
difficulté oppose aussi parfois 
les autorités nationales et les 
banques privées : l'article 52 de 
la loi bancaire française du 24 
janvier 1994 autorise le 
gouverneur de la Banque de 
France à inviter les actionnaires 
et sociétaires d'un 
établissements de crédit à lui 
fournir le soutien qui lui est 
nécessaire si la situation le 
justifie. Dans au moins un cas 
récent les actionnaires privés 
d'une banque privée, la 
Compagnie du BTP, ont refusé 
de suivre l'invitation du 
gouverneur de la Banque de 
France à faire un nouvel apport 
en capital. La Cour d'Appel de 
Paris a rendu un arrêt35 sur cette 
affaire, selon lequel l'article 52 
de la Loi bancaire ne saurait être 
interprété dans un sens coercitif. 
Ceci est conforme à l'interpré­
tation de la Commission selon 
lequel l'appel à la solidarité des 
actionnaires ­ privés comme 
publics ­ ne saurait exclure que 
ces derniers examinent le nouvel 
investissement sur la base de sa 
rentabilité, compte tenu du 
niveau de risque qu'ils prennent, 
conformément à ce que fait tout 
investisseur en économie de 
marché. En aucun cas le soutien 
35 Arrêt du 13 janvier 1998. 
à une banque en crise ne doit 
être acquis par avance et 
considéré comme automatique. 
Si tel devait être le cas, de graves 
lacunes dans l'efficience du 
système bancaire risqueraient 
d'apparaître. 
La Commission a finalement 
considéré dans sa décision sur le 
Crédit Lyonnais de 1998 que la 
politique communautaire de 
concurrence et la réglementation 
prudentielle en matière bancaire 
visaient un objectif commun, 
celui du développement d'un 
secteur bancaire concurrentiel et 
sain36. Ceci implique qu'en 
contrepartie des possibilités 
d'entrée dans le secteur, des 
voies de sortie soient aussi 
prévues. Sinon, les établis­
sements non concurrentiels 
n'étant pas sanctionnés par la 
sortie du marché, une situation 
malsaine de surcapacité risque 
de voir le jour. In fine, ce sont 
toujours les consommateurs et 
les contribuables qui payent le 
prix de telles distorsions de 
marché. 
Evaluation des outils existants 
de la politique d'aide 
Les aides au fonctionnement 
sont interdites et rien ne permet 
d'envisager leur compatibilité 
avec le traité37. L'encadrement 
,b Décision sur les aides au Crédit 
Lyonnais du 20 mai 1998, JO 221 
du 8.8.98 ρ 62. 
­1 ' Cfr. décision de la Commission sur 
la Westdeutsche Landesbank 
(WestLB), JO LI50 du 23.6.2000. 
p. 1. 
sur les aides au sauvetage et à la 
restructuration38 adopté par la 
Commission en 1994 prévoit un 
certain nombre de critères la 
guidant dans son examen en vue 
de déclarer la compatibilité ­ ou 
l'incompatibilité ­ de l'aide. Il 
n'est pas exagéré de dire que cet 
encadrement a connu un test 
crucial avec les crises à 
répétition du Crédit Lyonnais de 
1994 à 1998, ayant abouti au 
plus important cas d'aides d'Etat 
de l'histoire de la Communauté. 
A posteriori, sans son adoption 
en 1994 il apparaît que la 
Commission aurait été très 
démunie pour traiter avec 
rigueur et objectivité une telle 
crise. 
Ainsi que rappelé ci­dessus, 
l'encadrement prévoit que pour 
qu'une aide à la restructuration 
soit déclarée compatible, il 
convient que l'entreprise 
bénéficiaire soit viable, que 
l'aide soit limitée au strict 
nécessaire et que des 
contreparties permettent de 
limiter l'effet distorsif de l'aide 
sur la concurrence. La question 
de la viabilité est essentielle : si 
celle­ci n'est pas assurée, l'aide 
n'apporte qu'un traitement 
palliatif mais n'a aucun effet 
curatif. On est alors quasi certain 
de voir un nouveau plan d'aides 
nécessaire au terme de quelques 
années. Ceci est contraire au 
­1Ö Lignes directrices communautaires 
pour les aides d'Etat au sauvetage et 
à la restructuration des entreprises 
en difficulté, JO C368 du 
23.12.1994. Ces lignes directrices 
ont été mises à ¡our en 1999, Cf. JO 
C288du 9.10.1999. 
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principe 'one time, last time'-*9 
qui veut qu'en principe une aide 
ne soit accordée qu'une seule 
fois. Autrement, l'aide à la 
restructuration se voit détournée 
de son objectif et devient une 
aide au fonctionnement. 
Au regard de l'expérience 
récente, c'est sans doute 
l'articulation entre les deux 
premiers critères qui requiert 
l'évaluation la plus complexe de 
la part de la Commission. En 
juillet 1995, à la suite de 
nombreuses hésitations, la 
Commission avait sur la base du 
plan de restructuration présenté 
par les autorités françaises, et 
des informations dont elle 
disposait, conciu que l'aide au 
Crédit Lyonnais était 
proportionnée aux besoins de 
l'entreprise et que la banque était 
viable. Pourtant, il a bien fallu 
constater en septembre 1996 lors 
de la notification des aides 
d'urgence que tel n'était pas le 
cas : la construction du plan de 
restructuration de 1995 s'est ex 
post avérée fragile, la banque n'a 
pas été en mesure de se 
redresser, et sans les aides 
d'urgence accordées par l'Etat 
pour 1995 (rétroactivement) et 
1996 elle aurait enregistré des 
pertes la mettant en 
contravention avec la 
réglementation prudentielle 
bancaire. A terme, elle risquait 
de perdre son agrément bancaire 
et de sortir du marché. 
Il est difficile a posteriori de 
juger s'il s'agit d'une erreur 
- Renforcé dans la nouvelle version 
de l'encadrement de 1999. 
initiale de diagnostic de la part 
de la Commission en 1995 
(influencée en cela par les 
autorités françaises) ou bien 
d'une mise en oeuvre 
insatisfaisante du plan de 
restructuration : ainsi que l'a par 
la suite reconnu le président du 
Crédit Lyonnais, il apparaît 
toutefois que dans les premières 
années de la crise la nouvelle 
direction de la banque a fait une 
erreur de diagnostic en attribuant 
aux participations non bancaires 
et internationales du Crédit 
Lyonnais l'essentiel de son 
attention et qu'elle a gravement 
sous-estimé l'ampleur des 
restructurations nécessaires pour 
améliorer la rentabilité du réseau 
bancaire du Crédit Lyonnais en 
France, très inefficace et peu 
performant. Ce n'est qu'une fois 
qu'a été prise en compte cette 
dimension de la crise qu'une 
perspective réelle de la juguler 
est apparue. 
De tels échecs d'un plan de 
restructuration approuvé par la 
Commission, surtout dans un cas 
aussi important, sont coûteux 
non seulement pour le budget de 
l'Etat Membre, principal maître 
d'oeuvre de ce plan, mais aussi 
pour la crédibilité de la politique 
communautaire de concurrence. 
La leçon qu'en a retenu la 
Commission est que dans de 
telles situations particulièrement 
complexes, concernant des 
entreprises multinationales ayant 
de nombreux centres d'activité 
de nature différente et des 
centaines de filiales, une contre-
expertise est indispensable : pour 
cela, la Commission s'est 
appuyée en 1997-98, lors de 
l'examen du nouveau plan de 
restructuration du Crédit 
Lyonnais, sur une banque 
conseil qui lui a soumis une 
évaluation indépendante du plan 
de restructuration présenté par 
les autorités, concluant à la 
viabilité de celle-ci. Ce 
diagnostic semble confirmé par 
l'évolution favorable de la 
situation de l'entreprise depuis 
lors. La pratique de la Direction 
Générale de la Concurrence est à 
présent de commanditer 
systématiquement de telles 
contre-expertises lors de cas 
d'un niveau de complexité 
élevée. Quelle que soit la 
difficulté de l'évaluation de la 
viabilité du plan soumis par les 
autorités, ceci ne remet pas en 
cause la pertinence de ce critère 
qui s'avère être la pierre de 
touche pour l'évaluation tout cas 
de ce type. 
L'articulation prévue dans les 
lignes directrices entre les aides 
au sauvetage et les aides à la 
restructuration a également été 
fondamentale dans le traitement 
de la crise du Crédit Lyonnais à 
partir de 1996. L'encadrement 
prévoit en effet que les aides de 
sauvetage, provisoires (en 
principe d'une durée de 6 mois 
maximum) soient suivies soit 
d'un plan de restructuration -
pour lequel toute mesure d'aide 
supplémentaire doit être notifiée 
à la Commission - soit, si la 
restructuration apparaît impos-
sible, la liquidation de 
l'entreprise. Dans le cas du 
Crédit Lyonnais, la décision de 
septembre 1996 s'est strictement 
limitée à l'approbation des aides 
de sauvetage et a stipulé que 
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toute mesure nouvelle d'aide à la 
restructuration devrait lui être 
notifiée en même temps qu'un 
nouveau plan de restructuration. 
L'exigence de contreparties 
imposées à l'entreprise aidée a 
également été confirmée comme 
un critère essentiel, seul en 
mesure vis-à-vis des concurrents 
de l'entreprise bénéficiaire 
d'assurer la crédibilité d'une 
décision positive sur un montant 
important d'aides, qui est, il 
convient toujours de le rappeler, 
une exception faite à 
l'interdiction de principe prévue 
par le traité. Nonobstant la 
viabilité de la banque, la 
Commission a dans un premier 
temps, fin 1997, jugé très 
insuffisant le niveau de 
contreparties présenté par les 
autorités en vue d'atténuer les 
effets distorsifs des aides. Ce 
n'est que lorsque la Commission 
a, en mai 1998, obtenu des 
engagements sur un montant très 
supérieur de contreparties (un 
total de 645 milliards de francs 
de cessions ou fermetures 
d'actifs en tenant compte des 
opérations de restructuration de 
1995 et 1998) qu'elle a infine 
déclaré les aides compatibles 
avec le traité. Tous ces critères 
d'appréciation étaient ceux 
prévus par les lignes directrices 
sur les aides au sauvetage à la 
restructuration. 
Dans l'ensemble, ces lignes 
directrices, conçues par la 
Commission à partir de son 
expérience en matière de grandes 
opérations de restructuration 
industrielle, se sont donc avérées 
adaptées au traitement d'une 
grave crise bancaire. Elles ont 
résisté à cette épreuve et fourni 
le cadre indispensable à 
l'examen de la Commission, sur 
la base de critères objectifs, 
publiés et ainsi connus à 
l'avance par l'ensemble des 
parties intéressées40. 
1.0.0.2. Une évaluation pos-
sible des distorsions 
de concurrence 
Par rapport aux décisions 
antérieures en matière bancaire, 
une nouveauté a été introduite 
dans la décision sur le Crédit 
Lyonnais de mai 1998, et reprise 
dans les décisions postérieures 
de la Commission en matière 
d'aides d'Etat apportées à des 
banques sous forme de fonds 
propres ou de quasi-fonds 
propres (Crédit Foncier, Société 
Marseillaise de Crédit, Banco di 
Napoli, Banco di Sicilia) : pour 
la première fois la Commission a 
procédé à une évaluation -
indicative - de la distorsion de 
concurrence introduite par les 
aides. 
En temps normal une telle 
évaluation est très difficile. Si un 
Etat Membre accorde une aide à 
une entreprise, la connaissance 
que l'on a de la distorsion de 
concurrence est plutôt intuitive -
cet argent donne un avantage à 
l'entreprise qui lui permet de 
concurrencer les autres présentes 
40 De légères adaptations ont été 
apportées dans l'encadrement révisé 
de 1999 permettant de mieux 
prendre en compte la spécificité des 
situations d'aide au sauvetage de 
banques en difficulté. 
sur les mêmes marchés. Pour 
cette raison, la plupart les 
décisions en matière d'aide ne 
prévoient normalement pas la 
quantification de la distorsion 
provoquée par l'aide. Certes, il 
est possible d'examiner 
différents ratios : dans un secteur 
donné il existe une relation 
moyenne entre la capitalisation 
en fonds propres et le chiffre 
d'affaires, de sorte qu'une 
injection en fonds propres de X 
millions d'euros permettra la 
réalisation d'un chiffre d'affaires 
de Y millions d'euros. Mais de 
tels ratios de capitalisation, si ils 
peuvent être pertinents dans des 
entreprises hautement capitalis-
tiques (par exemple la 
sidérurgie) sont en revanche 
beaucoup moins significatifs 
dans des secteurs de services à 
faible intensité capitalistique et 
donnent des indications très 
approximatives. 
Dans le secteur bancaire 
toutefois, la relation entre fonds 
propres et actif pondéré est 
réglementée par la contrainte 
prudentielle de solvabilité 
rappelée ci-dessus, de sorte que 
l'on sait parfaitement qu'une 
aide de 1 million d'euros en 
fonds propres pennet à une 
banque d'avoir un montant 
d'actifs pondérés à son bilan de 
12,5 à 25 millions d'euros (selon 
que l'on applique la contrainte 
du ratio « tier one » de 4% ou 
celle du ratio « tier one + tier 
two » de 8%). Le ratio de 
solvabilité peut se « travailler » 
par le numérateur mais aussi par 
le dénominateur : une banque 
connaissant une sous-
capitalisation au regard des 
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règles prudentielles peut 
chercher à augmenter ses fonds 
propres (numérateur) ou 
diminuer ses actifs pondérés 
(dénominateur). Elle ne peut en 
tout cas pas augmenter ces 
derniers tant que ses fonds 
propres sont insuffisants. La 
contrainte de solvabilité exerce 
donc un effet de bridage de la 
croissance que souligne la 
Commission41 : les établisse­
ments les moins performants ne 
peuvent pas développer de 
stratégie de croissance 
expansive. Sans aides, une 
entreprise bancaire non rentable 
et sous­capitalisée doit réduire 
son bilan et son activité, la 
contrainte de solvabilité a un 
effet « auto punitif». Dans le cas 
d'injections en capital ou de 
mesures d'effet équivalent 
pouvant être déclarées 
compatibles avec le traité, le rôle 
des contreparties sous forme de 
cessions d'actifs est, dans un tel 
contexte, de limiter la distorsion 
de concurrence provoquée par 
les aides, ainsi estimée de façon 
très indicative. Il s'agit là d'une 
autre facette de la 
complémentarité déjà soulignée 
entre la politique de concurrence 
et les effets de la régulation 
prudentielle. 
Cette évaluation indicative, en 
termes d'actifs pondérés au bilan 
d'une entreprise, justifie ex post 
la nature des contreparties déjà 
retenue en 1995, puis reprise en 
1998 dans le cas du Crédit 
Lyonnais : l'effort demandé à la 
banque avait été évalué en 
4 1 Décision Crédit Lyonnais du 20 mai 
1998, JO L221 du 8.8.98, ρ 72. 
termes de diminution de bilan 
(par cession d'actifs). Ainsi, en 
contrepartie des aides reçues, la 
banque devait faire elle­même 
une partie du chemin par un 
effort de réduction de bilan 
qu'en vertu de la relation 
précédemment soulignée une 
banque non rentable doit faire si 
ses fonds propres sont 
insuffisants. Si l'on prend en 
compte les deux décisions de 
1995 et 1998, c'est à plus du 
tiers de ses actifs que le CL aura 
finalement dû renoncer en 
contrepartie des aides colossales 
reçues. 
Pour déterminer les niveaux de 
contreparties nécessaires, la 
Commission n'a toutefois pas été 
jusqu'à appliquer de façon 
mécanique cette relation entre 
aides et disposions, sur la base 
des distorsions potentielles telles 
qu'évaluées ci­dessus. Dans le 
cas du Crédit Lyonnais c'était 
impossible dans le cadre d'une 
décision de compatibilité, les 
distorsions théoriques maximales 
calculées par cette relation étant 
in fine supérieures au bilan de 
l'entreprise. A l'inverse de son 
approche de la notion d'aide 
qu'elle considère comme 
objective, la Cour de Justice 
laisse à la Commission une 
marge discrétionnaire 
d'appréciation quant aux 
conditions permettant de 
déclarer la compatibilité des 
aides avec l'intérêt 
communautaire, pourvu que 
celle­ci motive clairement sa 
décision et ne fasse pas d'erreur 
manifeste d'appréciation. Dans 
les dernières décisions en 
matière d'aides à la 
restructuration de banques, la 
Commission n'a pas cherché à 
obtenir des contreparties 
strictement égales aux niveaux 
estimés de distorsions de 
concurrence. Il conviendra 
d'examiner à l'avenir, si de 
nouveau cas comparables 
venaient à se présenter, si la 
Commission maintient 
l'approche empirique suivie dans 
les précédents cas, ou bien relève 
le niveau d'exigences en matière 
de contreparties exigibles pour 
que les aides puissent alors être 
déclarées compatibles (pourvu 
que les autres critères de 
compatibilité soient respectés). 
1.0.0.3. Conclusion 
Depuis la première décision de 
la Commission de 1995, on a 
assisté à une certaine 
banalisation de la manière dont 
les cas d'aides d'Etat aux 
banques sont traités: ainsi que 
souligné à plusieurs reprises 
dans les décisions les plus 
récentes, les banques sont des 
entreprises qui relèvent des 
règles générales en matière 
d'aides, et en particulier de 
l'encadrement sur les aides au 
sauvetage et à la restructuration. 
Ceci d'autant plus, ainsi que 
souligné ci­dessus, que 
l'encadrement sur ces aides, 
conçu bien avant ces crises 
bancaires s'est avéré un outil 
efficace et permettant pour 
l'essentiel de traiter ces crises. 
Seuls quelques ajustements 
pourraient être envisagés, 
concernant principalement les 
procédures applicables aux 
règles de sauvetage, en vue 
d'adapter les procédures 
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existantes à des situations 
d'urgence. En revanche, il n'est 
pas question de déroger au droit 
général et de créer un 
encadrement spécifique appli-
cable au secteur bancaire. Non 
seulement la nécessité d'un tel 
encadrement n'est pas apparue, 
mais il pourrait même être 
nuisible au maintien de la 
discipline d'aides dans ce 
secteur. 
Les dirigeants des entreprises 
aidées ont appris au moins une 
leçon : les aides s'obtiennent au 
prix d'une difficile cure 
d'austérité, de plans de 
restructuration accompagnés de 
changement du management, et 
d'une réduction de la taille de 
l'entreprise. Le Crédit Lyonnais 
est ainsi passé en cinq ans de la 
première à la quinzième ou 
vingtième place des entreprises 
bancaires en Europe (suivant le 
critère de taille retenu). Les 
conséquences du laxisme des 
politiques bancaires expansion-
nistes et imprudentes sont 
sanctionnées. La récente 
expérience communautaire en 
matière d'aides d'Etat dans les 
cas de crises bancaires montre 
ainsi que l'approbation de l'aide 
ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il 
peut être dérogé aux règles de 
concurrence. Ainsi a été mis une 
limite au phénomène de « moral 
hazard » qui veut les entreprises 
inefficaces soient aidées et non 
pas soumises aux règles 
normales du marché. 
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Sabre contre Amadeus e.a. : un 
dossier riche en enseignements 
ENRICO MARIA ARMANI, DG COMP-H-2 
INTRODUCTION 
Le 25 juillet 2000, la Commis-
sion a annoncé qu'elle avait 
décidé de clore une enquête sur 
Air France, concernant une 
discrimination présumée à 
l'encontre de Sabre - un système 
informatisé de réservation (SIR) 
américain. Ce classement faisait 
suite à la signature, par la 
compagnie aérienne française et 
Sabre, d'une charte de bonne 
conduite garantissant à Sabre, 
ainsi qu'aux autres SIR, des 
conditions équivalentes à celles 
consenties au système Amadeus, 
dont Air France est copro-
priétaire.42 
L"affaire Sabre contre Amadeus 
e.a. présente un double intérêt. 
D'une part, elle crée un 
précédent: il s'agit du premier 
cas concret de mise en œuvre du 
mécanisme de courtoisie active 
avec l'autorité de concurrence 
des Etats Unis d'Amérique. 
D'autre part elle clarifie la portée 
des règles de concurrence à 
l'égard d'un secteur en pleine 
évolution tel que les SIR. 
Communiqué de presse 1P/00/835 
du 25.07.2000, consultable sur le 
serveur RAPID http://europa.eu. 
int/rapid/start/vvelcome.htm 
LA DEMANDE DE COURTOISIE 
ACTIVE 
L'origine de l'enquête remonte à 
une plainte que la Compagnie 
aérienne American Airlines avait 
déposé en juin 1996 auprès du 
Department of Justice of the 
United States of America (DoJ). 
American Airlines se plaignait 
essentiellement du fait que 
quatre compagnies aériennes 
européennes (Air France, Iberia, 
Lufthansa et SAS), toutes liées 
au SIR Amadeus, favorisaient ce 
dernier au détriment de Sabre, 
son propre SIR. American 
Airlines leur reprochait notam-
ment de ne pas fournir à Sabre 
une information sur les vols 
aussi complète et ponctuelle que 
celle fournie à Amadeus, et de 
ne pas lui faire profiter des 
mêmes possibilités techniques 
(par exemple de la confirmation 
en ligne des réservations). 
En janvier 1997, le DoJ a 
formellement demandé à la 
Commission d'enquêter sur les 
allégations de SABRE au titre 
des règles de concurrence de 
l'Union Européenne. Il s'agissait 
de la première application du 
mécanisme de la "courtoisie 
active" prévu par l'accord de 
coopération UE - Etats Unis en 
matière de concurrence43. La 
courtoisie active permet en effet 
aux autorités de la concurrence 
américaines de demander à la 
Commission d'enquêter sur des 
actes anticoncurrentiels présu-
més commis en Europe, et 
inversement (voir encadré). 
L'enquête préliminaire n'a révélé 
aucune preuve de discrimination 
de la part d'Iberia, de Lufthansa 
et de SAS. La Commission a 
donc cessé d'enquêter sur ces 
trois compagnies. En revanche, 
sur la base des résultats de ses 
premières investigations, la 
Commission a décidé d'ouvrir la 
procédure formelle à l'encontre 
d'Air France et lui a adressé une 
communication des griefs. 
Comme indiqué en introduction, 
les parties ont ensuite signé une 
charte de bonne conduite et la 
Commission a décidé de clore 
l'affaire (cf. infra). 
Du point de vue juridique, la 
demande du DoJ a conduit la 
Commission à entamer une 
instruction d'office, dans le cadre 
des pouvoirs qui lui sont 
conférés par le règlement de 
procédure n°17/6244. Ainsi, du 
point de vue des parties mises en 
cause, le fait que l'affaire ait 
trouvé son origine dans cet 
instrument nouveau ne s'est pas 
traduit par une altération des 
droits découlant dudit règlement. 
£*-1 Décision du Conseil et de la 
Commission du 10 avril 1995 
(95/145/CE, CECA) JO L 95 du 
27 avril 1995, p.47 et JO L 131 du 
15 juin 1995, p.38 
4 4 .10 13 du 21.2.1962, p. 18 
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Le seul' élément qui a distingué 
le déroulement de cette affaire 
par rapport aux cas traités 
"habituellement" concerne le 
processus d'information, par la 
Commission, des autorités de 
concurrence américaines. Con-
formément aux dispositions de 
l'accord bilatéral précité, la 
Commission a informé le DoJ 
tout au long de la procédure du 
déroulement de celle-ci. L'infor-
mation a porté plus particulière-
ment sur: 
- les mesures d'application 
prises (par exemple, la com-
munication des griefs à Air 
France); 
- les principaux développe-
ments survenus durant 
l'instruction (par exemple, 
l'arrêt de l'instruction des 
allégations contre les autres 
parties mises en cause) et 
- sa décision finale (le clas-
sement de l'affaire). 
Ainsi, le 24 juillet 2000 la 
Commission a adopté une 
décision autorisant le Directeur 
Général de la Concurrence de 
répondre formellement à la 
demande du DoJ, conformément 
à l'accord bilatéral précité45. 
LES LEÇONS DE L'AFFAIRE 
QUANT AU FOND 
Classer une affaire sans suite 
risque de faire passer sous 
silence l'analyse sous-jacente qui 
y a conduit. Or, dans le cas 
présent, l'instruction de la plainte 
d'American Airlines a conduit la 
Commission à mener une ré-
4 5 Décision C(2000) 2160, non 
publiée 
flexion approfondie sur le 
fonctionnement du marché des 
SIR et sur les droits et 
obligations des différents acteurs 
sur ce marché. Preuve en est la 
durée de l'enquête, à savoir plus 
de trois ans. 
Pour avoir quelques détails au 
sujet de cette réflexion, il est 
néanmoins possible de se référer 
à la communication des griefs 
que la Commission a adressée à 
Air France en février 199946: 
l'approche de la Commission y 
est décrite explicitement en ce 
qui concerne les griefs retenus, 
et résulte implicitement en ce qui 
concerne les griefs ne l'ayant pas 
été. 
Le présent article explique ci-
après les principaux éléments du 
raisonnement sous-jacent à la 
communication des griefs de la 
Commission. Il convient toute-
fois de rappeler qu'une commu-
nication des griefs constitue une 
appréciation préliminaire et non 
une évaluation définitive de la 
part de la Commission. Ainsi, les 
principes suivants ne peuvent en 
aucun cas lier la Commission ou 
ses services. 
Obligation, pour une compa-
gnie aérienne dominante, de 
neutralité vis à vis des SIR 
A ce jour, la Commission a 
adopté une seule décision dans le 
secteur des SIR au titre des 
règles de concurrence: la déci-
4 0 Communiqué de presse IP/99/171 
du 15.03.199, consultable sur le 
serveur RAPID 
sion London European vs Sabe-
na47. Il y était question de droit, 
pour un transporteur, d'être 
affiché dans un SIR dominant. 
Dans le cas présent, la situation 
est inversée puisque l'affaire 
concerne les obligations aux-
quelles est soumis un transpor-
teur dominant vis à vis des SIR. 
Dans sa communication des 
griefs, la Commission a estimé 
qu'il convenait de distinguer 
deux marchés: 
- le marché de l'offre, par les 
compagnies aériennes, de 
services aériens réguliers aux 
agents de voyage, en vue de 
leur distribution au "public", 
- le marché de l'offre, aux 
agents de voyage, de services 
SIR (destinés à sonder le 
marché et à effectuer des 
réservations). 
Pour exercer ses activités de 
manière efficace, une agence de 
voyage s'équipera du SIR qui lui 
permettra d'offrir à ses clients le 
meilleur service de transports 
(par exemple les prix les plus 
intéressants, la meilleure dispo-
nibilité de places, etc..) et ce, 
pour le plus grand nombre de 
compagnies aériennes possibles 
(ou, en tout état de cause, pour 
les compagnies qui représentent 
la plus grande partie de son 
chiffre d'affaires). 
Dans ce contexte, un trans-
porteur en position dominante 
(sur le premier marché) qui 
communique de meilleures 
47 Décision du 4.11.1988, affaire 
IV/32.318, JO L 317 du 24.11.1988 
p. 47 
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informations à son propre SIR 
qu'à d'autres affecte la con-
currence sur le deuxième marché 
(par "meilleures informations" il 
faut entendre des tarifs plus 
exacts, plus exhaustifs, plus 
fiables,...). Il en va de même si 
ce transporteur habilite unique-
ment son propre SIR à des 
fonctions avancées comme la 
vérification de la disponibilité en 
ligne, la pré-réservation de 
sièges, etc. . 
Sous réserve de l'appréciation de 
l'affectation du commerce entre 
Etats membres et en l'absence de 
toute autre justification, une telle 
pratique est contraire à 
l'article 82 CE dans le mesure où 
ce transporteur dominant opère 
une discrimination entre SIR et 
utilise sa position dominante sur 
un marché pour protéger ou 
renforcer la position de marché 
de son propre SIR sur un autre 
marché. 
Applicabilité des règles de 
concurrence au secteur des 
SIR 
Lors de l'instruction prélimi-
naire, plusieurs compagnies 
aériennes ont invoqué la non 
applicabilité du Règlement de 
procédure n° 17/62 au secteur des 
SIR pour deux raisons. D'une 
part parce que ce règlement ne 
s'applique pas aux positions 
dominantes sur le marché des 
transports48. D'autre part parce 
que, selon elles, le marché des 
SIR échapperait aux règles de 
concurrence (articles 81 CE et 
82 CE) en raison de l'existence 
du code de conduite sur les 
SIR49. 
La première objection n'est pas 
pertinente parce que le premier 
marché en cause n'est pas un 
marché de transport mais un 
marché de distribution d'un 
service de transports aériens 
(couvert par le champs d'applica-
tion du règlement n°l 7/62). 
La seconde objection n'est pas 
pertinente non plus, parce qu'une 
norme de législation secondaire 
(comme un Règlement du 
Conseil) ne peut en aucun cas 
affecter l'applicabilité des règles 
du Traité. Il convient d'ailleurs 
de remarquer que le code de 
conduite même stipule qu'il 
s'entend sans préjudice de 
l'application des articles 81 et 82 
du traité (quatrième considérant). 
49 
48 Règlement n°l 41/62, JO 124 du 
28.11.1962, p. 2751 
Règlement (CE) n° 323/1999 du 
Conseil du 8 février 1999 modifiant 
le règlement (CEE) n° 2299/89 
instaurant un code de conduite pour 
l'utilisation de systèmes informatisés 
de réservation (SIR). 
Le marché européen de la 
réservation informatisée est en effet 
régi par un code de conduite qui a 
pour objet d'assurer une concur-
rence loyale entre les transporteurs 
aériens et entre les systèmes 
informatisés de réservation. Il 
dispose, entre autres, que les 
transporteurs participants veillent à 
ce que les données qu'ils décident 
d'introduire dans un SIR soient 
exactes et ne soient pas moins 
complètes que celles destinées à tout 
autre SIR (où les "données" 
concernent les horaires, les tarifs, les 
places disponibles e t c . ) . 
La procédure contre Air 
France 
Dans le cas d'espèce, la 
Commission a estimé, dans sa 
communication des griefs, qu'Air 
France était une compagnie 
aérienne dominante sur le 
marché de la fourniture aux 
agences de voyages françaises de 
services aériens en vue de leur 
distribution au public. Elle lui a 
contesté les trois griefs à 
suivants: 
- Le fait d'avoir, entre octobre 
1993 et juin 1997, distribué 
ses tarifs non européens selon 
une procédure telle qu'Ama-
deus recevait ces tarifs bien 
avant Sabre (avec une avance 
pouvant aller jusqu'à trois 
jours). 
- Le fait d'avoir, entre 1992 et 
mai 1996, distribué ses tarifs 
intra européens non domes-
tiques selon une procédure 
telle que Sabre ne les recevait 
pas en totalité et les recevait 
avec un retard par rapport à 
Amadeus pouvant aller 
jusqu'à une semaine. 
- Le fait de ne pas avoir 
communiqué son tarif Fly and 
Drive à Sabre en 1997. 
Chacun de ces trois éléments 
conduisait au même résultat, à 
savoir qu'Amadeus était plus 
complet que Sabre. Ainsi, 
chacun d'entre eux contribuait à 
renforcer ou forger la perception 
des agents de voyages français 
qu'Amadeus répondait mieux à 
leurs besoins que Sabre. Or, lors 
de l'instruction préliminaire, la 
Commission n'a décelé aucune 
justification objective au 
comportement d'Air France, ce 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 29 
» OPINION AND COMMENTS 
qui l'a ■ conduite à entamer la 
procédure formelle contre la 
compagnie aérienne française. 
En réalité, il existait bien un 
certain nombre de contraintes 
techniques et économiques 
expliquant les deux premiers 
éléments: du point de vue d'Air 
France, la procédure choisie 
pour transmettre ses tarifs était la 
plus efficace. Toutefois, la 
Commission a également consta­
té qu'Air France n'avait adopté 
aucune mesure pour surmonter 
ces contraintes, alors que de 
telles mesures existaient et 
qu'elles n'étaient pas dispropor­
tionnées. Ainsi, la Commission a 
estimé que l'obligation de 
neutralité d'un transporteur 
dominant, tout en l'autorisant de 
poursuivre l'efficacité économi­
que, lui impose de rechercher et 
de mettre en œuvre toute mesure 
raisonnable nécessaire à assurer 
cette neutralité. 
Le classement de la procédure 
Avant même la conclusion de la 
procédure formelle, cependant, 
Sabre et Air France ont signé 
une "charte de bonne conduite". 
Cette charte fait obligation aux 
parties de réserver un traitement 
équitable aux différents SIR et 
aux différentes compagnies 
aériennes. Elle prévoit notam­
ment l'engagement d'Air France 
de transmettre ses tarifs par le 
biais de vendeurs de tarifs 
indépendants uniquement, de 
participer dans tous les SIR au 
même niveau de connexion, 
d'habiliter tous les SIR aux 
mêmes fonctionnalités et de 
promouvoir Sabre aussi favora­
blement que n'importe quel autre 
SIR. Elle prévoit également des 
engagements réciproques en 
matière d'échange régulier 
d'informations de même qu'une 
coopération accrue en matière 
d'innovations techniques et de 
mise au point de nouveaux 
produits. De plus, Air France 
s'est engagée à étendre à tout 
SIR qui en fasse la demande les 
bénéfices de cette charte. 
Prenant acte du contenu de la 
charte de bonne conduite et suite 
à une invitation en ce sens du 
plaignant, la Commission a 
décidé de ne pas poursuivre la 
procédure jusqu'au stade de la 
décision formelle et de classer 
l'affaire sans suite. 
S'agissant d'une issue peu 
habituelle pour une procédure 
ayant atteint le stade de la 
communication des griefs, il 
convient de signaler que ce 
classement a été motivé par les 
spécificités du cas. En premier 
lieu, le fait que les infractions 
contestées à Air France sont 
toutes terminées depuis long­
temps. Ensuite, le fait que leur 
impact sur la position 
concurrentielle de Sabre sur le 
marché pertinent a été 
vraisemblablement faible. Enfin, 
le fait que la charte de bonne 
conduite signée par les parties ­
y compris son application à tous 
les SIR ­ conjure tout risque de 
répétition de l'infraction pour 
l'avenir. Dans ce contexte, la 
valeur ajoutée d'une décision 
formelle aurait été vraisem­
blablement faible par rapport aux 
ressources nécessaires pour y 
arriver. 
Le rejet des autres allégations 
Outre les trois griefs retenus 
contre Air France, la plainte 
d'American Airlines comportait 
un grand nombre d'autres 
allégations que la Commission a 
estimé ne pas devoir retenir dans 
le cadre de la communication 
des griefs. Certaines d'entre 
elles, parce que les faits n'avaient 
pas été correctement rapportés 
par le plaignant; celles­ci ne 
méritent pas d'être relatées ici. 
D'autres, en revanche, n'ont pas 
été retenues pour des raisons de 
droit. Ces raisons méritent 
quelques explications parce 
qu'elles permettent de mieux 
appréhender les limites des 
obligations qui découlent des 
règles de concurrence dans un 
cas d'espèce. 
Le droit pour une entreprise de 
protéger ses intérêts commer­
ciaux légitimes 
American Airlines reprochait 
aux compagnies aériennes visées 
par la plainte d'avoir habilité 
Amadeus (et pas Sabre) à 
effectuer un certain nombre de 
fonctions de réservation 
spéciales. Lors de l'instruction, 
ces compagnies ont confirmé 
leur refus d'habiliter Sabre aux 
fonctions en cause, mais ont 
justifié leur refus par le fait que 
les fonctions offertes par Sabre 
ne présentaient pas le même 
degré de protection des données 
qu'Amadeus. Selon elles, 
habiliter Sabre à ces fonctions 
aurait affecté leurs intérêts 
commerciaux. 
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En principe, une disparité de 
traitement entre SIR constitue 
une violation de l'article 82 CE. 
Toutefois, l'enquête préliminaire 
de la Commission a confirmé 
que, à l'époque des faits, les 
différences techniques entre 
Sabre et Amadeus se traduisaient 
effectivement par des différences 
en matière de possibilités de 
gestion et/ou de protection de 
données sensibles. 
Dès lors, la Commission a 
estimé que le refus des 
compagnies aériennes d'habiliter 
Sabre à utiliser certaines 
fonctionnalités pouvait être 
justifié objectivement tant que 
Sabre n'aurait pas développé son 
système informatique à un 
niveau qui offre les mêmes 
garanties qu'Amadeus. En effet, 
les règles de concurrence de 
l'Union Européenne ne peuvent 
en aucun cas obliger une 
entreprise à agir contre ses 
propres intérêts commerciaux 
légitimes. 
Dans le cas présent, la 
Commission a considéré comme 
"légitimes" les intérêts suivants: 
- la protection contre les 
fraudes: 
American Airlines se plai-
gnait du fait que ces compa-
gnies aériennes autorisaient 
uniquement Amadeus à accé-
der à leur base données inter-
ne (par exemple pour modi-
fier des réservations). Les 
compagnies ont répondu que, 
au moment des faits, certains 
agents équipés avec Sabre 
avaient utilisé cette fonction 
pour se faire verser des 
commissions qui ne corres-
pondaient pas à la vente de 
billets. Or un tel risque 
n'existait pas avec Amadeus 
parce que celui-ci était équipé 
de dispositifs de protection 
contre les utilisations fraudu-
leuses; 
la protection des secrets 
d'affaires: 
American Airlines se plai-
gnait du fait que ces com-
pagnies aériennes habilitaient 
Amadeus et pas Sabre à gérer 
les tarifs négociés (c'est à dire 
réservés à des groupes res-
treints d'utilisateurs) ou les 
"Frequent Flyer Passengers". 
Les compagnies ont répondu 
que, contrairement à Ama-
deus, Sabre n'était pas en 
mesure, au moment des faits, 
de gérer ces tarifs ou ces 
données de manière telle que 
ces informations confiden-
tielles ne soient pas divul-
guées; 
la protection de la stratégie de 
l'entreprise: 
American Airlines se plai-
gnait du fait que ces com-
pagnies aériennes habilitaient 
Amadeus à effectuer un plus 
grand nombre de réservations 
simultanées que Sabre. De 
plus ces compagnies avaient 
habilité uniquement Amadeus 
à la confirmation en ligne des 
réservations. Les compagnies 
ont répondu que, au moment 
des faits, Sabre n'était pas en 
mesure d'assurer le fonction-
nement correct de leurs 
Revenue Management Sys-
tems (systèmes internes aux 
compagnies aériennes visant 
à maximiser la recette pour 
un vol donné) et n'offrait pas 
les mêmes garanties qu'Ama-
deus en matière de prévention 
de surréservation. 
La liberté pour une entreprise de 
choisir ses propres standards 
industriels 
American Airlines reprochait 
aux compagnies aériennes visées 
par la plainte d'avoir développé 
certaines fonctions ou bases de 
données selon un standard 
compatible avec Amadeus mais 
incompatible avec Sabre. Par 
exemple, Sabre ne pouvait pas 
lire certaines données tarifaires 
ou certaines pages d'informa-
tions en raison du nombre de 
caractères par ligne ou de lignes 
par page. 
La Commission a rejeté cette 
allégation, considérant que 
l'élaboration des standards indus-
triels est un facteur de 
concurrence essentiel. Ainsi, 
aucune entreprise ne saurait être 
tenue à adopter un standard 
particulier (à moins que cette 
obligation ne soit établie par 
l'autorité publique, dans un souci 
d'intérêt général). 
En revanche, il importe qu'une 
entreprise dominante accepte de 
communiquer (et communique 
effectivement) avec suffisam-
ment de préavis les standards 
qu'elle adopte de manière à ce 
que les tiers puissent s'y adapter. 
Ce principe a déjà été établi lors 
du règlement de l'affaire IBM50. 
5 0 Cf. XIVo Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence, points 94 et suivants. 
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Ainsi, Ta Commission a exigé 
que la charte de bonne conduite 
signée par Sabre et Air France 
prévoie explicitement, d'une 
part, la liberté pour les parties 
dans leur choix et le dévelop-
pement des standards et, d'autre 
part, l'obligation de commu-
niquer ces standards. 
Le coût des adaptations tech-
niques 
Un des corollaires du point 
précédent est de savoir qui, entre 
la compagnie aérienne et le SIR, 
doit assumer le coût des 
développements nécessaires à 
adapter les SIR aux systèmes des 
compagnies aériennes. En effet, 
certaines compagnies aériennes 
ont été mises en cause par 
American Airlines parce que 
celles-ci refusaient de payer les 
développements nécessaires à 
assurer la compatibilité de leur 
système avec Sabre. A ce propos 
les compagnies mises en cause 
ont invoqué que ces dévelop-
pements coûtaient trop cher par 
rapport au bénéfice qu'elles en 
auraient retiré: les parts de 
marché de Sabre étant très 
faibles dans les marchés en 
question, le coût des adaptations 
n'aurait vraisemblablement pas 
été couvert par un juste retour. 
La Commission a accepté le 
point de vue des compagnies 
aériennes. En effet, elle a estimé 
que c'est au SIR "demandeur" de 
s'adapter aux standards (ou à la 
structure du système informa-
tique) de la compagnie aérienne 
et non l'inverse (l'obligation du 
transporteur se limitant à com-
muniquer ses standards). Le coût 
des adaptations doit, en toute 
logique, être supporté par le SIR 
à moins que la compagnie 
aérienne n'en décide autrement 
pour des raisons qui lui sont 
propres. 
Les contraintes propres au 
développement des nouveaux 
produits 
American Airlines reprochait 
aux compagnies aériennes visées 
par la plainte d'avoir favorisé 
Amadeus dans ses programmes 
de développement de nouvelles 
fonctions. En pratique, American 
Airlines soutenait que ces 
compagnies aériennes lançaient 
les nouvelles fonctionnalités 
systématiquement avec Amadeus 
et ne les introduisaient dans 
Sabre que par la suite (donc en 
retard). Or, selon American 
Airlines, les compagnies aérien-
nes auraient l'obligation de 
lancer toute nouvelle fonction en 
même temps dans tous les SIR. 
Tout en reconnaissant qu'un 
retard systématique dans l'intro-
duction des nouvelles fonction-
nalités peut nuire à l'image d'un 
SIR, la Commission n'a pas 
retenu l'idée d'American Airlines 
que l'obligation de neutralité des 
transporteurs dominants leur 
impose d'habiliter tous les SIR à 
toutes les fonctionnalités au 
même moment. En effet, une 
telle obligation serait excessive 
et ignorerait les contraintes 
intrinsèques à tout processus de 
développement technique. 
Comme rappelé ci-dessus, 
l'existence de différents stan-
dards et de logiques de systèmes 
conduit à ce que l'introduction 
d'une nouvelle fonctionnalité 
(par exemple la possibilité de 
réserver un repas spécial pour un 
certain passager) requiert des 
développements de deux types. 
En premier lieu, le dévelop-
pement de la fonctionnalité en 
question entre la compagnie 
aérienne et son propre système 
informatique (qui, souvent, 
présente un degré de 
compatibilité élevé avec son SIR 
associé). Ensuite, le dévelop-
pement des adaptations néces-
saires pour permettre cette même 
fonctionnalité sur les autres SIR. 
Or la logique économique veut 
que ces développements soient 
menés en série (l'un après l'autre) 
et non en parallèle (tous en 
même temps). En conséquence, 
il est inévitable qu'un certain 
laps de temps s'écoule entre 
l'introduction d'une fonction-
nalité dans un SIR par rapport à 
un autre. 
Une programmation en série des 
développements ne peut donc 
pas être interprétée comme 
indicative d'un abus de position 
dominante (sauf, bien entendu, 
s'il devait s'avérer que ce laps de 
temps a été excessif ou que le 
transporteur dominant n'avait pas 
mis en œuvre les mesures 
nécessaires afin de limiter ce 
laps de temps à un délai 
raisonnable). 
CONCLUSION 
Le cas Sabre contre Amadeus 
e.a. nous suggère deux 
considérations. 
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En premier lieu, l'impact que ce 
précédent pourra avoir pour 
l'avenir. En effet, bien que cette 
affaire n'ait pas donné lieu à une 
décision formelle de la part du 
Collège, elle a conduit les 
services de la Commission à 
prendre explicitement ou 
implicitement position sur des 
thèmes liés aux technologies de 
l'information. Nul doute qu'avec 
le développement du commerce 
électronique, des thèmes analo-
gues risquent de se poser à 
nouveau. Il sera alors intéressant 
de voir si ces prises de position 
préliminaires seront confirmées 
par la suite. 
En second lieu, îe fait que cette 
affaire, couronnée de succès, 
constitue le premier cas concret 
de mise en œuvre du principe de 
courtoisie active prévue par 
l'accord bilatéral entre l'Union 
Européenne et les Etats Unis 
d'Amérique. Comme l'a déclaré 
le Commissaire Monti, l'issue 
satisfaisante de cette enquête 
"démontre qu'une collaboration 
étroite entre l'UE et les États-
Unis permet de mieux faire 
respecter le droit de la 
concurrence des deux côtés de 
l'Atlantique", au profit des 
entreprises et des consom-
mateurs. 
Positive Comity 
Stephen Ryan, DG COMP A-4 
1. What is positive comity? 
International comity. The notion 
of comity, whereby one 
jurisdiction may take into 
account the interests of another 
jurisdiction in the application of 
its laws, is well-established in 
international law. In pursuit of 
this principle, a jurisdiction may 
elect to exercise restraint or 
moderation in its law 
enforcement activity, out of 
deference to the important 
interests, and sometimes 
conflicting laws, of another 
jurisdiction. At least in the area 
of competition law enforcement, 
two distinct forms of comity can 
be distinguished: traditional and 
positive comity. 
Positive comity. Positive comity 
is the process by which one 
jurisdiction, which believes that 
its important interests are being 
adversely affected by allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct taking 
place in the territory of another 
jurisdiction, may request that the 
latter investigate and, if 
warranted, prosecute the 
behaviour on the basis of its 
laws. This would normally imply 
that the requesting jurisdiction 
would then refrain from pursuing 
its own enforcement activity 
with respect to the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct, at least 
pending the outcome of the 
requested investigation. 
Traditional (or "negative ") 
comity distinguished. The notion 
of traditonal comity, on the other 
hand, means that a jurisdiction 
should normally pay heed to the 
important interests of other 
jurisdictions in the application of 
its competition laws. In 
particular, observance of 
traditonal comity is intended to 
avoid any direct conflict between 
competition law enforcement 
activity in different jurisdictions. 
2. Positive comity in the 
1991 and 1998 EU/US 
Agreements 
Positive comity is provided for 
in the 1991 EU/US competition 
cooperation agreement ', and in 
the 1998 EU/US positive comity 
accord52; the notion is also 
-1 Agreement between the 
Government of the United States 
of America and the Commission 
of the European Communities 
regarding the application of their 
competition laws, OJ L 95 of 
27.4.95, pp.47 - 50. 
5 - Agreement between the 
European Communities and the 
Government of the United States 
of America on the application of 
positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition 
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enshrined in the 1995 OECD 
Recommendation on cooperation 
between member countries in 
competition matters53, to which 
both the EU and US subscribe. 
The positive comity provisions 
in the two agreements represent 
a commitment on the part of the 
European Union and the United 
States, where possible, to 
cooperate with respect to 
antitrust enforcement, rather than 
to always seek to apply their 
competition laws extraterrito-
rial ly. The provisions are also 
aimed at avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of enforcement 
activity on the two sides of the 
Atlantic, and at ensuring that 
anticompetitive conduct is 
investigated by the authority best 
placed - notably in terms of fact-
finding and the enforcement of 
remedies - to do so. 
The 1991 agreement provides 
that "if a Party [the EU or US] 
believes that anticompetitive 
activities earned out on the 
territory of the other Party are 
adversely affecting its important 
interests, the first Party may 
notify the other Party and may 
request that the other Party's 
competition authorities initiate 
appropriate enforcement 
activities". The agreement goes 
on to provide that the 
"competition authorities of the 
laws, OJ L 173, 18/06/1998, pp. 
2 6 - 3 1 . 
5 J Revised Recommendation of the 
Council concerning Co-
operation between Member 
Countries on Anticompetitive 
Practices affecting International 
Trade, 27 and 28.7.1995, 
C(95)130/FINAL. 
notified Party will consider 
whether or not to initiate 
enforcement activities, or to 
expand ongoing enforcement 
activities, with respect to the 
anticompetitive activities identi-
fied in the notification". 
The 1998 agreement further 
clarifies the procedure to be 
followed with respect to a 
positive comity request (or 
"referral"). The agreement 
creates a presumption that, when 
anticompetitive activities are 
occuring in the whole or in a 
substantial part of the territory of 
one of the parties (the EU or US) 
and are affecting the important 
interests of the other party, the 
latter "will normally defer or 
suspend its enforcement 
activities in favour of' the 
former, at least pending the 
outcome of the requested 
investigation. This should 
happen particularly when the 
anticompetitive activities in 
question do not have "a direct, 
substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable impact on 
consumers" in the territory of the 
party deferring or suspending its 
activities. 
The 1998 agreement specifies 
that a positive comity request 
can only be made if the allegedly 
anticompetitive activities are 
"impermissable under the 
competition laws" of the 
requested jurisdiction. At the 
same time, the agreement makes 
it clear that such a request "may 
be made regardless of whether 
the activities also violate the 
Requesting Party's competition 
laws". 
The 1991 and 1998 agreements 
both provide that the jurisdiction 
dealing with a positive comity 
referral should keep the 
requesting jurisdiction closely 
informed of any important 
developments in its enforcement 
proceedings, within the 
constraints of its internal rules 
protecting the confidentiality of 
information. The two agreements 
also make it clear that a positive 
comity referral in no way 
detracts from the prosecutorial or 
enforcement discretion of either 
jurisdiction's authorities. 
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La Cohérence entre la politique de 
concurrence et les fonds structurels 
Nicoletta FALCONE et Paola ¡CARDI, DG COMP-G-1 
1. La cohésion économique 
et sociale comme objectif 
de la Communauté 
européenne. 
L'existence de disparités 
structurelles profondes parmi les 
régions de Γ Union européenne et 
la volonté de concilier un 
système d'organisation économi­
que basé sur les forces de 
marché ainsi que sur la liberté 
d'opportunités et d'entreprise, 
avec l'engagement en faveur des 
valeurs de solidarité interne et 
soutien réciproques, ont poussé 
la Communauté à introduire dans 
le traité de Rome, avec l'Acte 
unique européen de 1986, une 
nouvelle exigence politique: «la 
cohésion économique et 
sociale», un corollaire 
indissociable de réalisation du 
marché unique. 
2. Les instruments de la 
cohésion économique et 
sociale : les fonds 
structurels et la politique 
de concurrence. 
Les fonds structurels repré­
sentent l'instrument principal de 
la politique régionale commu­
nautaire, grâce auxquels l'Union 
européenne réalise la cohésion 
économique et sociale. Les 
objectifs poursuivis sont le 
développement et l'ajustement 
structurel des régions en retard 
de développement, la recon­
version économique et sociale 
des zones ayant des difficultés 
structurelles ainsi que l'ajuste­
ment et la modernisation des 
politiques et des systèmes 
d'éducation, formation et 
emploi54. Ils se traduisent 
concrètement par la possibilité 
de la part des Etats membres 
d'obtenir des subventions 
communautaires qui complètent, 
selon le principe 
d'additionnalité, l'engagement 
financier des Etats membres. 
Parallèlement aux Fonds 
Structurels, la politique de 
concurrence apporte une 
contribution essentielle et directe 
au renforcement de la cohésion 
économique et sociale de 
l'Union européenne. Son rôle se 
manifeste surtout à travers la 
politique des aides d'Etat, 
notamment aux articles 87 et 88 
du traité CE (ex articles 92 et 
93), et plus en particulier, à 
travers les aides d'Etat à finalité 
régionale. Les nonnes commu­
nautaires en matière d'aides 
54 Conformément à ce qui a été prévu 
par l'Agenda 2000, les objectifs des 
fonds structurels pour la période 
2000­2006 (les Fonds structurels de 
la troisième génération) ont été 
réduits de 7 à 3.Voir pour plus de 
détails le Règlement Ν1260/1999 du 
Conseil du 21 juin 1999 portant 
dispositions générales sur les Fonds 
structurels (JO C 176 du 9.6.1998, 
p. 1). 
d'Etat prévoient un mécanisme 
qui interdit aux Etats membres 
d'octroyer des aides incompa­
tibles avec le principe de libre 
concurrence, exception faite, 
entre autre, des cas où les 
dérogations prévues par l'article 
87. § 3 alinéas a) et c) sont 
d'application. Ces cas prévoient 
respective­ment que l'aide sera 
destinée à «favoriser le 
développement économique de 
régions dans lesquelles le niveau 
de vie est anormalement bas ou 
dans lesquelles sévit un grave 
sous­emploi» ou à «faciliter le 
développement de certaines 
activités ou de certaines régions 
économiques quand elles 
n'altèrent pas les conditions des 
échanges dans une mesure 
contraire à l'intérêt commun». 
Le choix des régions éligibles 
aux aides en question devient 
donc un instrument pour une 
poursuite correcte de la 
cohésion: l'objectif prioritaire de 
la cohésion demande en fait un 
contrôle rigoureux sur les aides 
dans les régions plus riches afin 
de garantir que l'impact des 
interventions destinées au 
développement des régions 
moins favorisées de la 
Communauté ne soit pas annulé 
par des aides importantes 
octroyées dans les régions les 
plus favorisées55. 
A cette fin la Commission a 
établi un plafond d'intensité 
d'aide des régions admises à la 
dérogation prévue par l'article 
­,­' Voir à ce propos la XXle Rapport 
sur la politique de concurrence, 
1995, paragraphe 158. 
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87 § 3 · alinéa a) du traité CE 
(régions en retard de dévelop-
pement, aussi appelé «sous-
développement absolu») diffé-
rent de celui relatif aux régions 
admises à la dérogation prévue 
par l'article 87 § 3 alinéa c) 
(régions développées, confron-
tées à des problèmes de 
reconversion, aussi appelé 
«sous-développement relatif»). 
En outre, toujours dans le 
contexte de l'objectif de 
cohésion, la concentration 
géographique des aides vise la 
maximisation de leur efficacité 
économique et limite l'impact 
sur la concurrence. 
3. La cohérence entre la 
politique de concurrence 
et les fonds structurels 
L'action de l'Union dans le 
cadre des objectifs régionaux des 
fonds structurels d'une part, et la 
politique de concurrence dans le 
cadre des aides régionales, 
d'autre part, constituent donc 
deux éléments complémentaires 
et inséparables de la politique de 
cohésion. L'efficacité de ces 
deux politiques dépend en 
grande partie, de la cohérence de 
leur articulation, difficile à 
réaliser surtout à cause du 
nombre et de la diversité des 
protagonistes ayant des compé-
tences, des échéances et des 
objectifs différents. La Commis-
sion a en fait une compétence 
exclusive en matière d'aides 
d'Etat et partage avec les Etats 
membre et le Conseil la 
compétence en matière de 
politique structurelle. 
Nombreux ont été les 
instruments utilisés par la 
Commission afin de coordonner 
et aligner ces deux politiques et 
de réaliser la cohérence entre les 
décisions adoptées dans le cadre 
de la politique de concurrence, et 
les décisions relatives aux 
régions éligibles aux Fonds 
Structurels. En particulier, dans 
une Communication de 199856, 
la Commission a défini la 
stratégie nécessaire pour 
améliorer la coordination entre la 
politique en matière d'aides 
d'Etat et les Fonds structurels. 
Un des éléments centraux de 
cette stratégie vise l'augmen-
tation de la cohérence entre les 
cartes relatives aux aides 
nationales à finalité régionale et 
celles relatives aux Objectifs 1 et 
2. 
En premier lieu, afin d'améliorer 
la coordination entre ces deux 
cartes, les Etats membres ont été 
invités à aligner la période de 
validité de la carte des aides 
régionales sur le calendrier 
d'intervention des Fonds 
Structurels57. 
En deuxième lieu, la 
Commission a demandé au 
Conseil d'appliquer rigoureu-
sement le seuil de 75% du PIB 
par habitant pour identifier les 
régions présentant des retards 
5 " Communication de la Commission 
aux Etats membres sur la politique 
régionale et la politique de 
concurrence (JO C 90 du 26.3.1998, 
p.3). 
5 ' Voir le point 5.3 des Lignes 
directrics concernant les aides d'Etat 
à finalités régionale (JO C 74 du 
10.3.1998, p. 4). 
dans le développement au titre 
de l'Objectif 1. Une telle 
application rigoureuse garantit 
une totale cohérence entre ces 
régions et celles visées par 
l'article 87 § 3 alinéa a)58. 
En troisième lieu, le Règlement 
sur les Fonds structurels reprend 
les objectifs formulés par la 
Commission dans la 
Communication aux Etats 
membres sur la politique 
régionale et la politique de 
concurrence, tout en demandant 
aux Etats membres de garantir 
un niveau élevé de cohérence 
entre les propositions présentées 
au titre de l'Objectif 2 et celles 
au titre de l'article 87 § 3 alinéa 
c)59. Sur la même ligne, le point 
3.10.5 des Lignes directrices 
concernant les aides d'Etat à 
finalité régionale60 avait déjà 
prévu à cet effet, la possibilité 
pour les Etats membres de 
proposer des zones éligibles à la 
dérogation 87 § 3 alinéa c) au 
titre de leur statut de zones 
éligibles aux Fonds structurels, 
toujours dans le respect des 
conditions de compacité et de 
population minimale. Dans ce 
contexte, pour la période 2000-
2006, plusieurs Etats membre, 
comme la France, l'Italie, la 
Belgique, le Royaume Uni, 
5 8 Voir le Règlement N1260/1999 du 
Conseil du 21 juin 1999 portant 
dispositions générales sur les Fonds 
structurels, considérant n. 16 et 
article 3, paragraphe 1. 
5 9 Voir le Règlement N1260/1999 du 
Conseil du 21 juin 1999 portant 
dispositions générales sur les Fonds 
structurels, considérant n. 16. 
60 JOC74du 10.03.1998, p.4. 
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l'Espagne, le Danemark et la 
Suède ont proposé des zones 
éligibles à la dérogation 87 § 3 
alinéa c) au titre de leur statut de 
zones éligibles à l'Objectif 2. 
Certaines disparités entre les 
deux politiques restent toutefois 
présentes. La couverture 
géographique en termes de 
population eligible aux Fonds 
structurels est différente de celle 
eligible aux aides à finalité 
régionale, et ceci aussi bien dans 
Tableau 61 
la période 1994-1999 que dans la 
période 2000-2006. Pour la 
période 1994-1999, 50,6% de la 
population de l'Union étaient 
éligibles aux aides structurelles 
communautaires, tandis que 
seulement 46,7% de la 
population étaient classés au titre 
de l'article 87 § 3 alinéa a) et c). 
De même, pour la période 2000-
2006, les estimations provisoires 
indiquées dans le tableau ci-
après montrent que la 
correspondance entre les zones 
couvertes dans les deux cas n'est 
toujours pas réalisée : même si la 
couverture des Fonds structurels 
est devenue globalement 
inférieure à celle des aides 
d'Etat, certaines zones éligibles 
aux Fonds continuent à ne pas 
être couvertes par des aides 
d'Etat à finalité régionale (6,6% 
pour la période 1994-1999 et 
5,6% pour la période 2000-
2006). 
Cohérence entre les zones "Fonds Structurels" et les zones "Aides d'Etat" 
en % de la population de l'Union 
Zones où des aides 
régionales nationales 
sont autorisées 
Zones où des aides 
régionales nationales 
ne sont pas 
autorisées 
Totaux 










Sources: Eurostat, DGCOMP, calculs DGREGIO 
Régions non éligibles 


















Période 2000-2006: estimations basées sur une comparaison géographique au niveau NUTS5 
Par contre, le fait qu'un certain 
pourcentage de la population 
vive dans des régions couvertes 
par des régimes d'aide à finalité 
régionale sans être éligibles aux 
Fonds structurels (2,7% pour la 
période 1994-1999 et 6,9% pour reis puisqu'elle garantit la 
la période 2000-2006) constitue 
une condition favorable à la 
cohérence entre la politique des 
aides régionales et les 
interventions des Fonds structu-
flexibilité des choix des Etats 
membres en matière de politique 
régionale en mettant à leur 
disposition une marge de 
manœuvre pour poursuivre des 
61 Il s'agit d'estimations provisoires. 
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politiques ' régionales qui leur 
sont propres, au-delà des zones 
définies conjointement pour 
l'application de la politique 
régionale communautaire. 
4. Conclusions 
Grâce aux derniers instruments 
législatifs disponibles, des nom-
breux progrès ont eu lieu depuis 
que la politique régionale 
communautaire a été lancée. La 
concentration des ressources 
dans les régions problématiques 
et la cohérence des initiatives de 
solidarité en matière de 
développement de l'économie 
régionale deviennent les princi-
pes clefs à la base de l'efficacité 
des politiques de cohésion. Une 
telle stratégie devient encore 
plus importante si l'on considère 
que la Communauté européenne 
s ouvrira a au moins six 
nouveaux Etats dans le cours de 
la programmation 2000-2006. 
L'entrée des nouveaux pays 
augmentera les disparités en 
termes de revenu et d'indicateurs 
socio-économiques et une 
application rigoureuse des 
principes susmentionnés sera 
essentielle. 
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ANTI-TRUST RULES 
Application of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between 1st June and 30tn September 2000 
Commission fines ADM, Ajinomoto, 
others in lysine cartel 
Georg DE BRONETT, DG COMP-C-2 
The Commission has fined 
Archer Daniels Mid/and, 
Ajinomoto and three other 
companies a total of almost 110 
million Euro for operation a 
global price-fixing cartel for 
lysine. The decision highlights 
the Commission 's determination 
to fight cartels, the most 
damaging of all anti-competitive 
practices. 
Lysine is the most important 
amino acid used in animal 
foodstuffs for nutritional 
purposes. Amino acids are 
building blocks of protein. They 
can be of vegetal or animal 
origin (e.g. soybeanmeal of 
fishmeal). They can also be 
manufactured. The five cartel 
participants manufacture and sell 
synthetic amino acids. The 
availability of synthetic amino 
acids enables nutritionists to 
compose protein diets the better 
meet the animal's feed 
requirements. 
The Commission's extensive 
investigation found that Archer 
Daniels Midland Co (USA), 
Ajinomoto Co (Japan), Cheil 
(Korea), Kyowa Hakko (Japan) 
and Sewon (Korea) fixed lysine 
prices world-wide, including in 
the European Economic Area. 
They have also fixed sales quota 
for that market and operated an 
information exchange in order to 
underpin these quotas from at 
least July 1990 to June 1995. 
The Commission considers that 
the cartel represents a very 
serious infringement of the EC 
competition rules and justifies 
heavy fines. The leading players 
in the cartel, Archer Daniels 
Midland and Ajinomoto are 
fined 47.3 million Euro and 28.3 
million Euro respectively. The 
other three cartel participants, 
Cheil, Kyowa and Sewon 
receive a fine of 12.2 million, 
13.2 million and 8.9 million 
Euro respectively. 
This case started in July 1996, 
shortly before several cartel 
participants were charged by the 
US antitrust authorities with 
engaging in illegal conspiracy. 
In July 1996, Ajinomoto decided 
to inform the Commission about 
the existence of the cartel 
covering a period from Archer 
Daniels Midland's entry into the 
EEA lysine market (June 1992) 
up to June 1995. 
Ajinomoto's decision came right 
after the Commission had 
adopted its Leniency Notice on 
the non-imposition or reduction 
of fines in cartel cases (O.J. C 
207 of 18 July 1996). This 
Notice sets out the conditions 
under which companies co-
operating with the Commission 
during its investigation into a 
cartel may be exempted from 
fines or granted reductions in the 
fines which would otherwise 
have been imposed upon them. 
Three other cartel participants 
started to co-operate with the 
Commission at a later stage. 
Pursuant to the Leniency Notice, 
the Commission has granted four 
co-operating companies signifi-
cant reductions in the fines. 
As said, Ajinomoto was the first 
to come in an give decisive 
evidence of the cartel. However, 
it was also a ring-leader in the 
cartel and failed to inform the 
Commission of an earlier period 
of the cartel involving the then 
three Asian producers 
Ajinomoto, Kyowa and Sewon 
(dating back to July 1990). The 
Notice provides for a maximum 
reduction in the fine of 50% in 
such a case. The Commission 
takes the view that it can grant 
this maximum reduction to 
Ajinomoto. 
The Commission also grants a 
50 % reduction to Sewon. This 
company informed the 
Commission about the earlier 
period of the cartel while also 
producing further evidence of 
the later cartel. 
Cheil and Kyowa also provided 
the Commission with evidence 
confirming the existence of the 
infringements. They receive 
smaller reductions of 30 % each. 
Archer Daniels Midland did not 
co-operate with the Commission 
during the investigation. 
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However, it did not contest the 
facts set out in the Commission's 
Statements of Objections. For 
this, the company receives a 10 
% reduction of the fine. 
Competition Commissioner 
Mario Monti said : 
« This decision is rigorous and 
balanced. On the one hand, the 
Commission needs to be tough 
on these sort of hardcore cartels. 
That is why heavy fines are in 
order here. They must have a 
deterrent effect. On the other 
hand, we do take the Leniency 
Notice at heart. This is borne out 
by the significant reductions in 
the fines for Ajinomoto and 
Sewon, the two companies who 
co-operate most with my 
services. » 
Commission prohibits discriminatory 
landing fees at Spanish airports 
Oliver Stehmann, DG COMP-D-2 
1. Introduction 
The Commission has been 
examining landing fees at 
European airports for a 
number of years. On 28 June 
1995 it ruled that the system 
of discounts operated at the 
main Brussels airport 
infringed EU law. 
Subsequently most Member 
States fell in line with the 
Commission's viewpoint and 
changed their system of 
landing fees. Most recently, 
the French, Irish and Swedish 
airport authorities agreed to 
carry out the necessary 
changes. Nevertheless, two 
further decisions were taken 
against the Portuguese and 
Finish airport authorities on 
10 February 199962. As one 
While the Portuguese authorities 
are challenging the Commis-
sion's decision in the European 
further step in this procedure, 
on 26 July 2000, the European 
Commission adopted a 
decision against the system of 
landing fees applied at 
Spanish airports which it 
found to discriminate in 
favour of national airlines. 
2. The Spanish system of 
landing fees 
The Spanish airport authority, 
AENA63, which is a public 
enterprise, has been granted the 
exclusive right to administer 
the airport infrastructure of all 
41 commercial airports on the 
Spanish territory. In return for 
the services provided in 
Court of Justice, the Finish 
authorities have undertaken to 
respect the Commission's 
decision and change their system 
of landing fees by January 2001. 
6 3 AENA: Aeropuertos Españoles y 
Navegación Aérea 
connection with the landing 
and take-off of planes a fee has 
to be paid by the airlines. The 
landing fees as well as the 
modulations are set by loyal 
decrees and by law.64 Three 
categories of airports are 
distinguished according to the 
importance of their traffic65. 
Different landing fees are 
established for national flights 
based on the maximum take-
off weight of the plane and 
based on the category of 
airports. For instance, the fee 
for an aircraft below 10 tonnes 
at a first category airport 
amounts to 694 pesetas/t. For 
an airport in the third category 
it amounts to 521 pesetas/t. 
The Spanish law furthenuore 
distinguishes between dome-
6 4 The royal decrees 1064/1991 and 
1268/1994 as well as law 
41/1994 
6 5 For instance, in the first category 
belong Madrid-Barajas, Palma 
de Mallorca, Barcelona, Gran 
Canaria, Malaga, Tenerife-sur, 
Alicante, Lanzarote, and in the 
second category Fuerteventura, 
Bilbao, Santiago de compostela, 
Tenerife-norte, Menorca etc. 
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stic, intra-Community and 
extra-Community flights. In 
the case of an aircraft below 10 
tonnes at an airport of the first 
category the fee amounts to 
940 pesetas/t. in the case of 
extra-Community flights and 
751 pesetas/t. for intra-EEA 
flights. For every category of 
airports and for every weight 
category of planes, landing 
fees are hi eher for intra-
Community flights than for 
domestic flights. The highest 
fees are charged for extra-
Community flights. 
As a second measure, the law 
grants discounts according to 
the number of landings per 
month on a specific airport. 
For the first 50 landings no 
discounts are granted. For the 
51s' to the 100lh landing a 
discount of about 9% is 
granted. The discounts 
increase further with the 
number of landings per 
month. As can be seen from 
the following table, the most 
important discounts are only 
available for airlines which 
have more than 200 landings 
per month. 













Discounts on landing fees at Spanish airports in the year 2000. 
3. The relevant market 
The product market 
The relevant market is defined as 
the market for services linked to 
access to airport infrastructure 
for which a fee is payable. More 
specifically, such services are 
linked to the exploitation and 
maintenance of runways, the use 
of taxiways and aprons, and 
approach guidance for civil 
aircraft. 66 
66 This corresponds to the market 
definition chosen in previous 
decisions, as Brussels National 
Airport: Commission Decision 
95/364/EC of 28 June 1995, OJ L 
216, 12.9.1995, p. 8., and the two 
Commission decisions of 10 
February 1999 on landing charges 
The geographic market 
The 41 airports administered by 
AENA are interchangeable only 
to a limited extent and each can 
therefore be regarded as a 
distinct geographic market. The 
distances between the different 
airports are considerable and 
each has its own, well-defined 
catchment area. Airlines running 
domestic or intra-EEA flights to 
and from Spain have no option, 
therefore, but to use the airports 
administered by AENA, along 
with the airport facility access 
applied by the Finnish and 
Portuguese Civil Airport 
Authorities: Commission Decision 
99/198/EC and 99/199/EC of 10 
February 1999, OJ L69/24, 
16.3.1999, p.26-27. 
services provided in these 
airports 67 
4. The Commission's 
Assessment 
AENA is a public undertaking in 
the sense of Article 86(1) of the 
EC Treaty and the relevant laws 
and decrees fixing landing fees 
at Spanish airports are a state 
measure within the meaning of 
67 The only international airport not 
administered by AENA that could 
serve the same geographic area, i.e. 
Lisbon, is several hundred 
kilometers away from Madrid and 
other Spanish airports and, 
moreover, it is not linked by an 
adequate road or rail infrastructure. 
Thus it does not constitute a realistic 
alternative. 
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Article 86(Ί ). There is no doubt 
that AENA, whose core activity 
is to provide airlines with access 
services to civil airport facilities 
in return for a fee, is, according 
to the definition of the Court, an 
undertaking within the meaning 
of Article 82 of the Treaty. 
Dominant position 
As the only means available to a 
carrier for providing air transport 
services to a given town, airports 
have a dominant position as 
regards a very high proportion of 
their traffic. The airline has no 
choice and, as a result, the 
airport faces little risk that the 
airline would change the airport 
as a result of a lower fee offered 
elsewhere. Thus, each of the 
AENA-managed airports is in a 
dominant position as there is 
normally only one commercial 
airport for each geographic 
market and given that high entry 
barriers exist with regard to the 
construction of new airports. 
Since AENA has the exclusive 
right to administer these airports, 
it holds a dominant position on 
the market for aircraft landing 
and take-off services. 
Substantial part of the common 
market 
In 1999, the AENA-
administered airports had a total 
traffic of 63 million passengers 
of which intra-Community 
flights account for 
approximately 32 million 
passengers. These airports 
handled more than 584 000 
tonnes of freight. AENA holds a 
dominant position on the market 
for aircraft landing and take-off 
services on all the 41 airports for 
commercial civil traffic in Spain. 
Together they cover the whole of 
Spain, which is a substantial part 
of the common market. 
Abuse of a dominant position 
When assessing the abuse, the 
Commission looked at both 
elements of the Spanish landing 
fees, i.e. the differentiation 
according to the origin of the 
flight and the discounts granted, 
separately. 
(a) Discounts based on landing 
frequency 
Rebates as such are a normal 
business practice if offered by a 
company which is not dominant. 
They only may become a 
problem if granted by a 
dominant firm. The latter can use 
discounts to distort competition 
in the market. Article 82 requires 
that a dominant firm must treat 
its clients equally, as long as the 
transactions are comparable. 
Hence, there must be an 
objective justification for any 
difference in treatment of its 
various clients by an undertaking 
in a dominant position. In the 
case of landing of planes, for 
instance, such an objective 
justification could be economies 
of scale in carrying out the 
landing services, the aim to 
reduce traffic noise or air 
congestion. 
The effect of the discount system 
is that airlines are treated 
differently in terms of the price 
charged for landins, and take-off 
services. Although the discounts 
offered by AENA apply to all 
airlines, de facto, domestic 
airlines benefit considerably 
more than foreign ones. Every 
landing after the 200'h qualifies 
for a discount of 35%, with no 
limit on the number of landings 
thereafter. Thus, airlines which 
carry out significantly more than 
200 landings a month, such as 
Iberia, benefit from a 
proportionally higher overall 
discount. Only Spanish airlines, 
as Iberia, Binter Canarias, 
Spanair, Air Europa or Air 
Nostrum benefit from the largest 
category of discounts. The other 
airlines receive average 
discounts, in return for 
equivalent services provided by 
AENA, which are considerably 
smaller. In 1999, Iberia alone 
received about 62% of all 
discounts on landing fees 
granted by AENA. 
In the Commission's view, there 
is no objective justification for 
this difference in treatment. The 
services provided by AENA, 
such as approach control and use 
of apron areas, require the same 
work irrespective of the 
individual airline. In the case of 
landing and take-off services 
economies of scale do not exist. 
The services provided do not 
depend on the individual owner 
of the aircraft or whether they 
are rendered to the first or the 
10th aircraft of the same airline. 
With regard to the Canary Islands, 
Spain justified the discounts on 
the grounds that this would foster 
regional and cohesion policy 
objectives. It would promote the 
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Islands as a tourist destination. 
These justifications were refuted 
in the Commission's decision. 
The goal of promoting the Canary 
Islands as a tourist destination 
could be achieved by non-
discriminatory discounts 
accessible to all airlines operating 
services to and from the Canary 
Island airports68. 
Thus, the Commission 
concluded that by applying the 
discounts as described above, 
AENA treats airlines differently 
without objective justification. It 
thereby imposed on some of 
them a competitive 
disadvantage, which constitutes 
an abuse of dominant position in 
the sense of Article 82(2)(c). 
(b) The differentiation of 
charges according to type 
of flight (domestic or 
international) 
A similar reasoning applies to 
the differentiation of tariffs 
depending on whether it is a 
domestic or an intra-Community 
flight. Also in this case the effect 
6 ° In addition, it is not obvious that the 
present system of landing fees 
would in fact help developing the 
Canary Islands as a tourist 
destination. For Canary Islands, the 
intra-Community traffic is more 
than twice as large as the intra-Spain 
traffic. As pointed out above, the 
present discount system de facto 
discriminates against (non-Spanish) 
European airlines. By imposing 
higher cost on European airlines, the 
discount system also generates 
higher travelling cost for the Canary 
Island's main source of tourists, i.e. 
European tourists from outside 
Spain. 
is to treat airlines differently for 
the provision of equivalent 
landing and take-off services. 
This places airlines operating 
EEA services at a competitive 
disadvantage in comparison to 
airlines providing domestic 
services. The differentiation of 
landing fees according to the 
origin of the flight therefore 
constitutes another abuse of a 
dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 82 (2)(c). 
Effect on trade between the 
Member States 
In line with previous 
jurisprudence69, the Commission 
concluded that, given the volume 
of traffic between Spain, the 
Community and the EEA, there 
is an appreciable effect of the 
discussed measures on cross-
border trade. Taken all airports 
together, in 1999 with 32 million 
passengers the traffic volume 
between Spain and other 
Member States of the 
Community exceeds the 
domestic traffic volume of 25 
million passengers, respectively. 
In the case of the Canary Islands, 
the intra-Community traffic is 
more than twice as large as the 
intra-Spain traffic. Also the 
traffic between Spain and EEA 
69 In its judgement in the Corsica 
Ferries case, the Court of Justice 
recognised that discriminatory 
practices which "affect undertakings 
providing transport services 
between two Member States, (...) 
may affect trade between Member 
States." Case C-18/93 Corsica 
Ferries Italia Sri v. Corpo dei Piloti 
del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-
1783. 
countries is substantial. In 1998 
there were about 871 thousand 
passengers travelling on direct 
flights between Norway and 
Spain. 
5. Conclusions 
As a result of the above, the 
Commission found that the 
system of discounts and different 
landing fees according to the 
origin of the flight, as 
established in a royal decree by 
the Spanish government, 
discriminates in favour of 
national airlines. There does not 
exist an objective justification 
for such discriminatory 
treatment. Since it is enacted by 
the Spanish State, the latter is 
therefore infringing Article 86 
(1) in conjunction with Article 
82 of the Treaty. As a result, the 
Spanish government has been 
given two months to report to the 
Commission on how it will 
abolish the criticised pricing 
scheme. 
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Adoption of Regulation 823/2000 
renewing the block exemption for liner 
shipping consortia 
Charles WILLIAMS, DG COMP-D-2 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 823/2000 of 19 April 200070 
contains a block exemption for 
liner shipping consortia valid for 
five years. It renews the block 
exemption contained in 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 870/9571 the five year 
validity of which expired on 25 
April 2000. The new Regulation 
makes some changes to the 
block exemption; these are 
described below. 
CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OF 
CONSORTIA 
A consortium is a grouping of 
shipping lines which cooperate 
to provide a joint liner shipping 
service. Consortia represent a 
method of organisation of liner 
maritime transport which came 
about following the introduction 
of containers at the end of the 
1960s, which necessitated the 
construction of vessels of much 
greater size so as to realise 
economies of scale and to 
improve productivity. The size 
of the investment required to 
acquire and operate such vessels 
was greater than the financial 
resources of the majority of 
individual shipowners. The 
70 OJ L 100, 20.4.2000, p. 24. Press 
release IP/00/404 of 25 April 2000. 
7 1 OJ L89, 21.4.1995, p. 7. 
development of container 
services therefore brought about 
the need for cooperation between 
shipowners and for a 
rationalisation of their activities. 
This cooperation has usually 
taken the form of consortia. 
Although there is a progression 
towards consortia as the 
predominant form of industrial 
organisation in the sector, liner 
conferences, the traditional form 
of organisation for liner 
shipping, continue to exist. 
Shipping lines within a 
conference agree common 
freight rates for sea transport. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/8672 contains a block 
exemption permitting such rate 
fixing by conferences. Most 
consortia operate within 
conferences and their members 
thus are operating under a 
conference tariff. 
THE COUNCIL ENABLING 
REGULATION 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
479/92 of 25 February 1992 
empowered the Commission to 
grant a block exemption for liner 
shipping consortia. 
7 2 OJ L378, 31.12.1986, p. 4. 
This favourable position is 
explained by the advantages 
brought about by consortia. In 
general they help improve not 
only the productivity but also the 
quality of liner transport services 
offered to transport users by 
rationalising the activities of the 
member companies and by the 
economies of scale which they 
bring about. 
THE FIRST BLOCK EXEMPTION: 
REGULATION 870/95 
Commission Regulation 870/95 
of 20 April 1995 granted a block 
exemption for a period of five 
years.73 The objective of the 
Regulation was to create a 
framework which would give 
shipping lines flexibility whilst 
ensuring that shippers received a 
fair share of the benefits. In 
order to take account of the wide 
variety of consortia, the 
Commission did not adopt the 
classic system of lists of 
prohibited 'black' clauses and 
permitted 'white' clauses. 
Instead, the Regulation exempts 
all agreements whose objective 
is the joint operation of liner 
shipping services, provided they 
fulfil the conditions and 
obligations set out in the 
Regulation. 
Under Regulation 870/95, the 
Commission approved eleven 
consortia under the opposition 
procedure, and in several other 
cases the Competition DG sent 
comfort letters confirming that a 
This period is laid down by Art. 2 of 
Rea. 479/92. 
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notified agreement conformed 
with the block exemption. The 
Commission also approved, 
under the objections procedure 
laid down in Article 12 of 
Regulation 4056/86, four 
consortium arrangements that 
fell outside of the block 
exemption. 
PROCEDURAL STEPS LEADING 
TO THE ADOPTION OF THE NEW 
REGULATION 
As a first step in preparing for 
the expiry of Regulation 870/95, 
DGIV prepared a "Report on 
Commission Regulation 
870/95".74 The Report explained 
the adoption of the Regulation, 
recorded points of interpretation 
that had arisen in the course of 
applying the Regulation and set 
out some initial options for the 
renewal of the block exemption. 
The Report was sent for 
comment to the European 
Shippers' Council (ESC), the 
European Community 
Shipowners' Association 
(ECSA) and the European 
Maritime Law Organisation 
(EMLO), as well being placed 
on the DGIV internet site. Five 
sets of comments (including 
from the ESC and ECSA) were 
received, and these were 
considered when drawing up a 
preliminary draft Regulation. 
As required by Articles 4 and 5 
of the enabling Council 
Regulation 479/92, the 
7 4 Working Paper of DGIV, 28 
January 1999, http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dg04/entente/other.htm. 
Commission consulted the 
Maritime Transport Advisory 
Committee both before and after 
the preliminary draft Regulation 
was published in the Official 
Journal of 31 December 199975 
for third party comments. 
Third party comments were 
received from ECSA (European 
Community Shipowners' Asso-
ciations), CLECAT (European 
Liaison Committee of Freight 
Forwarders, Europäisches Ver-
bindungscomité des Speditions-
und Lagereigewerbes, Comité de 
Liaison Européen des 
Commissionnaires et Auxiliaires 
de Transport), and BMLA 
(British Maritime Law 
Association). The comments 
welcomed the renewal of the 
block exemption, and made 
suggestions for further 
amendments which are 
explained below. 
REGULATION 823/2000 
The reasons for which the block 
exemption was adopted in 1995 
are still valid. The application of 
the Regulation 870/95 worked 
well in practice. The 
Commission therefore decided to 
renew the block exemption by 
way of a new Regulation, largely 
replicating Regulation 870/95, 
valid for a further period of five 
years. In particular, the 
Commission neither changed the 
definition of consortia that fall 
within the scope of the block 
exemption, nor changed the list 
of exempted activities. 
7 5 OJC379, 31.12.1999, p. 13. 
Article 1 of Regulation 
823/200076 limits the scope of 
the Regulation to international 
liner services, thus excluding 
cabotage services operating 
solely within a single Member 
State. 
Article 2 of the Regulation 
contains a broad definition of 
consortia. Article 3 contains an 
exhaustive list of exempted 
activities. The new 
Regulation includes amendments 
so as to clarify it in line with the 
Commission's interpretation of 
Regulation 870/95. 
Regulation 823/2000 thus 
provides that: 
(1) the block exemption also 
applies to consortia 
operating on more than one 
trade (Article 1(1)), and the 
market share thresholds are 
required to be met in respect 
of each market upon which 
such a consortium operates 
(Articles 6 and 7); 
(2) exclusivity clauses (that is, 
obligations on the 
consortium members to use 
only those vessels allocated 
to the consortium service on 
the trade route in question 
and to refrain from 
chartering slots on vessels 
belonging to third parties) 
and third party clauses (that 
is, provisions restricting the 
ability of the parties to 
assign, space charter or sub-
space charter to other 
carriers in the relevant trade 
except with the prior 
76 The order of Articles 1 and 2 of 
Regulation 870/95 have been 
inverted in the new Regulation. 
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consent of the other parties) 
are considered to be 
ancillary activities and thus 
to be exempted (Article 
3(3)). 
In the light of the comments 
from third parties, the following 
further changes were made: 
(1) in Article 3(2)(d), the 
reference to "tonnage" pools 
was amended to become a 
reference to "cargo" pools. 
In this context, "tonnage" 
means a quantity of cargo,77 
(2) in 3(3)(b), the exempted 
form of third party clause is 
amended to become an 
obligation not to assign or 
charter space to other 
vessel-operating carriers. 
This change is to avoid that 
freight forwarders and other 
non vessel-operating 
intermediaries are caught by 
a third party clause. 
Article 4 is unchanged and 
provides for the non-
applicability of the block 
exemption for any agreement 
which seeks to freeze the use of 
a fixed percentage of capacity by 
members of the consortium. 
The following four sets of 
conditions and obligations are 
attached to the exemption so as 
to guarantee that the conditions 
of Article 81(3) are fulfilled. 
77 The quantity of cargo is for bulk 
cargoes traditionally expressed as a 
number of tonnes or tons, and for 
containerized cargoes normally 
expressed as a number of TEU 
(twenty foot equivalent units). 
First, Article 5 (which is 
unchanged) lays down a 
condition that the consortium is 
in one or more of the three 
situations described below: 
there is effective price 
competition between the 
members of the conference 
within which the 
consortium operates (as a 
result of independent rate 
action), 
there exists within the 
conference within which the 
consortium operates a 
sufficient degree of 
effective competition in 
terms of services provided 
between consortium 
members and other 
conference members that 
are not members of the 
consortium, 
consortium members are 
subject to effective 
competition from non-
consortium lines, whether 
or not a conference operates 
in the trade in question. 
Second, Articles 6 and 7 lay 
down a condition relating to the 
market shares held by a 
consortium. There is a system of 
three different levels of market 
share. Any consortium with 
market shares on all markets 
below 30% (if within a 
conference) or 35% (if operating 
outside a conference) is 
automatically exempt if it fulfils 
the other conditions of the 
Regulation. If a consortium has a 
market share above 30/35% on 
any market but below 50% on all 
markets, the consortium will 
benefit from the block 
exemption if it is notified to the 
Commission and the 
Commission does not oppose 
exemption within six months. A 
consortium with a market share 
above 50% on any market may 
be notified to benefit, if 
appropriate, from an individual 
exemption. 
The most important change that 
Regulation 823/2000 made to the 
block exemption as compared to 
Regulation 870/95 is to refer to 
market share thresholds in the 
place of trade share thresholds 
(ie, the share of trade held by the 
consortium between the pairs of 
ports that it actually serves) 
referred to in Regulation 870/95. 
Market share is the usual 
indication of market power used 
in competition legislation. The 
trade share criterion was adopted 
in the previous Regulation 
because shipping companies had 
considered that market shares 
would be difficult to calculate; 
experience had however shown 
that shipping companies were 
able to provide market shares. 
Third, Article 8 (which is 
unchanged) lays down additional 
conditions, so for example the 
consortium must preserve the 
right of each individual line to 
offer individual service 
arrangements. Article 8(2) 
stipulates that the consortium 
agreement must allow an 
individual line to withdraw from 
the agreement following a six-
month notice period. This serves 
to ensure that the trade is kept 
flexible and therefore as 
competitive as possible. 
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Fourth, Article 9 (which is 
unchanged) contains obligations 
attaching to the exemption, 
notably that there shall be real 
and effective consultations 
between the consortium and the 
shippers or other transport 
representatives. 
Article 10 is unchanged and 
contains an exemption for 
agreements, between transport 
users and consortia exempted 
under Article 3, which concern 
the use of scheduled maritime 
transport services. 
Article 12 is unchanged and 
empowers the Commission to 
withdraw the block exemption 
from any consortium exempted 
under the Regulation which is, 
nevertheless, found not to 
comply with the requirements of 
Article 81(3) or which is 
prohibited by Article 82. 
The following comments were 
also made by third parties, but 
were not taken up in Regulation 
823/2000: 
( 1 ) a suggestion to reduce the 
six-month period for the 
Commission to react under 
the opposition procedure, 
(2) in relation to the notice 
periods for withdrawal, 
suggestions: 
- to lengthen the initial 
periods of 18 months or 30 
months, 
- to start the initial period not 
from the entry into force of 
the agreement, but from the 
day that a consortium 
commences operations or 
obtains Commission 
approval, whichever is the 
later, 
- to extend the notice period 
from six months to twelve 
months, at least for highly 
integrated consortia. 
The Commission considered that 
the existing provisions relating 
to notice periods for withdrawal 
draw an appropriate balance 
between two conflicting 
considerations. On the one hand, 
setting up a consortium service 
requires investments for which it 
is appropriate to allow an initial 
period that allows reasonable 
protection to the consortium 
service. On the other hand, the 
possibility of a party 
withdrawing from a consortium 
and becoming a competitor 
within a reasonable period is an 
element of potential competition, 
and a factor ensuring flexibility 
to allow services readily to adapt 
to meet changing market 
conditions. 
Eleven consortia were exempted 
under the opposition procedure 
for a period until the expiry of 
Regulation 870/95. That 
procedure enabled the 
Commission to check that those 
consortia were subject to 
effective competition. There was 
no indication that circumstances 
had changed such that those 
consortia were no longer subject 
to effective competition. In order 
to avoid the burden of renewed 
notifications. Regulation 
823/2000 therefore provides that 
such consortia continue to be 
exempted (Recital 27, Article 
13(2)); such agreements remain 
subject to obligations (Article 9) 
and to the Commission's power 
to withdraw the exemption 
(Article 12); 
It was also necessary to make 
provision for notifications that 
existed at the time when 
Regulation 870/95 came to an 
end. Regulation 823/2000 
therefore provides that a 
notification made under the 
opposition procedure of 
Regulation 870/85 and in respect 
of which the period of six 
months had not expired when 
Regulation 870/95 came to an 
end would automatically be 
treated under the opposition 
procedure of the new Regulation 
(Article 13(3)). 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 47 
» ANTI-TRUST RULES 
The Commission persuades Saeco to 
implement an international guarantee 
for its products and closes the 
complaint file 
Robert MATHIAK, DG COMP-F-1 
The Commission has addressed 
the problem of territorial 
restrictions of guarantees offered 
by manufacturers on many 
occasions and has always 
insisted that, where a 
manufacturer offers a guarantee 
for the products bearing his 
trademark, he has to make sure 
that the guarantee can be 
invoked in his distribution 
network in the whole European 
Union. The Commission did so 
in several decisions concerning 
distribution systems relating to 
consumer goods78, and 
Regulation No. 1475/9579 
concerning car distribution 
contains a provision which 
explicitly makes the exemption 
dependent on a Community-
wide guarantee scheme80. 
Territorial restrictions such as a 
clause under which the guarantee 
is valid only in the Member State 
where the relevant good has 
been purchased and into which it 
had been imported directly by 
the official importer, act as a 
disincentive for parallel trade 
between Member States and 
discourage consumers from 
buying products in a Member 
State other than the one in which 
they are resident. They are a 
form of territorial protection for 
distributors and constitute an 
obstacle to the inter-penetration 
of markets. Agreements relating 
to the distribution of the relevant 
products which contain such 
arrangements thus constitute a 
restriction of competition under 
Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty. 
The Court of Justice has 
confirmed this position81. 
The case against Saeco, a 
leading manufacturer of coffee 
machines, had been opened 
following a complaint brought 
by EK Großeinkauf, a 
purchasing co-operative based in 
Germany. EK buys big 
quantities of coffee machines 
from Saeco's distributor in 
Germany and sells them to its 
members in Germany and 
Austria. At the time, the 
guarantee certificates used for 
Saeco products contained a 
clause according to which a 
warranty was only granted in the 
country of purchase and under 
the condition that the relevant 
machine had been imported 
directly by the official importer. 
On that basis, the Austrian 
distributor refused to deal with 
warranty claims for machines 
which had originally been sold 
by the German distributor, and 
both the German and the 
Austrian distributors tried to 
prevent deliveries by EK to 
Austria referring to the limited 
validity of the guarantee. 
Following the complaint, 
however, Saeco decided to 
change its guarantee system so 
as to make sure that customers 
within the EEA may invoke the 
guarantee regardless of the place 
of purchase and of the Member 
State to which it was exported 
originally. On intervention by 
the Commission, Saeco took all 
necessary steps to ensure the full 
implementation of the new 
system, including the substi-
tution of old guarantee 
certificates by new certificates, 
so that consumers now have 
certainty about their rights. This 
allowed the Commission to close 
the case. 
7 8 See XVI. Report on Competition 
Policy 1986, point 56, with further 
references. 
7 9 OJ L 145 of 29 June 1995 
8 0 See Article 5 (1) (1) (a) first 
indent and Article 6 ( 1 ) (7). 
81 See Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. / 
Commission, Case 86/82, 
judgement of 21 February 1984; 
SA ETA Fabriques d'Ébauches / 
SA DG Investment, Case 31/85, 
judgement of 10 December 1985. 
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Amende contre les Editions Nathan 
sur ses accords de distribution de 
matériel éducatif 
Manuel MARTINEZ-LOPEZ, DG COMP-F-1 
Le 5 juillet 2000, la Commission 
a adopté une décision 
d'infraction avec amendes 
contre l'entreprise française 
Editions Nathan concernant ses 
accords de distribution dans 
une procédure intéressant la 
France, la Belgique, l'Italie et 
la Suède. 
Editions Nathan fabrique et 
distribue du matériel éducatif et 
des manuels scolaires, 
principalement en France. Les 
accords en cause concernent 
uniquement le matériel éducatif 
destiné à la petite enfance, qu'un 
réseau de distributeurs 
indépendants vend dans la quasi 
totalité des Etats membres. Ces 
produits sont achetés comme 
supports pédagogiques par les 
crèches, écoles maternelles et 
hôpitaux, un marché estimé à 
environ 600 millions d'euros par 
an dans l'Union européenne. 
L'enquête de la Commission, 
lancée à l'initiative des autorités 
françaises, a révélé que ces 
accords empêchaient les 
distributeurs de commercialiser 
les produits Nathan en dehors de 
leurs territoires exclusifs, 
protégeaient ces territoires contre 
les ventes d'autres distributeurs et 
restreignaient leur liberté de fixer 
les niveaux de prix et conditions 
commerciales de revente. 
De tels accords visant à 
cloisonner les marchés entre Etats 
Membres constituent une 
violation de l'article 81 du traité 
CE. Ils portent préjudice aux 
établissements scolaires qui 
auraient pu profiter de la 
concurrence entre distributeurs de 
différent pays, y compris en 
France, où Nathan est l'un des 
leaders du marché. Cette pratique 
a pénalisé les écoles et autres 
collectivités étant donné que les 
distributeurs étrangers en étaient 
exclus. En dernier ressort, ce sont 
les contribuables et usagers 
parents d'enfants qui subissaient 
le préjudice. 
Par delà la caractérisation de 
l'infraction stricto sensu, cette 
affaire suscite deux remarques 
principales : d'une part, elle 
réitère que la Commission ne 
tolérera pas des accords verticaux 
qui empêchent les 
consommateurs d'obtenir tous les 
bénéfices découlant de 
1 ' interpénétration économique 
voulue par les Traités. De tels 
accords restrictifs sont 
explicitement visés par la récente 
réfonne des règles applicables 
aux accords de distribution, qui 
exclut du bénéfice de l'exemption 
par catégorie les restrictions 
verticales a priori les plus 
dommageables82. 
D'autre part, la Commission a 
toutefois tenu compte aussi du 
fait que la mise en œuvre des 
accords illicites, par ailleurs 
limitée, a été prouvée uniquement 
en France et Belgique. Quoique 
significatives, les parts de 
marchés dans les territoires 
concernés restaient inférieures à 
15%. L'infraction a été qualifiée 
comme peu grave en 
conséquence. Par ailleurs, 
Editions Nathan et son 
distributeur belge Bricolux SA, 
ont aussi activement coopéré 
pendant la procédure. La forte 
réduction du montant de base de 
l'amende en raison de la 
coopération des parties, à savoir 
40%, souligne l'intérêt qu'ont les 
entreprises, dans le respect des 
garanties procédurales, à 
simplifier l'instruction des 
affaires les concernant. 
82 Règlement de la Commission 
(CE) 2790/99 du 22.12.1999, 
Lignes Directrices sur les 
Restrictions Verticales, 1P/00/520 
et site Internet DG Concurrence. 
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Judgement by the Court of First 
Instance of 6 July 2000 concerning 
Commission Decision 
98/273/Volkswagen of 28 January 1998 
Ulrich KRAUSE-HEIBER and 
Konrad SCHUMM, DG COMP-F-2 
History 
By decision of 28.1.199883, the 
Commission had imposed a 
record fine of € 102 million on 
Volkswagen AG, for having 
committed a very serious 
infringement of Article 81 
lasting for more than 10 years. 
This fine was the highest ever 
imposed by the Commission on 
a single undertaking for 
infringement of competition 
rules. 
The Commission had found that 
Volkswagen AG, in conjunction 
with its subsidiaries Audi AG 
and Autogerma SpA, their 
common importer for Italy, had 
developed a strategy, by 
implementing a set of 
measures84, aimed at preventing 
-1 See Commission Press Release 
IP/98/94 of 28 January 1998. 
8 4 The measures found by the 
Commission, which were part of a 
general strategy, comprised a 
restrictive margin policy, a 
restrictive bonus policy, a 
restrictive supply of the Italian 
market, restrictions on cross-
deliveries, termination of dealer 
contracts, and the obligation 
imposed on foreign end 
consumers to sian a declaration to 
customers from Germany and 
Austria in particular, from 
buying new cars in Italy for 
immediate re-export.8·"1 Such 
exports had become attractive 
following the substantial 
depreciation of the Italian Lire, 
which took place in 1992 and in 
1995. Block Exemption 
Regulation No 1475/9586 allows 
manufacturers and/or their 
importers to prevent sales to 
non-authorised resellers, but 
sanctions obstructions of sales to 
end consumers and authorised 
dealers of other Member States. 
These provisions aim at 
promoting intra-brand compe-
tition within the distribution 
network of a given make, and 
shall assure the right of 
consumers to buy a car in the 
Member State of their choice, in 
taking advantage of the benefits 
of the Single Market. 
Volkswagen AG had appealed 
against this decision in April 
sell the car only under certain 
conditions. 
See also Commission Press 
Release IP/00/725 of 6 July 2000 
concerning this judgement. 
1998 with the Court of First 
Instance (hereafter: Court). 
MAIN FINDINGS IN THE 
JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT OF 
FIRST INSTANCE 
By its detailed judgement of 6 
July 200087, the Court largely 
confirmed the Commission 
decision. It however reduced the 
fine to € 90 million. 
Volkswagen based its appeal 
essentially on five grounds. 
While two of them concerned 
possible errors of fact or of law 
in applying Article 81, the 
remaining three grounds were 
most of a procedural nature and 
referred to the principle of good 
administration, the obligation of 
reasoning, and the right of being 
heard. An additional ground 
aimed at a reduction of the fine, 
since Volkswagen considered 
the fine imposed by the 
Commission as excessive. 
The first ground essentially 
concerns the set of export 
restrictions establishing the 
infringement of Article 81, as 
identified by the Commission in 
its decision. The Court 
confirmed that Volkswagen had 
applied a restrictive bonus 
policy, by refusing bonus 
payment for export sales in 
87 
86 Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1475/95 concerning motor vehicle 
distribution and servicing 
agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995. 
See Press Release 50/2000 by the 
Court of First Instance of 6 July 
2000 concerning case T-62/98 
Volkswagen AG vs. Commission 
of the European Communities. 
Volkswagen has lodged an appeal 
against the judgement of the CEI 
with the European Court of 
Justice. 
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excess of 15% of total sales88. 
As concerns the restrictive 
supply policy, by which 
Volkswagen aimed at 
discouraging dealers from 
selling for export, the Court 
confirmed the Commission's 
findings, saying that a strategy 
aiming at obstructing re-exports 
from Italy, and thus foreclosing 
this market, had been applied by 
Volkswagen.89 As to the 
behaviour of dealers towards 
non-resident customers in 
particular, who were, through the 
measures taken by Volkswagen 
and Autogerma, discouraged to 
sell to such clients, the Court 
pointed in particular to the 
substantial number (more than 
60) of complaining letters from 
consumers, in particular German 
and Austrians, who represented 
evidence to the great difficulties 
which had existed with respect 
of buying a car in Italy.90 
The Court however annulled the 
decision in respect to two 
measures. Pursuant to the Court, 
the Commission could not 
sufficiently prove the existence 
of a split-margin system, by 
which a fraction of the dealer's 
margin earned from the sale of a 
car was withheld in case of 
export sale, and could not 
present sufficient evidence either 
that the termination of dealer 
contracts were measures aimed 
at discouraging export sales to 
end consumers and other 
Volkswagen dealers. 
As concerns Volkswagen's 
submission, saying that the 
measures undertaken only aimed 
at reducing the high number of 
sales to non-authorised resellers, 
the Court rejected this 
argument, by referring to 
documents which clearly show 
that re-exports in general, 
including sales to consumers or 
dealers of other Member States, 
were the subject of the 
measures.91 
Object and effect of a 
restriction of competition 
within the reasoning of Article 
81 
One important point of law to 
underline is that the Court 
confirmed, by referring to its 
existing case law. that the effects 
of the export restrictions in place 
need not to be established for the 
application of Article 81, if it 
can be proved that the object of 
the measures is to restrict 
competition, something which is 
very clear for measures aiming 
at limiting parallel export and 
thus at partitioning markets.92 
The Court thus confirmed that 
the object of a measure is 
already sufficient to establish an 
infringement.93 Article 15 of 
Regulation No 17 does not 






Pts. 49, 50, 59. 
Pts. 79, 88. 93. 
Pts. 105, 115, 116, Hi 
Pts. 133 to 135. 
Pts. 178, 181. 
In the same sense: opinion of the 
Advocate General Mischo, 
delivered on 18 May 2000, Case 
C-283/98 P. Mo och Domsjö AB 
vs Commission of the European 
Communities, and the case law 
referred to therein. 
infringement has to be assessed 
by reference to the actual results 
which occur on the market or to 
the harm caused to purchasers of 
the relevant products. 
The Court concluded94 that in 
the present case the Commission 
was not obliged to examine the 
concrete effects of the measures 
on competition within the 
Common Market, given that it 
could show that the agreement in 
question had as its object the 
prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition. In 
addition to that, the Court 
stressed that, in any case, the 
existence of a number of 
consumer complaints confirmed 
that the measures had effects on 
the market. 
In conclusion, the Court found 
that the documents submitted by 
the Commisson proved the 
existence of measures aiming at 
foreclosing the Italian market for 
new cars of the VW and Audi 
brands and establishing an 
infringement of Article 81. It 
pointed in particular to the 
strong evidence submitted by the 
Commission, and the systematic 
character of the infringement.95 
Delimitation of the relevant 
market 
The Court further confirmed the 
Commission decision, by 
holding that the delimitation of 
the relevant geographical market 
was not required in this case, and 
94 
95 
Pts. 178, 179. 
Pts. 193, 195, 196. 
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is generally not required for 
establishing an infringement of 
Article 81, and rejected this part 
of the second ground.96 It 
pointed out that in a case of 
application of Article 81, this 
question does not play the same 
role as in cases of application of 
Article 82, where a delimitation 
of the relevant market is 
necessary. In a case concerning 
Article 81, the relevant market 
may be defined in order to 
determine whether the agreement 
in question was liable to affect 
trade between Member States 
and had as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within 
the Common Market. The 
Commission had found 
sufficient evidence that 
Volkswagen had committed such 
infringement. As the 
Commission was right in 
concluding that the measures 
resulted in the foreclosure of the 
Italian market, it followed that 
operations in all other Member 
States could be affected. 
Therefore, an explicit 
delimitation of the relevant 
market was not necessary in this 
case. 
Reasoning of the decision 
Another ground of appeal which 
referred to insufficient reasoning 
of the decision, was rejected by 
the Court, by explicitly pointing 
to the clear and unambigious 
reasoning made in the decision, 
which has enabled both 
Volkswagen to identify the 
reasoning of the decision for its 
defence, and the Court to carry 
out its judicial review. 
Furthermore, Volkswagen 
claimed that the fine imposed 
was excessive. In this context, it 
has to be noted that the decision 
against Volkswagen is the very 
first decision based on the 
Commission Guidelines97 
concerning the setting of fines, 
which is reviewed by the Court. 
Volkswagen argued that the 
Guidelines had been adopted 
with a view to the current case 
against Volkswagen, and that the 
Commission had not explicitly 
referred to them. In respect to 
the method explained in these 
Guidelines, the Court found 
however that the Commission 
explained in detail the method 
applied for calculating the fine. 
As to the gravity of the 
infringement, the Court held that 
the abundant amount of evidence 
proved the very seriousness of 
the infringement, as stated in the 
decision. It is important to 
underline that the Court 
confirmed that the arguments of 
Volkswagen, referring to the 
lack of fiscal harmonisation of 
the Single Market for cars, and 
monetary instabilities, could not 
justify the non-respect of 
competition rules or attenuate 
such infringement, even if such 
97 
96 Pts. 230, 231,341 
Commission Guidelines on the 
method of setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article 15 (2) of 
Regulation No 17 and Article 65 
(5) of the ECSC Treaty, OJ C 9, 
14.1.98, p.3. 
situation may cause commercial 
difficulties to undertakings.98 
As part of the ground pertaining 
to good administration, 
Volkswagen had referred to the 
information policy conducted by 
the Commission prior to the 
Decision. The Court held that the 
Commissioner and his 
spokesperson had communicated 
the likely amount of the fine to 
certain media before the formal 
adoption of the Decision on 28 
January 1998", and that by this, 
the Commission infringed the 
principle of good administration 
and the presumption of 
"innocence" in its decision. The 
Court did not annul however the 
decision since it was not 
established by concrete evidence 
that the Advisory Committee of 
the Member States or the 
College of Commissioners 
would have modified the amount 
of the fine or the content of the 
decision should the divulgation 
of the information concerned not 
have taken place. 
Reduction of the fine 
The Court reduced the amount of 
the fine from € 102 million to € 
90 million. It found first that the 
Commission did not establish 
with sufficient evidence two of 
the measures applied by 
Volkswagen, and that secondly 
the duration of the infringement 
(three years) was much shorter 
than established by the 
Commission (more than ten 
98 
99 
Pts. 334, 336. 
Pts. 258 to 268. 
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years). It is important to 
underline that the Court did 
however not apply a reduction 
proportional to the shorter 
duration of the infringement. 
Instead, it took into account the 
particular gravity and the 
intensity of the measures in 
setting the fine at € 90 million. 
Therefore, it could be deducted 
from the judgement that the 
Court considered a higher 
amount for the gravity of the 
infringement than the one 
imposed by the Commission. 
The Court also concluded that 
the initial amount fixed by the 
Commission could not be 
considered as particularly high, 
given that it represents a 
relatively low percentage in 
respect to Volkswagen's turnover 
(0.25% of 1997 turnover in the 
Member States primarily 
affected by the infringement 
(Italy, Germany, Austria) and/or 
0.5% of EU turnover. 
vehicle distribution.100 The 
treatment of other pending cases 
against other car manufacturers 
will no doubt take into account 
the various considerations of this 
judgement, which clearly held 
that the measures used by 
Volkswagen to limit exports to 
consumers from other Member 
States are to be considered as 
restriction of competition by 
their object and as a very serious 
infringement of Article 81. 
It also confirms that the 
Commission is rightly entitled to 
impose fines of important 
amount for such infringement 
since the amount of € 90 million 
was considered appropriate for 
an infringement of that type 
lasting three years. This 
indicates that the Court considers 
that fines for such infringement 
should be fixed at a level which 
has a sufficiently dissuasive 
effect. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
JUDGEMENT FOR 
COMPETITION POLICY 
The judgement by the Court of 
First Instance confirms the 
legitimacy of the active policy of 
enforcement of the Commission 
in pursuing infringements of 
Article 81 in motor vehicle 
distribution, which hamper the 
rights of consumers to benefit 
from the Single Market. This 
right is also clearly expressed in 
the current block exemption 
regulation concerning motor 
100 Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1475/95, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, 
Article 5 (2) d) and Article 6 (1) 
(7). 
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The Commission approves the co-
operation agreement between General 
Motors Corporation and Fiat SpA 
Alberta LASCHENA and Christophe DUSSART, 
DG COMP-F-2 
On 16 August 2000, the 
Commission cleared the co-
operation agreement between 
General Motors and Fiat in the 
areas of powertrains l(l!, joint-
purchase of car components 
and some other joint activities, 
such as the organisation of 
financial services directed to 
their dealers and consumers, in 
Europe and Latin America102. 
The Alliance involves General 
Motors taking a 20% equity stake 
in Fiat Auto Holdings BV, a new 
holding that controls Fiat Group's 
auto and light commercial vehicle 
operations. In return, Fiat 
receives approximately 5% of 
General Motors's common stock. 
Notwithstanding this financial 
link, the two car manufacturers 
will continue to compete world-
wide in the design of vehicle 
components not linked to 
powertrains as well as in the 
assembly, distribution, branding, 
marketing and sale of cars. The 
Alliance excludes Fiat's Ferrari 
" ' The powertrain of a motor vehicle 
includes engine, clutch, 
transmission, universal joints, 
drive shaft, differential gear, and 
axle shaft. 
and Maserati luxury sports car 
operations 103 
102 See press release n. IP/00/932, 
Commission approves co-
operation agreement between 
General Motors and Fiai. 
The co-operation agreement 
between the two car 
manufacturers represents the 
latest significant episode in the 
consolidation trend by which car 
manufacturers seek scale 
economies and growth in 
emerging markets. For this 
reason, the evaluation of the 
notified agreement also took into 
account the particular context of 
the automotive industry, which is 
close to maturity and is 
characterised by an increasingly 
concentrated structure with few 
large suppliers104. 
A Carlsberg publication, 
containing a summary of the 
agreement, was made in the 
Official Journal on 20 June 2000. 
in order to give third interested 
parties the possibility of 
submitting their comments on the 
said operation (OJ C170/8, 20 
June 2000). 
1 0 4 See, for example, BMW/Rover 
(Commission Decision M.416. 
14.3.1994), Ford/Mazda 
(Commission Decision M.741, 
24.5.1996), Toyota'Daihatsu 




(Commission Decision M. 1519. 
12.5.1999), Ford/Volvo 
(Commission Decision M.1452, 
26.3.1999) and GM/Saah 
At the heart of the Alliance, is 
the creation of a Powertrain 
joint venture to be located in 
Turin, Italy, and of a 
Purchasing joint venture, which 
is based in Rüsselsheim in 
Germany. These two joint 
ventures will have an initial 
term of 10 years. Each party 
will contribute to the joint 
ventures all of its European and 
Latin American powertrain and 
purchasing assets. The activity 
carried out by these two new 
entities together accounts for an 
important part of the cost of a 
new vehicle. 
The Powertrain joint venture 
will, on an exclusive basis, 
design and produce a broad 
range of diesel and gasoline 
engines and transmissions. Both 
General Motors and Fiat will 
continue to develop their brand 
requirements individually. 
The Purchasing joint venture 
will manage, on an exclusive 
basis, orders for purchases of 
parts for incorporation into 
vehicles manufactured by the 
Parties as well as parts for 
distribution to the aftermarket. 
The Alliance was treated under 
article 81 of the Treaty since it 
was considered to fall outside 
the scope of council regulation 
4064/89 as GM and Fiat remain 
independent companies. 
The Powertrain joint venture 
and the Purchasing joint venture 
were considered to be two 
(Commission Decision M.1847, 
28.2.2000). 
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structural co-operative joint 
ventures, as they combine part 
of the existing activities of the 
parent companies in the area of 
the production of powertrain 
and purchases on a long term 
basis10-"1. Nevertheless, the joint 
ventures do not perform, on a 
lasting basis, all the functions of 
autonomous economic entities, 
remaining largely dependent on 
Fiat and General Motors, and 
therefore were not considered 
full function joint ventures 
within the meaning of Article 
3(2) of Council Regula-
tion 4064/89 106. They were 
therefore treated under 
Regulation 17/62 within a two-
months deadline since they 
were considered as structural 
joint ventures 107 
The major effects of the 
Alliance were registered on the 
markets for the procurement of 
parts and supplies for the 
automotive industry. In this 
market. General Motors and 
Fiat, following the conclusion 
of the agreement, became the 
first purchaser. 
The Alliance also has effects on 
the markets for the production 
' ^^ Note concerning the assessment of 
co-operative joint venture 
pursuant to article 85 of the EC 
Treaty (93/C 43/02 point 3). 
1 0 " Commission notice on the concept 
of full-function joint ventures 
under Council Regulation (EEC) 
4064/89 on the control of 
concentration between 
undertakings (98/C 66/01, point 
13 and ss.). 
' ° ' Commission's decision of 23 
December 1992. 
and supply of cars and light 
commercial vehicles (LCVs). 
These markets are close to 
maturity, and are characterised 
by an increasingly concentrated 
structure with few large 
suppliers and large symmetric 
structure. The positions of car 
manufacturers are not destined 
to change permanently. Barriers 
to entry are quite high and entry 
in the relevant market is not 
frequent. 
The agreement was found to be 
restrictive of competition within 
the meaning of article 81 (1) of 
the Treaty in the mentioned 
markets. It was considered that 
a co-operation agreement 
consisting of the establishment 
of joint ventures could restrict 
competition between parent 
companies to the extent that 
they are already actual or 
potential competitors. In the 
present case, both General 
Motors and Fiat are in the 
position to fulfil individually the 
tasks assigned to the joint 
ventures and they forfeit their 
capabilities to do so by the 
creation of the joint 
ventures108. This agreement 
came under article 81 (1), since 
it also involved firms with 
market power and it was likely 
to cause foreclosure problems 
vis-à-vis third parties 109. 
108 j\j0[e concerning the assessment of 
co-operative joint venture 
pursuant to article 85 (now article 
81 ) of the EC Treaty (93/C 43/02). 
' ° ' Draft guidelines on the 
applicability of article 81 (1) to 
horizontal cooperation (OJ 
CI 18/14 of 27 April 2000). 
General Motors and Fiat are 
direct competitors in the 
markets for the production of 
passenger cars and LCVs since 
they individually produce motor 
vehicles to be supplied via their 
national importers to dealers 
and final consumers. Through 
the Powertrain joint venture, 
they co-ordinate their activities 
in the development and 
production of powertrains on an 
exclusive basis. Therefore, the 
agreement does not aim at 
unifying their efforts to 
compete in domains in which at 
the moment they are not active. 
Through the establishment of 
the Purchasing joint venture, 
Fiat and General Motors will 
coordinate on an exclusive basis 
their respective activities in the 
market for the purchase of 
vehicles' components and other 
supplies. The joint purchasing 
by General Motors and Fiat of 
part of their component supply 
should reinforce their buying 
power towards their suppliers. 
The restriction of competition 
was considered as appreciably 
affecting trade between 
Member States owing to special 
characteristics of the relevant 
markets described under point 
4. (maturity, barriers to entry, 
concentrated structure) and 
because the important position 
of General Motors and Fiat on 
the said markets. 
It was however considered 
possible to issue a comfort letter 
since it appears that the 
Alliance fulfils the four 
conditions of Article 81 (3) EC 
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Treaty. It seems that the 
Powertrain joint venture helps 
to improve the development and 
the manufacture of powertrains, 
while allowing each parent 
company to concentrate its 
individual efforts in powertrain 
customisation. Moreover, 
components and parts account 
for a considerable share of the 
cost of a new car and the 
increase in the two companies' 
bargaining power could result 
in substantial savings which 
would be passed on to the 
consumer in terms of better 
safety standards and lower 
prices. 
Competition does not seem to 
be eliminated in respect of a 
substantial part of the products 
in questions since on the 
relevant markets, General 
Motors and Fiat are subject to 
competition from other car 
manufacturers, of similar 
dimension and economic 
strength. 
In the end, what can we learn 
from the co-operation 
agreement between General 
Motors and Fiat? 
The two car manufacturers, 
through the Alliance, aim at 
achieving standardisation in 
"low-touch" component and 
platform areas that do not 
differentiate cars in consumers' 
eyes. Each party will continue 
to differentiate its products in 
terms of design, performance 
and brand image. For this 
reason, General Motors and Fiat 
will continue to customise their 
engines individually and will 
distinguish vehicle characte-
ristics and components in those 
areas influencing customers' 
perception. 
While other competitors have 
decided to merge in order to 
liberate resources to better 
compete, General Motors and 
Fiat have chosen a new and 
"leaner" solution, which will 
allow them to co-operate in the 
"upstream" activities and to 
focus their individual efforts on 
more customers oriented 
activities. The future is likely to 
see more agreements of this kind 
between car manufacturers. This 
possibility is open to the car 
industry, provided that the 
conditions set out in article 81(3) 
are met. 
THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT 
OF THE PARTICIPATION OF BSKYB IN 
THE PAY-TV OPERATOR IN 
GERMANY 
Andrew HOBBS, DG COMP-C-2 
On 22 December 1999, British 
Sky Broadcasting pic ("BSkyB") 
notified its acquisition of 24% of 
KirchPayTV GmbH & Co. 
KGaA ("KirchPayTV"). The 
notification was judged 
incomplete and was finally 
completed on 7 February 2000. 
During its investigation the 
Commission identified a number 
of competition concerns, which 
were eliminated by the parties 
submitting commitments in 
phase I of the merger control 
procedure. The Decision of 21 
March 2000 bound the parties in 
relation to pay-TV and digital 
interactive television services in 
Gennany and established an 
arbitration process for the 
implementation of the 
commitments. 
BSkyB operates pay-TV in the 
UK, together with interests in 
digital interactive television and 
technical services for pay-TV. 
BSkyB had no German interests, 
but it is 40% owned by News 
Corporation, who controls a 
small German TV channel and 
the German rights for the UEFA 
Champions League. Although 
not a party to the concentration, 
News acknowledged that it had 
sufficient influence over BSkyB 
to be taken into account for the 
purposes of Article 2, following 
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the Kesko Oy ν Commission 
judgement110. 
KirchPayTV operates 
Germany's only pay­TV service 
and is wholly owned by the 
holding company of 
KirchGruppe. KirchGruppe is 
also active in the fields of 
commercial television, trade of 
broadcasting rights and technical 
services for pay­TV. It owns 
BetaResearch, which developed 
the conditional access system 
used by KirchPayTV, i.e. it is 
included in the d­box decoder. 
The relevant markets 
Three relevant markets were 
identified: a) pay­TV, which has 
been well established in previous 
decisions involving Germany1 ' '; 
b) digital interactive television 
services, which is an embryonic 
market in Germany and follows 
the market identified in the 
BIB/Open Decision.112 With 
BSkyB's experience in this field 
Kirch could move ahead with its 
stated aim to provide a platform 
on which others could offer 
services like shopping, banking, 
games etc via the TV; and, c) the 
1 1 0 Case T­22/97 Kesko Oy ν 
Commission, 15/12/99, 
paragraphs 137­140. 
1 ' ' See Commission Decision 
94/922/EC, MSG Media Service 




L53, 27.2.1999, p. 1). 
1 1 9 
" ­ See Commission Decision 
1999/781 /EC, British Interactive 
Broadcasting/Open (OJ L 312, 
6.12.1999, p. 1), paragraph 11. 
acquisition of broadcasting 
rights, in particular for films and 
sporting events, which had 
previously been identified by the 
Commission.113 This is a vital 
neighbouring market for pay­
TV, as film and sport content 
persuade potential subscribers to 
pay for receiving television 
services. Although most 
broadcasting rights are acquired 
on a national basis, some sports 
rights with a pan­European 
interest from the viewers' 
perspective are acquired for the 
whole of Europe and re­sold per 
country. This raised the question 
of whether there is separate 
geographic market for pan­
European sports rights, but it 
was not necessary to precisely 
define the market in this case. 
Dominance 
Pay­TV 
KirchPayTV has a virtual 
monopoly on the German pay­
TV market, although with a loss 
making business. BSkyB adds a 
very successful pay­TV 
company, with experience of 
digital interactive TV services 
and deep pockets. The question 
was therefore whether this 
strengthened the position of 
Kirch, by providing it with a 
badly needed influx of financial 
resources and know­how. The 
question of whether BSkyB was 
being eliminated as a potential 
competitor in Gennany also 
needed to be examined. 
1 1 "* 
See Commission Decision 
1999/242/EC, TPS (OJ L 90, ~> .4.1999, p. 6), paragraph 34. 
On the first point, it appeared to 
the Commission that the loss 
making Kirch pay­TV needed 
access to development funds, 
which it had failed to raise on the 
open market. Without these, 
given the significant costs 
involved, there were serious 
doubts as to its future. BSkyB 
brought both money and 
commercial know­how to use it 
effectively. In the absence of 
such funds it could be argued 
that barriers to entry would be 
lowered as there would be an 
increasing demand for new digital 
services and Kirch would no 
longer be able to buy up all the 
significant pay­TV rights. This 
led to serious doubts as the 
concentration reinforces 
KirchPayTV's dominant position 
on the market for pay­TV in 
Germany. 
At first glance BSkyB would 
seem to be a potential competitor. 
It was successful in the UK, it had 
technical know­how, the German 
market had large potential growth, 
via News International it had 
access to Twentieth Century Fox 
and the Gemían pay­TV rights for 
the UEFA Champions League, as 
well as six broadcasting licenses 
for thematic channels. However, 
the Commission concluded that 
neither BSkyB nor any other 
company is likely to enter the 
German pay­TV market in the 
medium term for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly the more than 30 
channels available in the German 
free TV market reduce the 
incentive for viewers to 
subscribe to pay­TV as well. 
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This effect" is demonstrated by 
the success of pay-TV in the UK 
and France, compared to its 
failure to get enough subscribers 
to break even. 
The second point relates to 
Kirch's control over the decoder 
infrastructure and technology 
used in Germany. Almost every 
decoder in Germany is a d-box 
and Deutsche Telekom, who has 
the preponderant share of the 
cable network market, uses 
exclusively Kirch's d-box 
decoders on the pay-TV platform 
operated by its subsidiary 
MediaServices Gesellschaft 
(MSG)114. Any potential entrant 
would therefore depend on its 
direct competitor, Kirch, for 
technical services or develop an 
alternative platform. Given the 
situation on the cable network an 
alternative would have to be 
satellite based, which would 
severely limit the potential 
audience for the service due to 
restrictions on the use of dishes. 
In addition the new customers 
would have to buy or rent the 
alternative decoder. Experience 
in the UK has shown the 
operator has to subsidise the 
equipment, resulting in an 
enormous cost to enter what is 
already a loss making market. 
The third barrier was lack of 
access to content, as Kirch has 
long term exclusive deals with 
This took place prior to the current 
sale by Deutsche Telekom of 
majority stakes ¡n most of its cable 
networks. In fact the situation has 
changed little as most purchasers 
still have to use Kirch decoders. 
all the film studios plus its own 
extensive library and production 
facilities. It also owns the pay-
TV rights to many leading sports 
events, thus reducing 
significantly the rights available 
to a potential new entrant. 
Incidentally upon acquiring the 
UEFA pay-TV rights News 
offered them to Kirch for four 
years, which undermines in 
indications of independent entry. 
Finally BSkyB would need 
considerable financial resources 
to enter the market at a time 
when it is investing heavily in 
the UK with upgrading of its new 
digital pay-TV service and the 
rollout of its platform for digital 
interactive television services. It 
was, therefore, concluded that 
BSkyB was not, in the short to 
medium tenn, a potential entrant 
into the Gennan pay-TV market. 
Digital interactive television 
services 
The central concern of the 
Commission in this case was the 
digital interactive television 
services market, where no 
services have been launched but 
Kirch, Bertelsmann115, the 
German public service 
broadcaster ARD, UPC and 
Primacom had all announced 
launching plans. There are no 
indications that BSkyB intended 
to independently enter this 
market in the short to medium 
term. 
The costs of developing, 
installing, promoting and 
subsidising consumer equipment 
have been shown by the UK 
experience to be very high. Such 
investments require correspon-
ding opportunities for market 
penetration. No third party was 
likely to make such an 
investment as the concentration 
would have enabled 
KirchPayTV to enter the market 
before any other operator. This 
in turn would have extended the 
dominance of d-box decoders 
from the pay-TV market into this 
market, creating a dominant 
position. 
Without the injection of funding 
from BSkyB, Kirch would not 
have the financial resources or 
developed the necessary know-
how to enter this market in the 
immediate future. BSkyB could 
supply both the know-how and, 
uniquely, the experience of 
running digital interactive 
television services gained in the 
running of the BIB/Open joint 
venture.' '6 This would foreclose 
the market to other potential 
entrants by significantly raising 
the barriers to entry. By 
combining the only pay-TV 
operation with digital interactive 
services provided through the 
same box, Kirch could extend its 
monopoly in pay-TV into this 
new market. Due to the 
proprietary nature of the 
decoder, third parties would 
have to use a separate box or 
apply for a license to use the 
15 It is reported, that the Bertelsmann 
group is now developing a service 
with Deutsche Telekom. 
116 In the meantime, BSkyB has 
acquired a majority stake in the 
BIB/Open joint venture. 
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decoder technology. This 
approach would expose the new 
entrant to delays and revealing 
vital information to a competitor 
to obtain the licence. Nor would 
a new entrant be able to provide 
pay-TV. Although Deutsche 
Telekom had announced that it is 
selling its cable assets, the 
structure of the sale was not 
clear and it appeared that Kirch's 
decoders would continue to be 
used as the main service 
technology. Thus serious doubts 
with regard to the compatibility 
of the operation were created in 
this market. 
The acquisition of broadcasting 
rights, in particular for films and 
sporting events 
By virtue of its dominant 
position in the pay-TV market, 
Kirch dominates the upstream 
broadcasting rights market in 
Germany and is active as a 
purchaser of pan-European 
rights to sporting events. BSkyB 
also dominates the UK market, 
with the buyer power from its 
position in the pay-TV market. 
News International also controls 
the German pay-TV and free to 
air rights for Champions 
League football, and has bid for 
some pan-European sports event 
rights. 
Third parties were concerned 
that Kirch's position gave it the 
means and incentive to use its 
power in related markets, to 
benefit itself or BSkyB, such as 
tying pay-TV and free TV rights. 
Yet Kirch was already in a 
position to do that without the 
concentration. Nor would joint 
resources allow the parties to 
outbid other bidders. Kirch has 
no need to offer higher bids for 
German pay-TV rights as it is 
the only bidder and has most of 
them in long term contracts. If 
Kirch and BSkyB buy together 
for the UK and Germany the 
amount they have available to 
bid for the joint rights would be 
substantially the same as they 
had separately. There is no 
indication that in buying the 
joint rights they would offer 
more than they would offer 
separately for the individual 
rights. 
It was alleged that Kirch could 
use its power on the German 
market to strengthen BSkyB's 
dominant position on the pay-TV 
market in the UK by making the 
acquisition of the rights for 
Germany conditional on BSkyB 
obtaining the rights for the UK. 
This did not seem practical as 
film and sports right are usually 
licensed on a long term and 
exclusive basis, making the 
chances of these contracts 
ending at a similar time for two 
or more territories low. Refusal 
on the part of film studios may 
result in them developing their 
own film channels (as Sony and 
Disney have already started to 
do in Europe). Finally, the risk 
for Kirch would seem to be high 
when the only benefit could have 
gained was through its 4% 
shareholding in Sky (which, 
subsequent to the Decision, it 
has sold). 
The same market raised an issue 
under Article 2(4), namely 
whether the parties would 
engage in joint buying of pan-
European sports events rights. 
Again this could be engaged in 
outside the scope of the 
concentration, motivated by a 
desire to cut costs. There was no 
causality between the creation of 
the .IV and any co-ordination of 
the competitive behaviour by the 
parents. It was concluded 
therefore that there were no 
Article 2(4) aspects in the case. 
Interestingly the UK's 
Competition Commission, 
examining the similar concentra-
tion involving BSkyB and 
Vivendi (who own Canal Plus, 
the French pay-TV operator) 
came to the same conclusions 
with regard to broadcasting 
ridits.117 
' See the report of the Competition 
Commission: "In relation to sports 
rights, we consider that the merger 
situation is unlikely to result in 
any significant enhancement of 
the position of BSkyB. which is 
already a strong one. The key 
national rights are unlikely to be 
affected by collaboration, and 
there is insufficient reason for us 
to expect that the merger situation 
would materially impact on 
BSkyB's acquisition of rights to 
international events if joint 
bidding occurred. Further, there is 
the prospect that any anti-
competitive effects of 
collaborative bidding could give 
rise to intervention from the 
national or EC competition 
authorities. We do not, therefore, 
expect that the merger situation 
would have an adverse effect on 
the acquisition of sports rights in 
the UK or on competition between 
pay-TV operators. For similar 
reasons, we do not expect the 
merger situation would have an 
adverse effect on the acquisition 
of film rights." 
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Commitments 
Responding to the Commission's 
serious doubts, the parties 
offered commitments covering 
the technological platform for 
pay­TV and interactive services, 
which were adopted as part of 
the Decision. They also offered 
undertakings on issues relating 
to broadcasting rights, but these 
were simply noted, as the 
broadcasting rights issues did not 
raise serious doubts. 
The technical commitments, and 
the accompanying arbitration 
procedure, established a situation 
where third parties could either 
access the existing Kirch 
decoder base or establish there 
own decoders and require Kirch 
to provide its pay­TV services. 
The commitments were 
developed in co­operation with 
third parties that had raised 
specific problems. 
The first set was aimed at 
allowing access to Kirch's 
technical platform by interested 
third parties. Kirch agreed to 
offer technical services on a fair, 
reasonable and non­
discriminatory basis to allow 
Kirch decoders to receive third 
party services. Separate 
accounting is provided for such 
services. Sufficient information 
to make full use of the services 
and to write applications to 
operate on Kirch's decoder, 
including provision for 
independent testing of the 
application, was also provided 
for. 
Another set of undertakings 
established Simulcrypt 
arrangements to ensure the 
interoperability between service 
providers using different systems 
for conditional access, so that 
third party services can run on 
Kirch's decoder or vice versa. 
Kirch undertakes to supply its 
pay­TV services to third party 
decoders via Simulcrypt 
arrangements. In addition, Kirch 
has to implement the Multimedia 
Home Platform (MHP), which 
has been standardised by the 
Digital Video Broadcasting 
group. The provision of the 
MHP will give third parties like 
ARD and Bertelsmann the 
possibility to develop digital 
interactive applications and 
services that can be run on the 
decoder that Kirch uses for its 
pay­TV services. 
Where a third party develops its 
own technical platform and 
decoders, Kirch licenses its 
technology and permits the 
manufacture of decoder boxes 
combining its decoder 
technology with other decoder 
systems. 
The technical commitments 
compensated for the influx of 
resources and know­how, 
lowering barriers to entry on the 
pay­TV market and preventing 
KirchPayTV from leveraging its 
dominance on this market into 
the market for digital interactive 
television services. By 
eliminating the serious doubts 
with regard to a creation or 
strengthening of a dominant 
position the concentration could 
be cleared. 
In the arbitration procedure for 
the implementation of the 
commitments, the arbitration 
rules of the "Deutsche Institution 
für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit e.V. 
(DIS)" are applied. So far, no 
case of arbitration has come to 
the knowledge of the 
Commission. The arbitration 
process does not affect the 
powers of the Commission to 
take decisions in relation to the 
commitments in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Merger 
Regulation. 
The Decision is the subject of an 
appeal for annulment before the 
Court of First Instance by 
ARD.11 § 
118 Τ-158/00. 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Merger Control: main developments 
between 1st May 2000 and 31st August 
2000 
Walter TRETTON, Neil MARSHALL and Anna 
PAPAIOANNOU, DG COMP-B 
I. Policy developments and 
fines 
The report to the Council on 
turnover thresholds and 
referral procedures: 
launching the review of the 
MR1 1 9 
This report required by the last 
amendment to the Merger 
Regulation covers the period 
between March 1998, when the 
revised Regulation came into 
force, and the end of 1999. The 
1997 revision of the Regulation 
introduced secondary thresholds 
to avoid multiple filings to 
national competition authorities. 
However, it appears, on the basis 
of the survey carried out so far, 
that a significant number of 
operations with cross-border 
effects continue to fall outside 
the scope of the Regulation.120 
119 
120 
The report was adopted on 
28.06.2000. 
Of the total of 4,303 mergers, 
acquisitions and joint ventures or 
'concentrations' that required 
clearance in the Member States of 
the European Union during that 
period, no fewer than 294 cases 
were notified to two national 
competition authorities, rather 
than to the Commission, because 
they did not meet the turnover 
thresholds. Another 31 cases were 
notified in three EU member 
This indicates that some of the 
main aims of the Regulation 
have not yet been fully achieved. 
The aims include the principles 
of subsidiarity, as enshrined in 
the one-stop shop, and level 
playing field. In the light of 
these principles, the Commission 
believes that multiple filing 
cases have a Community interest 
and that the Commission, in 
principle should be better placed 
to deal with such cases. The 
report recognises the concern of 
the business community, for 
which multiple notifications are 
tantamount to legal uncertainty, 
increased efforts and costs. At 
the same time it is also clear that 
merger control forms an 
important part of competition 
policy in many Member States. 
It therefore believes that 
following a thorough 
examination is necessary, 
involving active participation by 
all interested parties, before any 
changes to the current 
jurisdictional rules could be 
proposed. 
states and 39 in more than three 
EU states. In comparison, the 
Commission received a total of 
494 notifications between March 
1998 and the end of 1999 of 
which 45 were notified under the 
new thresholds of art. 1(3) MR. 
The 1997 revision also 
introduced modifications to the 
mechanisms for referral of cases 
between the Member States and 
the Commission (Articles 9 and 
22). The report indicates the 
views of industry and the 
Member States on the 
effectiveness of these provisions. 
In the review, the Commission 
intends to assess the functioning 
of these rules, as well as to 
collect objective information 
concerning the impact, if any, on 
the costs that involved firms 
have to bear in referral cases. 
Finally, after ten years of 
application of the Merger 
Regulation, it is felt to be 
appropriate to conduct a 
forward-looking inventory also 
of other legal and practical 
aspects of the Merger Regulation 
in order to assess whether or not 
the existing system is well 
equipped to face the challenges 
of the foreseeable future. These 
challenges will include external 
factors, such as the extension of 
the Community through the 
accession of the applicant 
countries and the continuing 
"merger boom", as well as 
internal factors, such as the 
modernisation of Community 
anti-trust rules. In the context of 
the further review, the 
Commission will have to rely on 
information provided by 
companies with experience from 
merger control proceedings at 
the Community level as well as 
the Member States. It 
encourages the active 
participation of all interested 
parties in this important debate 
about the principles underlying 
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the Regulation. The EC Merger 
Control 10th Anniversary 
Conference121 has provided a 
first opportunity to publicly 
discuss issues related to the 
Merger Review. 
Notice on a simplified 
procedure for certain cases 
In parallel to launching the 
merger review, the Commission 
adopted a Notice, which renders 
merger procedures more efficient 
already within the present 
legislative framework. The 
Notice is based on the 
experience gained in the 
application of Merger 
Regulation, which has shown 
that certain categories of 
concentrations do not normally 
raise competition concerns. 
The Commission Notice on a 
simplified procedure for 
treatment of certain 
concentrations under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89122 identifies three 
categories of cases, which would 
qualify for a short-form decision 
adopted by the Commission at 
the end of the usual one month 
review. The Notice applies to 
concentrations where: 
• two or more undertakings 
acquire joint control over a 
joint venture, provided that 
the joint venture has no, or 
121 See special article on this 






negligible, actual or 
foreseen activities within 
the EEA territory (turnover 
of less than 100 million 
euros and assets less than 
100 million euros in the 
European Economic Area; 
• none of the parties are 
engaged in business 
activities in the same 
product and geographical 
market (horizontal 
relationships), or in a 
product market which is 
upstream or downstream of 
a product market in which 
any other party to the 
concentration is engaged 
(vertical relationships); and 
• two or more of the parties 
are engaged in business 
activities in the same 
product and geographical 
market or upstream or 
downstream market, 
provided that their 
combined market share is 
not 15% or more for 
horizontal and 25% or more 
for vertical relationships. 
The short-form decision will 
contain information about the 
parties, the nature of the 
concentration and economic 
sectors concerned as well as a 
statement that the concentration 
is declared compatible with the 
common market because it falls 
within one or more of the 
categories contained in the 
Notice, with the applicable 
category(ies) being explicitly 
identified. As for all full 
clearance decisions, the 
Commission will publish a 
public version of the decision. 
There will be no press release, 
but clearance will be announced 
in the Commission's Midday 
Express. 
The simplified procedure can 
reduce the administrative burden 
on notifying parties. It will still 
give the Member States and third 
parties the same possibilities to 
comment or intervene as under 
the ordinary procedure. The 
Commission may also, if 
necessary, at any time revert to 
the ordinary investigative 
procedures. Application of this 
simplified procedure started on 
1.9.2000. 
For the first time Commission 
imposed fines for failing to 
supply information under the 
Merger Regulation: Mitsubishi 
The Commission has imposed 
fines on Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries for failing to supply 
information with regard to a 
joint venture last year between 
Kvaerner and Ahlström. This is 
the first time the Commission 
has fined a company other than a 
notifying party in merger 
proceedings. It is also the first 
time that a periodic penalty 
payment has been imposed on an 
undertaking in such proceedings. 
During the investigation into the 
Ahlström/Kvaerner chemical 
pulping joint venture, Mitsubishi 
was requested to supply 
information according to Article 
11(5) of the Merger Regulation, 
which obliges third parties to 
assist the Commission in merger 
reviews to determine whether a 
given deal may create a 
dominant position. But despite 
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repeated requests from the 
Commission, Mitsubishi 
supplied only incomplete 
information concerning its 
activities in the world-wide 
market for recovery boilers, one 
of the markets where the 
Commission had expressed 
concerns. The Commission 
considered Mitsubishi's 
behaviour a very serious 
infringement of EU law since the 
information requested was 
necessary for the proper 
assessment of the 
Ahlström/Kvaerner operation. 
Under Article 14(1 )(c) of the 
Merger Regulation, the 
Commission may impose fines 
between 1,000 and 50,000 euros 
on undertakings which, 
intentionally or negligently, 
supply incorrect information in 
response to the Commission's 
request for information or which 
fail to supply information within 
the period fixed by a decision 
pursuant to Article 11. In 
addition, under Article 15(1) of 
the Merger Regulation, the 
Commission may also impose 
periodic penalty payments of up 
to 25,000 euros per day of delay 
calculated from the date when a 
formai request for information 
was taken. The Commission 
decided to impose both types of 
fines on Mitsubishi. The first 
fine, 50,000 euros, was for 
failing to comply with the 
Commission decision, pursuant 
to Article 14(l)(c) of the Merger 
Regulation. The second fine was 
a periodic penalty payment 
totalling 900,000 euros. 
In adopting this decision, the 
Commission wanted to stress its 
determination to enforce the 
merger control rules in the 
European Union, which 
presupposes the supply of 
correct information by both 
merging parties and competitors 
requested to assist it in its task. 
II. Relevant Cases 
Introductory remark : a 
record number of cases 
The second four-month period of 
2000 has seen a very sharp 
increase of notifications under 
the Merger Regulation (136 
notifications, which is up 46 % 
on the same period in 1999 and 
up 43 % on the first four-month 
period of 2000). Seven phase II 
proceedings were initiated123 
and nine phase II proceedings 
were closed, seven by decision 
and two following withdrawal of 
the notifications. There was also 
a very high number of clearances 
in phase I subject to 
commitments (1 1 cases). 
1 2 3 These were M.I879 - Boeing / 
Hughes, M.1852 




, M.2060Bosch-Rexroth, M.1646 
CGD/Partest/BCP/SairGroup/Port 
usaliallater withdrawn) 
Decisions following an 
additional four-month in-depth 
investigation (Decisions 
pursuant Art.8 MR) 
MCI WorldCom / Sprint 
The Commission decided to 
prohibit the merger between US 
telecommunications firms MCI 
WorldCom Inc and Sprint Corp 
as it would have resulted in the 
creation of a dominant position 
in the market for top-level 
universal Internet connectivity. 
In the course of the review, the 
companies proposed to divest 
Sprint's Internet business but this 
was insufficient to resolve the 
competition concerns resulting 
from the merger.124 
MCI WorldCom is the world's 
leading provider of Internet 
connectivity, with Sprint one of 
its main competitors. An in-
depth investigation by the 
Commission showed that the 
merger would, through the 
combination of the merging 
parties' extensive networks and 
large customer base, have led to 
the creation of such a powerful 
force that both competitors and 
customers would have been 
dependent on the new company 
124 The companies informed the 
Commission of their intention to 
withdraw their notification of the 
deal the day before the prohibition 
was adopted. But the Commission 
felt compelled to take a formal 
decision as its review had come to 
an end and as it can only accept a 
withdrawal if the deal is no longer 
legally binding. This was not the 
case, as the companies had not 
formally cancelled their merger 
agreement. 
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to obtain · universal Internet 
connectivity. This would have 
allowed the merged company to 
behave independently of both its 
competitors and customers. 
Following the Commission's 
objections, the companies 
offered to divest Sprint's Internet 
business from Sprint's other 
activities. However, the 
Commission's investigation 
showed that this proposal was 
insufficient as it would not re-
establish, with enough certainty 
as to its effect, immediate and 
effective competition in the 
market for top-level Internet 
connectivity. 
It was vital for the Commission 
that the divested business would 
become a strong, viable 
competitor that would prevent 
the merged WorldCom/Sprint 
from dominating Internet 
backbone. The companies' offer 
failed to guarantee this because 
Sprint's Internet business is 
completely intertwined with its 
traditional télécoms activities.125 
The Commission also studied the 
impact of the merger in the 
market for the provision of 
global telecommunications 
services to multinational 
companies where together with 
British Telecommunications' 
125 When assessing the feasibility of 
the proposed divestiture, the 
Commission also took into 
account issues raised by Cable & 
Wireless after its purchase of 
Internet MCI which was divested 
from MCI's other activities to gain 
clearance of the WorldCom/MCI 
merger in 1998. 
Concert alliance with AT&T the 
merged entity would appear to 
control the majority of the 
market. The Commission could 
not, however, show the absence 
of competitive constraints from 
actual competitors in this market 
and that customers would not be 
able to countervail against any 
parallel behaviour by the two 
leading players. Therefore, the 
Commission concluded that a 
collective dominant position 
could not be established between 
the merged entity and the 
Concert alliance. 
Pursuant to the EU-US 
agreement of 1991 on antitrust 
co-operation, the Commission 
has examined the merger in 
parallel with the US Department 
of Justice although the two 
authorities have conducted 
independent and separate 
investigations. This co-operation 
will continue in future cases, 
especially if and when the two 
authorities identify common 
competition concerns that might 
require a jointly pursued 
remedial action. 
This was the 13th time the 
Commission had blocked a 
merger since 1990. 
VEBA / VIAG 
The merger between the German 
groups VEBA and VIAG , 
together with the merger 
between RWE and VEW, which 
was investigated at the same 
time by the Bundeskartellamt, 
will change the face of the 
German power industry, 
especially at the level of the 
interconnected grid. In its 
original form the merger of 
VEBA and VIAG would have 
resulted in a dominant duopoly 
between VEBA/VIAG on one 
side and RWE/VEW on the 
other on the market in the supply 
of electricity from the 
interconnected grid. After the 
merger PreussenElektra AG 
(VEBA) and Bayernwerk AG 
(VIAG) together with 
RWE/VEW would have 
controlled well over 80% of this 
market. 
Numerous structural factors 
meant that, after the merger as it 
was initially notified, a 
significant degree of competition 
between VEBA/VIAG and RWE 
could no longer have been 
expected. There were a number 
of factors that indicated that 
parallel behaviour could result. 
These included the fact that 
electricity is a totally 
homogeneous product, which is 
sold on a transparent market; 
that the companies had similar 
cost structures owing to a 
similarly composed stock of 
power stations and also held a 
number of jointly operated large 
power stations; there were 
numerous interrelationships 
between VEBA/VIAG and 
RWE; expected growth in 
demand is low, and that the 
product has a low price 
elasticity. 
Moreover, the duopoly 
VEBA/VIAG and RWE or 
RWE/VEW (1) would not have 
faced any significant 
competition from outside. In 
addition to the extremely high 
64 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 
>> MERGERS 
market share of the duopoly, 
apart from EnBW no other 
interconnected power company 
would have been independent of 
the duopolists. The duopoly 
would have controlled by far the 
greatest part of installed 
generation capacity, almost all 
free generation potential, and by 
far the greatest part of the 
transmission network in 
Germany. There are also 
significant barriers to entry to 
the market, in particular relating 
to the creation of new capacity 
and imports. 
In response to the Commission's 
objections VEBA/VIAG 
proposed that it should dispose 
of numerous holdings in other 
companies, and make 
improvements to the ground 
rules governing the market in 
electricity. Similar undertakings 
have been given to the 
Bundeskartellamt by RWE/ 
VEW. The commitments given 
by VEBA/VIAG and 
RWE/VEW ensure that the main 
links between the two big groups 
will be severed, especially as a 
result of the sale of their 
holdings in the east German 
interconnected company 
Vereinigte Energiewerke AG 
(VEAG) and the lignite producer 
LAUBAG. VEAG will thus 
become independent of the West 
German interconnected 
companies, and will have to be 
taken seriously as a competitor. 
VEAG will have a market 
position comparable to that of 
VIAG before the merger, and 
will become the third force on 
the German market, the fourth 
one being the southern company 
Energie Baden-Württemberg 
(EnBW). The sale of these 
holdings will at the same time 
reduce the market positions of 
VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW, 
to whom VEAG belonged until 
now. 
Other links with RWE/VEW will 
be cut by selling off shares in 
VEW held directly and indirectly 
by VIAG, and shares in Rhenag 
Rheinische Energie AG held by 
VEBA. The position of the 
remaining interconnected 
companies will be strengthened; 
either VEBA or VIAG 
previously had a stake in each of 
these with the exception of 
EnBW. This applies to the 
Hamburg electricity supplier 
Hamburgische Electricitätswerke 
AG (HEW) and the Berlin 
company Kraft und Licht AG 
(BEWAG). 
VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW 
have also undertaken not to 
charge the transmission fee 
known as the "T-component", 
payable where a supplier of 
energy between the northern and 
southern trading zones set up by 
Associations Agreement II 
( Verbändevereinbarung II) 
cannot net out the quantities they 
supply against equivalent 
quantities in the opposite 
direction. This commitment will 
considerably improve the ground 
rules governing transmission 
through the network operated by 
these two leading interconnected 
companies. Imports from 
Scandinavia will be appreciably 
simplified, because VEBA will 
free a portion of the capacity 
reserved for it in the Denmark 
interconnector for use by 
competitors. 
Other commitments have also 
been given which meet the 
Commission's objections in 
respect of two markets in 
hydrocyanic acid products. 
Subsequent to these 
commitments, the Commission 
declared the merger compatible 
with the common market and 
with the EEA Agreement. 
AstraZeneca / Novartis 
In this operation, which will lead 
to the world's leading crop 
protection business, Astra-
Zeneca, itself created through the 
merger between Astra AB and 
Zeneca Group PLC in spring 
1999, and Novartis, resulting 
from the merger between Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz in December 
1996, will spin off and merge 
their activities in the area of crop 
protection into a newly 
incorporated company, Syngenta 
AG to which Novartis will also 
transfer its seeds business. 
The deal posed concerns in a 
high number of crop protection 
products, threatening to create or 
strengthen dominant positions in 
39 markets including cereal 
fungicides and maize herbicides. 
In many of these markets the 
parties' combined market shares 
would have been between 50 % 
and 75 %. The extensive 
remedies package consisted of 
divestitures of products, 
representing total sales 
worldwide in excess of €250 
million this year, of out-
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licensing and the termination of 
distribution agreements. 
Thanks to the bilateral 
agreement of 1991 on antitrust 
co-operation between the 
Commission and the United 
States of America, the 
Commission collaborated with 
the Federal Trade Commission, 
enabling a common and, hence, 
effective solution to the 
problems identified to be found 
in the markets for cereal 
fungicides (world-wide 
divestiture of Novartis' 
strobilurin business) and maize 
herbicides (world-wide 





The acquisition by Dow 
Chemical of Union Carbide 
(UCC), creating one of the 
world's largest producers of 
plastics and chemicals, posed 
competition concerns in three 
areas. The Commission found 
that without the remedies on 
which the adopted authorisation 
decision is conditional, the 
concentration would have led to 
the creation or strengthening of 
dominant positions in the 
markets for C8 LLDPE resins, 
ethyleneamines and PE 
technology. 
For C8 LLDPE the operation 
would have resulted in a 
combined market share in excess 
of 80%, or five times larger than 
thai of the nearest competitor. 
The merger with UCC would 
have strengthened Dow's 
already dominant position on the 
Western European market 
through the addition of UCC's 
share in the Polimeri joint 
venture with Enichem. To 
prevent the strengthening of this 
position, the parties undertook to 
either cause Polimeri to sell its 
Italian production plant that 
produces C8 LLDPE among 
other products or to divest all off 
UCC's 50 % ownership interest 
in Polimeri itself, either 
undertaking removing the 
overlap between the parties' 
activities. 
Secondly, the Commission 
found that specific types of 
ethyleneamines form separate 
product markets and that the 
relevant geographic market is 
worldwide. For most individual 
ethyleneamines the operation 
would have resulted in 
significant overlaps between the 
activities of the parties and 
combined world market shares 
above 60%. 
To remedy these competition 
concerns, Dow undertook to 
divest its entire worldwide 
ethyleneamine business 
(production plants, intellectual 
property rights, technology, 
customer contracts, personnel). 
It will also make up to half of the 
capacity at its Terneuzen plant in 
the Netherlands available to the 
new owner of the ethyleneamine 
business. This business can be 
physically separated from other 
Dow Chemical businesses and 
the new owner will not be 
dependent on Dow for raw 
materials. 
Thirdly, the Commission found 
that the Dow/UCC deal would 
have strengthened UCC's 
dominant position on the market 
for gas phase PE technology 
packages and/or on the more 
general market for low pressure 
PE technology packages through 
the addition of Dow's 
metallocene patent to Univation, 
UCC's joint venture with Exxon, 
and would have weakened BP 
Amoco's position as Univation's 
most important competitor as it 
would cease having access to a 
proven metallocene technology. 
To remedy the competition 
concerns, Dow agreed to offer 
interested third parties open 
licences to its background 
metallocene patents with regard 
to gas phase and slurry 
processes. Dow undertook not to 
grant licences to its background 
metallocene patents to Univation 
or to assign such patents to 
Univation. Dow will also divest 
all of its assets dedicated to gas 
phase metallocene PE 
technology to BP. Together with 
other measures this will enable 
BP to offer effective competition 
to the merged entity on the 
market for gas phase technology 
packages, including the 
possibility to supply metallocene 
catalysts. 
Industri Kapital / Dyno 
The acquisition of Norwegian 
chemicals and explosives 
company Dyno by venture 
capital group Industri Kapital126 
126 In cases of acquisitions by venture 
capital groups, the Commission 
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was approved following a four-
month, in-depth inquiry, subject 
to the divestiture by Industri 
Kapital of certain activities in 
the resins sector and regarding 
plastic materials handling 
systems. The operation will lead 
to the creation of the largest 
resin producer worldwide with a 
strong presence in Europe and 
North America. 
The Commission's investigation 
revealed particular competition 
problems in two areas: in 
formaldehyde and formaldehyde 
based resins in Finland, and in 
plastic materials handling 
systems in the Nordic area. 
Neste and Dyno both have a 
formaldehyde and a resin plant 
in Finland whose main 
customers are the wood 
processing industry. The 
addition of their strong positions 
would have led to a virtual 
monopoly for the supply of 
formaldehyde in Finland and to 
the creation of the largest resin 
producer in Finland by far. 
Furthermore, the operation 
would have created a link 
between Area and Polimoon, 
which are both active in plastic 
materials handling systems. Area 
is by far the strongest operator in 
the Nordic area and Polimoon is 
the only substantial competitor 
to Area in the Nordic Area. 
In order to remove the 
competition concerns arising on 
these markets, Industri Kapital 
takes account of all other portfolio 
companies controlled by the group 
in its competition analysis. 
has proposed to divest the 
formaldehyde and resin plant of 
Dyno in Kitee, Finland. In the 
event that this transaction does 
not take place within the time 
period foreseen, Industri Kapital 
will divest the formaldehyde and 
resin plant of Neste in Hamina, 
Finland. Either divestment will 
remove the competition concerns 
identified in the field of 
formaldehyde and formaldehyde 
based resins. Formaldehyde and 
resin customers in Finland will 
continue to have a choice 
between suppliers. 
Industri Kapital also pledged to 
sell Dyno's shares in Polimoon 
to an independent purchaser or, 
alternatively, to divest its 
complete holding in Area. Both 
undertakings will remove the 
link between Industri Kapital 
(Arca) and Polimoon in the field 
of materials handling systems. 
By accepting alternative 
undertakings the Commission 
has taken a novel approach. 
Alternative divestiture 
undertakings facilitate the 
divestiture process and increase 
the chances of finding a buyer 
for a business to be divested. 127 
1 9*7 
' - ' The Commission is still 
investigating the subsequent 
acquisition of the Swedish 
chemicals and flooring company 
Perstorp by Industri Kapital. In 
this case the Commission found 
serious competition concerns in a 
number of chemicals markets and 
started an in depth investigation 
on 30 June 2000. 
Alcoa / Reynolds 
See article by Dimitri 
GIOTAKOS in Competition 
Policy Newsletter 2/2000. 
Pirelli / BICC 
The Commission cleared the 
acquisition by Pirelli Cavi e 
Sistemi, the cable division of 
Italian Pirelli Group, of BICC 
General's power cable 
production plants in Italy and in 
Britain. BICC General will 
retain its plants in Spain and 
Portugal. The markets concerned 
by the operation are the 
production and sale of power 
cables to energy utilities. The 
Commission identified separate 
markets for low and medium 
voltage power cables, used for 
the distribution of electricity, 
and for high and extra-high 
voltage cables, used for the 
transmission of power. 
The key issue was the definition 
of the geographical market, more 
precisely whether competition 
operates at national or European 
level. Prior to liberalisation, the 
electricity market was marked by 
monopoly suppliers purchasing 
largely from domestic cable 
manufacturers. But the gradual 
liberalisation of electricity 
markets combined with the 
European Union's public 
procurement directives has 
changed profoundly the 
relationship between power 
utilities and cable manufacturers. 
Therefore, the Commission did 
not rely just on past market data 
but took into account the 
changes which have already 
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occurred and which can be 
expected to occur in the 
foreseeable future. 
The investigation revealed that 
manufacturers in Europe are in a 
position to supply their cables in 
different EU-Member States 
since product harmonisation is 
very advanced and transport 
costs are relatively low. Utility 
companies are equally able to 
source cables from foreign 
suppliers. Besides Pirelli/BICC, 
there are at least four other larger 
cable manufacturers (Alcatel, 
ABB, NKT and BICC General's 
remaining production plants in 
Spain and Portugal) as well as a 
number of smaller companies 
("fringe players" like Brugg and 
Sagem), the entry of which could 
be induced by the strategic 
allocation of orders. 
Transmission grid operators buy 
large quantities and have a 
strong bargaining position. This 
means they could place larger 
parts of their supplies with 
alternative suppliers if 
Pirelli/BICC were to apply anti-
competitive prices. 
The Commission also examined 
a possible collective dominant 
position of Pirelli together with 
Alcatel, the sector's number two 
player, both for low and medium 
and high and extra-high voltage 
power cables, but found no 
conclusive evidence for 
conscious parallel behaviour. 
The companies' market shares 
are asymmetric, the market is 
characterised by a low frequency 
in tenders and by a low degree of 
price transparency. Furthermore, 
in the high and extra-high 
voltage segment, cable 
manufacturers have a strong 
incentive to compete due to the 
structure of the bidding process, 
where utilities often award the 
whole contract value to the 
lowest bidder. The markets for 
medium and low voltage power 
cables also do not lend 
themselves to conscious parallel 
behaviour, as there are a number 
of smaller suppliers (the so-
called "fringe finns") who could 
be used as alternative suppliers if 
prices were to be increased by 
the two leading finns. These 
suppliers could also meet the 
requirements of regional utilities, 
which have a more limited 
purchasing power compared to 
the national grid operators. For 
these reasons, the Commission 
concluded that the concentration 
would not lead to the creation or 
strengthening of any dominant 
position, either single or 
collective, in respect of the 
markets for the provision of 
power cables of low/medium and 
high/extra-high voltage to the 
energy utilities. 
The case clearly showed that the 
Commission, where appropriate, 
takes due account of the 
emergence of European markets. 
Withdrawals in second phase 
Two cases in this period 
underlined the importance of the 
Commission's investigation in 
cases where then no final 
decision is taken following 
withdrawals of the notification. 
SairGroup / CGD / Partest / 
Portugália 
The deal was abandoned after 
the Commission had opened an 
in-depth investigation into the 
proposed joint control of 
Portuguese airline Portugália by 
SAirGroup , Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, Partest and Banco 
Comercial Português. It would 
have led to the acquisition of 
joint control of Portugália by the 
Portuguese State (through CGD 
and Partest) and by SAirGroup. 
Given that the Portuguese State 
already controls other airlines, 
namely TAP (Portugal's flag 
carrier) and SATA (a charter 
airline), the operation would also 
have created a link between TAP 
and SATA on the one hand, and 
Portugália on the other hand. 
The combination of TAP and 
Portugália would have led to 




Oporto Barcelona, and Lisbon-
Nice. Similarly, the operation 
would have led to high overlaps 
in charter flights from Lisbon 
between SATA, TAP and PGA. 
There were therefore serious 
risks that the proposed 
transaction could create a 
dominant position on the 
markets concerned. 
Finally, the operation would also 
have created a link between 
SAirGroup and TAP, since it 
would have created a joint 
venture between SAirGroup and 
the Portuguese State (the owner 
of TAP). This could have 
affected competition in other 
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routes where SAirGroup and 
TAP are competing, especially 
in the routes between 
Switzerland and Portugal, and 
between Belgium and Portugal. 
Microsoft / Liberty Media / 
Telewest 
Microsoft notified an operation 
in February whereby it would 
have acquired joint control over 
Telewest, a British broadband 
cable company, with Liberty 
Media, a subsidiary of AT&T 
Corp. The Commission started 
an in-depth probe into the deal 
over fears that it would reduce 
competition in the digital cable 
industry, in particular regarding 
the supply of software for digital 
television set-top boxes in the 
United Kingdom. 
The cable industry in the UK is 
highly concentrated, the main 
operators being NTL and 
Telewest. There are already links 
between NTL and Microsoft that 
could give Microsoft influence 
over the technology decisions of 
NTL. If Microsoft had acquired 
joint control over Telewest, it 
could then have been able to 
determine the technology 
decisions of the emerging digital 
cable industry in the United 
Kingdom. This could have 
substantially reduced the 
technological alternatives 
available to customers and led to 
potentially higher prices for 
households, which are expected 
to embrace digital TV as the 
main means to access the 
Internet and e-commerce. 
Digital TV is likely to become 
the most widespread means for 
consumers to access 
entertainment, education, news 
and e-commerce as well as 
digital TV programmes. Cable 
operators will offer consumers a 
full range of advanced 
broadband communications 
services considered vital to the 
developing Information Society 
in Europe. In this emerging 
market, the Commission 
considers it essential to prevent 
the creation of bottlenecks in any 
of the areas of supply. 
Following the Commission's 
statement of objections, 
expressed in a formal statement 
in May, Microsoft informed the 
Commission that while keeping 
its 23,7% in Telewest, it is 
breaking all structural links with 
Liberty Media and giving up any 
rights which would have given it 
decisive influence over decisions 
at Telewest. As a result of this 
modification, Microsoft 
relinquished legal control over 
Telewest and its interest in the 
company became a minority one. 
Conditional clearances after 
phase I (pursuant Articles 
6.1(b) and 6.2) 
BASF / American Cyanamid 
The acquisition of American 
Cyanamid, the crop protection 
subsidiary of American Home 
Products, will create the third 
largest crop protection company 
worldwide. The deal raised 
serious competition concerns in 
certain herbicide and fungicide 
markets, but BASF proposed 
undertakings which will 
guarantee healthy competition 
and protect consumers' interests. 
The transaction concerns the 
production, distribution and sale 
of crop protection products. The 
parties have overlapping 
activities in herbicides, 
fungicides, insecticides, soil 
fumigants and plant growth 
regulators. For all these products 
the geographic markets have 
been regarded as national 
because the sale of plant 
protection products is still 
determined by different national 
administrative procedures with 
regard to registrations. In 
addition, competitors' market 
shares and prices of competing 
products differ widely between 
Member States. 
The commitments cover the 
products' trademarks for 
commercialisation, access to 
registration, know-how and 
supply agreements entered with 
the licensee for its needs with 
respect to the supply of the 
product if so wished by the 
purchaser. 
These undertakings will 
eliminate the overlap or 
materially reduce the market 
shares of the merged entity in 
each of the markets where 
competition concerns were 
identified by the Commission. 
Glaxo Wellcome / SmithKline 
Beecham and Pfizer / 
Warner-Lambert 
Resulting from the merger 
between Glaxo Wellcome and 
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SmithKline Beecham, the new 
company, Glaxo SmithKline, 
will be the world's biggest 
pharmaceuticals firm with 7.3% 
of global sales. The deal raised 
concerns about creation of a 
dominant position in several 
treatment areas, but the parties 
offered a comprehensive 
package of commitments. 
Serious doubts arose in a number 
of key treatment areas for human 
pharmaceuticals where the new 
entity would have achieved very 
high market shares, up to almost 
100%, in three markets: anti-
virals, excluding anti-HIV (J5B), 
topical anti-virals (D6D) and 
anti-emetics (A4A). Serious 
doubts arose also in 
cephalosporins (JID) in Spain. 
Moreover, the Commission's 
investigation showed that the 
parties' position in the asthma 
(COPD) treatment area could be 
further strengthened due to their 
pipeline compounds. The 
remedies which eliminated or 
significantly reduced the overlap 
created by the proposed 
operation in these markets 
consisted of divestments by 
means of a licensing agreement 
and outlicensing. 
The approval of the merger 
between US-based pharmaceu-
tical companies Pfizer Inc and 
Warner-Lambert Inc creating 
one of the major global 
pharmaceutical companies with 
total revenues of US $ 27.7 
billion was also made possible 
after the companies addressed 
the Commission's competition 
concerns in a number of 
treatment areas. There were three 
product markets for human 
pharmaceuticals where the 
merged entity, to be called Pfizer 
Inc, would have achieved very 
high market shares. Those are 
anti-Alzheimer products (N7D) 
in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Sweden; calcium antagonists 
(C8A) in Austria; and 
antihelmintics, excluding 
schistomicides (P1B), in 
Gennany and Austria. For each 
of these products the parties 
committed to divesting of assets 
and outlicensing removing the 
entire overlap. 
European Aeronautic, Space 
and Defence Company (EADS) 
The Commission conditionally 
authorised the proposed creation 
of EADS, to which German 
company DaimlerChrysler AG, 
France's Lagardère SCA, the 
French State and the Spanish 
company Sociedad Estatal de 
Participationes Industriales 
(SEPI) have contributed their 
activities in the aeronautic, 
telecommunications, space and 
defence sectors. 
As regards large commercial 
aircraft and defence markets the 
operation did not appear to raise 
concerns. On the prime 
contractor level of large 
commercial aircraft the 
conditions of competition remain 
unchanged as BAe Systems 
maintains its veto rights vis-à-vis 
all strategic decisions at the 
European Airbus consortium and 
there is no indication that the 
operation would create a 
dominant position on the 
upstream equipment markets. In 
defence programme markets the 
parties will remain subject to the 
important countervailing buying 
power of national Ministries of 
Defence, and in defence export 
markets competition appears to 
take place at worldwide level 
where the parties will remain 
subject to the competition from 
larger and especially USA-based 
defence contractors such as 
Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon or 
Boeing. 
By contrast, the contribution of 
CASA's space activities raised 
competition issues in two 
satellite equipment markets: 
central tubes, around which 
satellites are assembled, and 
antenna reflectors, a component 
of the antennas used primarily in 
communication satellites for 
commercial and military use. 
Aérospatiale-Matra Lanceurs 
("AML"), a subsidiary of 
Aérospatiale Matra, is the main 
European producer of these 
products, with market shares in 
the order of 70% in certain 
segments, and there are 
indications that CASA is the 
next best alternative to AML. 
There was, therefore, a risk that 
the operation would create a 
dominant position in these two 
markets. Furthermore, the 
Commission also identified 
competition concerns in the 
supply of military 
communication satellites in 
France. This is because, in this 
market, i) competition is 
restricted to Matra Marconi 
Space, a subsidiary of Matra and 
Marconi, and Alcatel Space 
Industries; ii) Alcatel Space 
Industries procures central tubes 
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and antenna reflectors from the 
parties; and (iii) in view of the 
consequences of the transaction 
in central tubes and antenna 
reflectors, there were risks that 
Alcatel Space will not be able to 
competitively source these 
products any longer. It was 
therefore feared that the merged 
entity would be in a position to 
foreclose the market to Alcatel 
Space Industries and therefore 
become the only supplier of the 
French Ministry of Defence. 
In order to remove those 
competition concerns, the parties 
offered commitments consisting 
in the divestment by 
Aérospatiale-Matra Lanceurs of 
two packages which will enable 
their purchaser(s) to 
independently and viably design, 
manufacture and sell antenna 
reflectors and central tubes for 
satellites. This divestment 
package included the relevant 
intellectual property rights, the 
transfer of employees or, at the 
purchaser's option, the provision 
of technical assistance and 
dedicated tools. 
France Telecom / Orange 
After the Commission had 
approved Vodafone Airtouch's 
acquisition of Germany's 
Mannesmann in April, subject to 
the divestment of Orange, so as 
to remove competition concerns 
arising from overlaps in the 
Belgian and United Kingdom 
markets for mobile telecommu-
nication services France 
Telecom subsequently agreed to 
buy Orange. This new 
transaction gave rise to 
horizontal overlaps in the market 
for mobile telecommunication 
services in Belgium, where 
France Telecom is present via its 
subsidiary Mobistar and Orange 
also has a joint venture with 
KPN, called KPN Orange. This 
overlap would have given France 
Telecom a combined market 
share of over 30% on the 
Belgian mobile phone market. 
The deal would have led to the 
absorption of the third mobile 
operator in Belgium leaving 
Proximus and Mobistar as the 
only two competitors on the 
market. To prevent the creation 
of a duopoly on the Belgian 
market, France Telecom/Orange 
offered to divest their interest in 
the KPN Orange joint venture to 
an independent third party. 
Vodafone / Vivendi / Canal-f : 
Vizzavi Internet portal joint 
venture 
Regulatory clearance for the 
creation of the Vizzavi Internet 
portal joint venture between 
Vodafone, Vivendi and Canal+ 
was made possible after the 
companies submitted 
commitments to ensure rival 
Internet portals would have 
equal access to the parent 
companies' set top boxes and 
mobile handsets. 
The Commission's investigation 
concluded that the joint venture 
would have led to competitive 
concerns in the developing 
national markets for TV-based 
internet portals and developing 
national and pan-European 
markets for mobile phone based 
internet portals. In order to 
address these competitive 
concerns identified by the 
Commission, the parties 
provided undertakings to ensure 
that the default portal could be 
changed, should the consumer so 
wish. The undertakings will 
allow consumers to access third 
party portals, to change the 
default portal themselves, or to 
authorise a third party portal 
operator to change the default 
setting for them. 
The decision ensures that the 
current competitive model of 
internet services where 
consumers can choose their 
content provider independently 
of their access provider is carried 
over into the developing markets 
of Internet provision via mobile 
phones and televisions. 
Siemens / Dematic / VDO / 
Sachs 
This case which received 
conditional clearance in phase I 
is to be seen in the context of 
case Bosch / Rexroth, in which 
the Commission initiated in-
depth Phase II proceedings on 
29.08.2000. It will be discussed 
together with Bosch / Rexroth a 
subsequent issue of the 
Competition Policy Newsletter. 
Metsä-Serla / Modo Paper 
and SCA Packaging / Metsä 
Corrugated 
The proposed acquisition by 
Finnish-based company Metsä-
Serla Corp. of sole control of 
Swedish-based company Modo 
Paper AB raised concerns about 
the reduction of the number of 
paper merchants in Sweden to 
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only two major players as a 
result of the merger(the other 
one, Papyrus Merchants, being 
owned by Stora / Enso), but 
Metsä-Serla offered to sell its 
business Grafiskt Papper, thus 
re-establishing a healthy 
competitive environment. 
The operation by which the 
Swedish based company SCA 
Packaging, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Svenska Cellulosa 
AB, acquired sole control of 
Metsä Corrugated currently part 
of the Finnish group Metsä Serla 
gave rise to competition 
concerns in Denmark where the 
new combined company would 
have had a very high market 
share for corrugated boxes. In 
order to solve these doubts, SCA 
modified the original 
concentration by undertaking to 
dispose of the Neopak business 
(ex Metsä) and two box making 
operations (ex SCA Packaging) 
to a viable competitor. The 
Commission accordingly 
declared the operation 
compatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement. 
Preussag / Thomson 
The acquisition by German 
company Preussag AG of UK 
travel company Thomson Travel 
Group Pic raised serious 
concerns about the creation of a 
collective dominant position in 
the UK market for short-haul 
foreign package holidays. 
Preussag is a conglomerate with 
strong interests in the travel 
sector through its ownership of 
Gennan travel company TUI and 
its joint control, together with 
WestLB and the Carlson group, 
of UK travel company Thomas 
Cook Holdings Ltd. The UK 
market is characterised by a 
significant degree of vertical 
integration. The main domestic 
operators, including Thomson 
and Thomas Cook, are active in 
tour operating, travel agencies 
and charter airline services, and 
have extensive commercial links 
with each other. Preussag 
committed itself to divest its 
interest in Thomas Cook. 
Gennan bank Westdeutsche 
Landesbank (WestLB), which 
has links with Preussag, will also 
sell its stake in Thomas Cook. 
These undertakings also 
maintain competition in Ireland. 
The Commission's decision to 
clear the operation subject to the 
sale of Thomas Cook is 
consistent with its prohibition, 
last year, of the proposed 
acquisition by UK travel 
operator Airtours of domestic 
rival First Choice on the grounds 
that it would have left only three 
big travel operators in the UK 
market, the merged entity plus 
Thomson Travel and Thomas 
Cook. 
Rexam / American National 
Can 
The proposed acquisition of 
beverage can producer American 
National Can by UK-based 
Rexam Pic, a consumer 
packaging group raised some 
concerns as to the creation of 
dominant positions in two 
regional geographic markets, 
namely in Northern and in 
Southern Europe. Before the 
merger, there were four major 
beverage cans producers in the 
EU: Rexam, American Can, 
Continental Can and Carnaud 
MetalBox. 
In Northern Europe, the merger 
would have created a duopoly 
between Rexam/ANC and 
Continental Can, which together 
would have accounted for 80% 
of the market, with symmetrical 
market shares, cost structures, 
capacity and excess capacity. 
Anti-competitive co-ordinated 
behaviour would then have 
become possible in this market 
which is characterised by a flat 
growth trend, product 
homogeneity and transparency, 
the lack of technological change 
and a capacity-constrained third 
supplier. 
In order to remedy these 
concerns, the merging parties 
have proposed to divest two of 
their plants serving the Northern 
European market to an 
independent third party. As a 
result, the symmetry in capacity 
and in excess capacity will be 
eliminated and parallel 
behaviour through tacit co-
ordination between the two 
leading suppliers will not be 
sustainable in the long run. 
In Southern Europe, where the 
merged entity would have 
become the dominant supplier, 
the companies have also 
proposed to divest one plant. 
This undertaking eliminated the 
competitive overlap and restored 
the situation prevailing before 
the merger in this geographic 
area. 
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Sara Lee / Courtaulds 
The Commission conditionally 
approved the acquisition of 
Courtaulds Textiles Pic by Sara 
Lee. The deal would have 
created competition concernsin 
the hosiery market in France, 
where the companies own the 
two largest brands, Dim and 
Well, giving them a combined 
market share in value terms 
nearly nine times larger than its 
closest competitor (Le Bourget). 
Sara Lee's commitment to divest 
Textiles Well SA, i.e. the Well 
brand and the associated 
manufacturing site of Le Vigan 
in France, removed this concern, 
and the merger was allowed to 
proceed on this basis 
Nabisco / United Biscuits 
This was the second time this 
year the Commission has had to 
rule on a take-over bid involving 
UB. It was a collective bid 
involving Finalrealm, the 
acquiring vehicle formed by 
Nabisco, US investment 
company Hicks, Muse, Tate and 
Furst (HMTF), venture capital 
firms Cinven and PAI and a 
subsidiary of Deutsche Bank. 
The deal posed competition 
problems because of the addition 
of The Horizon Biscuit 
Company Ltd, another biscuit 
maker owned by HMTF. In the 
UK, the largest of the affected 
markets, the combination of UB 
and Horizon would have created 
concerns as regards both 
producer-branded and retailer-
branded biscuits. These concerns 
were resolved when the deal was 
modified so as to exclude 
Horizon from the operation via 
the sale of HMTF's minority 
shareholding in Finalrealm to the 
other financial investors 
involved in the deal. 
The Commission carried out its 
investigation in close liaison 
with the UK competition 
authorities. 
Volvo / Renault Véhicules 
Industriels^* 
With regard to the acquisition by 
Volvo of Renault Véhicules 
Industriels ("RVI") one main 
concern was that following the 
prohibition of the proposed 
merger between Volvo and 
Scania, Volvo has remained a 
significant shareholder in Scania. 
Similarly, RVI has, through the 
Irisbus joint venture, been linked 
to Iveco (of the Fiat group) in 
the production and sales of 
buses. However, in the context 
of the RVI acquisition, the 
parties have committed to 
remove these links to Scania and 
Iveco within a specific 
timeframe. In addition, the 
parties have also undertaken to 
eliminate the overlap in bus 
I 9S 
' - 0 This decision, although taken on 
1.9.2000 (one day after the end of 
the review period covered in this 
article), is nevertheless included 
here as it is to be viewed in the 
context of the prohibition decision 
in Case No. COMP/M.1672 
Volvo/Scania of 
15.03.2000.(Decision published 
on the Internet. See Dan 
SjòblonTs article in Competition 
Policy Newsletter 2/2000.) 
activities in France created by 
the operation. 
In Finland, Volvo would have 
reached a combined market 
share of 55% for heavy trucks. 
However, RVI is primarily 
active through an extensive co-
operation with Oy Sisu AB 
("Sisu"), a national truck 
producer with which it 
established a joint venture 
company RS Hansa Auto OY 
("Hansa"). Following a 
commitment, RVI's share of 
Hansa will be sold within a 
specific timeframe. This 
undertaking solves the 
competition concerns on the 
Finnish market for heavy trucks. 
The merged entity will remain 
subject to effective competition 
from several well-established 
competitors in all other 
markets.129 
Article 9 referral 
Interbrew/Bass 
Between May and August, the 
Commission referred one case to 
a Member State under the 
Article 9 procedures. This was 
the referral of the proposed 
acquisition by the Belgian 
company Interbrew SA of the 
brewing and distribution assets 
129 For example, in France, RVI has 
been losing market share since 
1994. The main beneficiary of this 
has been DAF, which has tripled 
its market share in that period. At 
present all the other European 
truck producers are present in 
France and achieve substantial 
sales ranging from 6 to 16%. 
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currently owned by the British 
company Bass. Earlier in the 
year, Interbrew had acquired 
Whitbread's brewing assets, and 
at the time the decision to refer 
the case was taken, the UK 
authorities' investigation into 
this acquisition was still 
underway. Both Interbrew and 
Bass are therefore active in the 
supply of beer in the UK. 
In its request for the case to be 
referred, the UK identified a 
number of markets within the 
UK for the supply of beer in 
which the conditions for refen'al 
were met. They considered that 
these markets were no larger 
than national, and that the 
combined strength of Interbrew 
and Scottish and Newcastle 
could give rise to the risk of a 
harmful duopolistic outcome. 
After undertaking its own 
investigation, the Commission 
agreed with the UK's analysis. 
Two further facts led the 
Commission to exercise its 
discretion to refer the case to the 
UK. Firstly, the UK authorities 
were already investigating 
Interbrew's acquisition of 
Whitbread's brewing interests. 
Secondly, the UK authorities 
have the benefit of a number of 
recent investigations into the UK 
beer industry, the most recent of 
which is the OFT's review of the 
Beer Orders. The Commission 
therefore considered that the UK 
is best-placed to carry out the 
necessary further examination of 
the case. The UK now has until 
January 2001 to conclude its 
investigation. 
The referral to the UK 
authorities only related to those 
parts of the deal which affected 
the UK beer sector. Separately, 
the Commission cleared those 
parts of the deal which relate to 
the supply of beer outside the 
UK, and to the supply of 
Flavoured Alcoholic Beverages 
both in the UK and elsewhere as 
no competition considerations 
arose as a result of the merger in 
those markets. 
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Main developments between 1st June 
and 30th September 2000 
Madeleine TILMANS, DG COMP-G-01 
Prolongation of the 
Community Framework for 
State aid in the motor vehicle 
industry until the end of 2001. 
Background 
The Commission introduced a 
Community framework for State 
aid to the motor vehicle industry 
in 1989, with the twofold aim of 
increasing the transparency of 
aid Hows and imposing strict 
discipline in the granting of such 
aid in order to reduce distortions 
of competition in the 
Community industry to a 
minimum. Various features of 
the industry, such as its major 
significance from an 
employment, trade and 
technological development point 
of view, but also the emergence 
of overcapacity, made such a 
framework essential. 
Since 1989, successive 
frameworks have been 
published. The current 
framework130 came into force on 
1 January 1998 for a period of 
three years. It foresees that, at 
the end of that period, the 
Commission should decide 
whether to extend it, in particular 
in the light of the experience 
with the application of the 
multisectoral framework. 
130 OJC279, 15.9.1997, p. 1. 
Aid under the motor vehicle 
framework 
Scope of the framework 
The Community framework for 
State aid to the motor vehicle 
industry applies to projects, 
involving the development, 
manufacture and assembly of 
"motor vehicles, "engines" and 
"modules and subsystems" either 
direct by a manufacturer or, 
under certain circumstances, by 
a first-tier component supplier. 
All aid which public authorities 
plan to grant under authorised 
aid schemes must be notified if 
either the nominal amount of the 
total investment costs reaches € 
50 million or if the total gross 
aid of the project amounts to at 
least € 5 million. All aid granted 
ad hoc outside an approved 
scheme as well as any rescue and 
restructuring aid must be notified 
in advance unless it complies 
with the thresholds and rules of 
the Commission notice on the de 
minimis rule for state aid131 (€ 
100000 over 3 years). 
The framework does not only 
apply to projects within the 
Community. It follows from the 
Europe Agreements, that the 
state aid authorities in the CEEC 
OJC6S. 6.3.1996 
should apply the framework as 
well when assessing an aid 
project in this sector. 
Notified aid measures in the 
motor vehicle sector mainly 
involve regional aid. From all 
cases notified under the present 
framework between 1998 and 
2000, 15 projects involved 
regional aid, whereas one project 
involved training aid, one 
involved environmental aid and 
one involved R&D aid. 
Regional aid 
The motor vehicle industry may 
benefit from regional aid to 
assist new plants and the 
extension of existing ones in the 
assisted areas of the Community, 
thus making a contribution to 
regional development. However 
the Commission has to compare 
the advantages from the 
standpoint of regional 
development with any 
unfavourable consequences for 
the sector as a whole. The 
purpose of the comparison is to 
ensure that other factors 
affecting the Community, such 
as respect for fair competition 
and overcapacity, are also taken 
into consideration. 
Before the Commission can 
authorise regional aid in favour 
of a car manufacturer, it has to 
conduct an analysis, which 
concentrates on the following 
issues: 
- Necessity of the aid: The aid 
recipient must clearly prove 
that it has an economically 
viable alternative location for 
its project. The existence of a 
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viable alternative defines the 
"mobility" of the project. If 
there were no other industrial 
site, whether new or in 
existence, capable of 
receiving the investment in 
question within the group, the 
undertaking would be 
compelled to carry out its 
project in the sole plant 
available, even in the absence 
of aid. In such a case regional 
aid is not necessary. 
Therefore, no regional aid 
may be authorised for a 
project that is not 
geographically mobile. In 
addition, regional aid 
intended for modernisation 
and rationalisation, which is 
generally not mobile, is not 
authorised in the motor 
vehicle industry. 
Eligibility of the costs: The 
Commission determines 
whether or not costs relating 
to the mobile aspects of a 
project are eligible under the 
regional scheme applicable in 
the assisted area concerned. 
Proportionality of the aid: To 
assess whether proposed aid 
is in proportion to the 
regional problems it is 
intended to help resolve, the 
Commission uses a cost-
benefit analysis. A cost-
benefit analysis compares the 
costs which an investor 
would bear in order to carry 
out the project in the region 
in question with those it 
would bear for an identical 
project in a different 
location, which makes it 
possible to determine the 
specific handicaps of the 
assisted region concerned. 
The Commission authorises 
regional aid within the limit 
of the regional handicaps 
resulting from the investment 
in the comparator plant. 
- Analysis of the effects on the 
industry and on competition: 
The Commission finally 
studies the effects on 
competition of every 
investment project, looking in 
particular at variations in 
production capacity at group 
level on the relevant market. 
For instance, if capacities are 
increased, the allowable aid 
intensity is reduced. In any 
case, the aid may not exceed 
the regional ceiling in the 
assisted region concerned. 
Other aid 
Rescue and restructuring aid to 
the car sector is assessed under 
the guidelines on State aid for 
rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty (OJ, C288, 
09.10.1999). The Commission 
usually requires a reduction in 
installed capacity in proportion 
to the aid intensity. Rescue and 
restructuring aid that leads to a 
capacity increase will be 
prohibited. 
R&D aid will be assessed under 
the Community framework for 
state aid for research and 
development (OJ, C45, 
17.02.1996), aid for 
environmental protection and 
energy saving under the 
Community guidelines on State 
aid for environmental protection 
(OJ C72, 10.03.1994) and aid to 
vocational training under 
Community framework for 
training aid (OJ C343. 
11.11.Í998). In addition, 
investment aid for innovation 
may be authorised in duly 
justified cases, as an incentive to 
industrial or technological risk 
taking. 
No aid, however, may be granted 
to companies in the motor 
vehicle industry for 
modernisation or rationalisation, 
as this would present a very high 
risk of distortion of competition 
and should normally be financed 
from the company's own funds. 
In addition, no new operating aid 
will be authorised by the 
Commission, even in assisted 
areas. 
Possible future options 
The Commission has been 
considering different options for 
assessing state aid in the motor 
vehicle sector, particularly in the 
light of the existing multisectoral 
framework on regional aid or 
large investment projects.132 
This framework aims at 
reducing, for large scale 
investment projects, the 
competition distorting effects of 
regional state aid by lowering 
the permissible aid ceiling 
compared with the maximum aid 
intensity authorised in the region 
concerned. This extent of the 
reduction depends on the capital-
labour ratio of the project, the 
degree of competition in the 
' J - Multisectoral framework on 
regional aid for large investment 
projects (OJ C 107. 7.4.1998, 
p. 7). 
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relevant market and the impact 
on regional development. 
The multisectoral framework 
was adopted by the Commission 
with a view to the broader 
objective of ultimately replacing 
the various existing sectoral 
rules on state aid by a single 
approach to regional state aid, 
regardless of the sector involved. 
The multisectoral framework 
became applicable from 
1 September 1998 for an initial 
trial period of three years and 
foresees that the Commission, 
before the end of the this period, 
will carry out a thorough review 
of the utility and scope of the 
framework, which will inter alia 
consider the question of whether 
it should be renewed, revised or 
abolished. 
The Commission has in 
particular identified the 
following possibilities when 
considering the future state aid 
rules in the motor vehicle sector: 
(i) ending the specific rules for 
control of aid to the 
industry, while adapting the 
multisectoral framework as 
appropriate (e.g. as regards 
notification thresholds; aid 
ceilings); 
(ii) revising/renewing the 
existing framework for a 
period to be determined. 
Extension of the present 
framework until 31.12.200I133 
In view of the fact that an 
assessment of the functioning of 
the multisectoral framework is 
not foreseen until the end of its 
period of validity in August 
2001, the Commission 
considered that an extension of 
the current motor vehicle 
framework of one year would be 
appropriate. The Commission 
took the view that there was no 
need to alter profoundly the way 
in which the Commission 
scrutinises motor industry state 
aid cases during this extension 
period. 
At its meeting on 31 May, the 
Commission accordingly 
decided to extend the present 
Community framework for state 
aid to the motor vehicle industry 
by a period of one year, subject 
to a few technical adjustments to 
bring the framework up to date. 
At the same meeting, the 
Commission decided to propose, 
in the form of an appropriate 
measure within the meaning of 
Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty, 
that the Member States comply 
with the rules of the framework 
resulting from the extension. The 
Commission asked Member 
states to agree to this proposal. 
133 OJ C 258/6, 09.09.2000 
United Kigdom - The 
Commission authorizes aid for 
private investors participating 
in the creation of the High 
Technology Fund which is 
aimed at encourage risk 
capital investments for early 
stage enterprises in high 
technology sectors. 
On 12 July, the European 
Commission authorised the 
creation by the UK authorities of 
a fund to encourage risk capital 
investments in early stage 
enterprises in high technology 
sectors. Under the measure, the 
UK authorities will contribute 20 
million pounds sterling (€31 
million) to the fund which will 
also include other investors. The 
other investors will participate 
on more favourable terms than 
the authorities, which brings the 
measure within the definition of 
state aid. The fund will then 
take minority stakes in venture 
capital funds focussed on early 
stage high technology 
companies, on the same terms as 
other investors. The measure 
includes several features which, 
taken together, allowed the 
Commission to decide that the 
measure would not unduly 
distort competition. In 
particular, the UK took steps 
which should ensure that the aid 
and the distortion of competition 
are the minimum necessary to 
achieve the objective. 
Following an analysis of why 
institutional investors were not 
making investments in this type 
of fund, the UK launched an 
open call for tender for the 
selection of a fund manager. The 
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fund manager, who will operate 
independently, will have an 
important incentive to optimise 
the performance of the fund. 
Because the UK High 
Technology Fund's investments 
in individual funds will be on 
identical terms to those of other 
investors, they can be held to 
respect the "market economy 
investor principle". The 
investment decisions of these 
funds will be taken on 
commercial terms and can also 
be held to respect the principle. 
The Commission normally 
considers that such investments 
do not represent state aid to the 
recipient of the funds. 
Nouvelles Décisions sur les 
cartes des aides à finalité 
régionale pour la période 2000-
2006. 
Le processus d'examen et 
d'approbation des "cartes" 
notifiées par les Etats membres 
pour l'octroi d'aides à finalité 
régionale s'est terminé en 
septembre par l'adoption de la 
carte pour la Belgique et une 
décision positive en ce qui 
concerne les aspects de la "carte" 
italienne qui avaient fait l'objet 
d'une procédure au titre de 
l'article 88 § 2 du traité CE. Au 
cours des quatre derniers mois, 
la Commission a approuvé les 
projets de cartes qui lui avaient 
été soumis par la Belgique, le 
Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas et le 
Royaume-Uni. Quant à l'Italie et 
au Portugal, leurs cartes 
respectives sont désormais 
entièrement approuvées par la 
Commission qui avait déjà 
précédemment donné son accord 
en ce qui concerne les zones 
relatives à la dérogation prévue à 
l'article 87 § 3 a) du traité CE. 
Belgique, Luxembourg et Pays-
Bas 
On 12 July, 19 July and 20 
September, the Commission 
aproved the regional aid map for 
the period 2000-2006 foi-
Luxembourg and for Belgium 
respectively. These maps 
determine the regions eligible for 
aid under the derogation 
foreseen under Article 87(3)(c) 
of the EC Treaty. The Dutch 
regional aid map covers 15% of 
the total population of the 
country. In Luxembourg, 32.0% 
of the national population is 
covered, in Belgium 30.9%. 
Each of the three map is defined 
using NUTS V as the basic 
geographical unit. The 
Commission accepted the 
justification for the use of NUTS 
V provided by the respective 
national authorities. Moreover, 
the Commission was satisfied 
that the population coverage of 
the regional aid map was inline 
with its coverage of economic 
avtivities and that each of the 
regions proposed was compact, 
as required by the regional aid 
guidelines134. 
The average regional aid 
intensity ceiling established in 
the three nw aid maps is lower 
than the average ceiling 
134 0.1 C 74, 10.03.1998, p. 9. 
applicable prior to 1 January 
2000 in each of the three 
Member States. In Luxembourg, 
the aid intensity ceiling for large 
enterprises is reduced to 10% 
nge. In the Netherlands and 
Belgium the average aid 
intensity for large enterprises is 
limited to 16.0% nge and 15.6% 
nge respectively. 
Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne 
le Luxembourg, le 19 juillet, la 
Commission a également 
autorisé la mise en application 
du régime d'aides régionales à 
l'investissement projeté par les 
autorités luxembourgeoises après 
avoir conclu qu'il s'inscrivait 
dans les limites de la "carte" 
qu'elle avait approuvée et qu'il 
respectait les prescriptions des 
lignes directrices pour les aides à 
finalité régionale. 
Portugal 
En décembre 1999, la 
Commission avait décidé 
d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à 
l'article 88 § 2 du traité CE à 
l'égard de la proposition qui lui 
avait été soumise par les 
autorités portugaises en ce qui 
concerne la région NUTS II 
«Lisboa e Vale do Tejo», qui est 
une «région 87 § 3 a) sortante» 
et qui devient eligible au 
bénéfice de l'article 87 § 3 c). Le 
point 5.7 des lignes directrices 
concernant les aides d'Etat à 
finalité régionale prévoit pour les 
zones perdant leur statut de 
"zone 87 § 3 a)", la possibilité 
d'autoriser une période 
transitoire de 4 ans maximum 
pour l'adaptation des intensités 
d'aides maximales dont elles 
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avaient bénéficié jusqu'au 
31.12.1999, une certaine 
limitation de la couverture 
territoriale devant cependant être 
respectée. Or, la notification 
portugaise proposait de faire 
bénéficier de ladite période de 
transition l'entièreté de cette 
région alors qu'elle représente 
33,4% de la population 
nationale, de ladite. Cela ne 
pouvait pas être justifié au 
regard des lignes directrices et 
était donc incompatible avec le 
marché commun. 
Dans le cadre de la procédure 
formelle d'examen, les autorités 
portugaises ont procédé à une 
modification de leur notification 
originale, ce qui a permis à la 
Commission d'approuver, le 28 
juin dernier, cette partie de la 
carte portugaise. En particulier, 
selon leur nouvelle proposition, 
seules les quatre régions de 
niveau III de la NUTS «Lezíria 
do Tejo», «Médio Tejo», 
«Oeste» et «Península de 
Setúbal», qui représentent 14,9% 
de la population nationale et 
dont le PIB par habitant se situe 
entre 55% et 58% de la moyenne 
communautaire, bénéficieront de 
la période de transition 
susmentionnée. En revanche, la 
région «Grande Lisbonne» 
(18,5% de la population) en est 
exclue. 
Puisque la Commission avait 
déjà décidé, en décembre 1999, 
que toutes les autres régions 
portugaises étaient admissibles 
au titre de l'article 87 § 3 a) du 
Traité, les deux décisions 
forment ensemble la carte des 
aides régionales applicable au 
Portugal. 
Royaume-Uni 
Le 26 juillet, la Commission a 
décidé d'approuver la "carte" des 
aides à finalité régionale que le 
Royaume-Uni lui avait notifiée 
en mai dernier pour la période 
2000-2006. En application de 
celle-ci, 28,7 % de la population 
de la Grande-Bretagne et la 
totalité de celle d'Irlande du 
Nord vivent dans des régions 
éligibles au bénéfice d'aides à 
finalité régionale. Les taux 
d'aides autorisés vont de 10 à 
35 % en équivalent-subvention 
net, à l'exception de l'Irlande du 
Nord où ils peuvent atteindre 
40 %. 
Italy - The Commission 
decides to authorize an 
investment aid to the firm 
"Villa Romana s.r.l." for the 
building of a hotel complex 
near Pompei. 
"Villa Romana" is a hotel 
facilities project. The aid was 
notified in the context of the 
"contratto d'area [territorial 
contract] Torrese-Stabiese " 
(Campania)135, under the 
conditions laid down in the 
Multisectoral Framework for 
135 The latter is based on the 
protocol of agreement 
concluded between the 
employers' organisation and 
the trade unions. 
large investment projects in 
assisted areas. It consists of 
investment aid granted in the 
form of a non-reimboursable 
grant amounting to 38,39 million 
Euros, to be disbursed over 3 
years. The aid intensity, as 
calculated according to the four 
factors laid down in the 
Multisectoral Framework, is 
56,67% NGE, which had to be 
lowered to the regional ceiling 
for Campania which - for an 
SME such as "Villa Romana 
s.r.l."-is 50,38% NGE. 
The hotel complex will be built 
near the archaelogical site of 
Pompei-Ercolano and have a 
capacity of 838 beds (438 
rooms). The project will create 
around 480 new jobs, both 
directly (219) and indirectly 
(262). 
On the basis of the evidence 
supplied by the Italian 
authorities, the Commission 
decided to consider the 
provinces of Naples and Salerno 
as the relevant geographic 
market. 
The relevant product market is 
"Hotels and motels, with 
restaurant" (NACE Code 55.11). 
The project aims at filling the 
existing gap in the supply of "4-
stars +" hotel category in the 
interested area. The hotel looks 
significant by its size, but it 
would just allow to intercept 
62% of the excess demand in the 
relevant geographic market. 
Over the years from 1994 to 
1997, Campania witnessed a 
steady increase in the presence 
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of both foreign tourists 
(+10,18% on average) and 
domestic (+2,98%) visitors. This 
trend is likely to continue or 
even accelerate in the years 
1999-2000. Moreover, there is a 
situation of permanent traffic 
congestion between Pompei and 
the Penisola Sorrentina - which 
prevents a 100% substitutability 
between adjacent hotel clusters. 
On the other hand, the supply of 
bedrooms of a comfort level in 
the area is extremely limited. 
Therefore, the new 4-stars hotel 
is not likely to affect the intra-
EU exchanges to an extent 
which is incompatible with the 
competition conditions in the 
internal market, as its impact is 
likely to be limited to the local 
tourist basin, which has at its 
core the archaëlogical site of 
Pompei-Ercolano, the Vesuvian 
area and the Penisola Sorrentina. 
The Commission has 
accordingly decided to raise no 
objections to the aid in question. 
Sweden - Commission 
approves State aid to improve 
the indoor environment in 
buildings for reasons of public 
health 
On 12 July 2000 the 
Commission decided to close the 
Article 88(2) procedure with a 
positive decision in respect of an 
aid scheme intended to reduce 
the presence of allergenic 
substances or other materials that 
constitute health hazards in 
buildings. 
The measure is an amendment to 
an environmental investment aid 
scheme that runs until the end of 
2001. The new aid may for 
example be granted for the 
conversion of insufficient 
ventilation systems or 
elimination of excessive 
humidity or mould and radon. 
Conversions that do not have 
health or environmental effects, 
such as changing the plan of the 
building are not eligible for aid, 
nor are measures carried out due 
to legal requirements (unless 
they go further than required). 
About SEK 50 million (about 6 
million Euro) are expected to be 
used for the new grants. 
The Commission initially had 
doubts with regard to the 
Community objective on the 
basis of which to accept the aid. 
It therefore opened the procedure 
under Article 88(2) of the EC 
Treaty. The investigation led to 
the conclusion that the 
Community guidelines on State 
aid for environmental protection, 
on which the original approval 
of the scheme was based, could 
not be applied on this measure. 
As the scheme will contribute to 
improving public health in 
general, including the health and 
safety of workers, the 
Commission closed the 
procedure with a positive 
decision based on the provisions 
of the Treaty on the health and 
safety of workers as well as 
public health and environmental 
protection in general (Articles 
137, 152 and 174 of the EC 
Treaty, respectively), which are 
recognised Community 
objectives. 
Portugal - La Commission 
ouvre la procédure au titre de 
l'article 88 § 2 du traité CE à 
l'égard du régime d'aides 
financières et fiscales existant 
dans la zone franche de 
Madère étant donné que les 
mesures utiles destinées à le 
rendre compatible avec les 
réglementations communau-
taires n'ont toujours pas été 
mises en application par les 
autorités portugaises. 
La Commission a autorisé en 
1987, pour une période initiale 
de trois ans, un régime d'aides 
financières et fiscales dans la 
zone franche de Madère. Une 
prolongation de ce régime pour 
des périodes additionnelles de 
respectivement trois et cinq ans a 
ensuite été autorisée par la 
Commission à deux reprises. 
Selon la dernière décision de la 
Commission y relative, des aides 
au fonctionnement pourraient 
être accordées aux entreprises 
industrielles, financières et de 
services qui s'installeraient dans 
la zone franche jusqu'au 
31.12.2000. En particulier, ces 
entreprises pourraient bénéficier 
d'une exonération totale 
d'impôts directs jusqu'à fin 
2011, date à partir de laquelle 
cette exonération deviendrait 
partielle. 
Entre-temps, suite à l'adoption 
des lignes directrices concernant 
les aides d'Etat à finalité 
régionale, la Commission a 
proposé à tous les Etats membres 
de modifier les régimes d'aides à 
finalité régionale existants qui 
seraient encore en vigueur le 1er 
janvier 2000 afin de les rendre 
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compatibles avec les dispositions 
des lignes directrices à partir de 
cette date. Or, ces lignes 
directrices consacrent le principe 
de l'interdiction des aides au 
fonctionnement, tout en 
admettant des exceptions dans 
les régions bénéficiant de la 
dérogation prévue à l'article 
87 § 3 a) du Traité, à condition 
qu'elles soient justifiées en 
fonction de leur contribution au 
développement régional et que 
leur niveau soit proportionnel 
aux handicaps qu'elles visent à 
pallier. En outre, ces aides au 
fonctionnement doivent être 
limitées dans le temps et 
dégressives. 
Bien qu'elles aient accepté les 
mesures utiles qui leur ont été 
proposées par la Commission, 
les autorités portugaises n'ont 
toujours pas apporté au régime 
en cause toutes les modifications 
nécessaires pour le rendre 
compatible avec les lignes 
directrices concernant les aides 
d'Etat à finalité régionale. Par 
conséquent, la Commission a 
décidé d'ouvrir la procédure 
d'examen prévue à l'article 88§2 
du Traité à son encontre. 
United Kingdom - Commission 
investigates aid involved in the 
Viridian Growth Fund, a 
venture capital fund located in 
Northern Ireland. 
On 26 July, the Commission 
decided to open the Article 88(2) 
EC procedure regarding aid 
involved in a new venture capital 
fund in Northern Ireland called 
the Viridian Growth Fund. The 
enquiry will enable the 
Commission to determine 
whether the aid is compatible 
with the common market. 
The UK authorities had notified 
to the Commission an aid 
scheme linked to the setting up 
and operations of the Viridian 
Growth Fund LP in September 
1999. Additional information 
was supplied in January, March 
and June 2000. 
The Fund will have capital in a 
total of £10 million. The purpose 
of the £ 10 million Fund is to 
address perceived gaps in the 
provision of venture capital to 
small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Northern Ireland. 
Partners in the Fund are the 
Department of Enterprise Trade 
& Investment (DETI - £3.34 
million), the European 
Investment Bank (£ 3.33 
million), the electricity supplier 
Viridian Group Pic (£ 2 million) 
and a number of pension funds 
(£ 1.33 million). 
There are important differences 
in the terms of investment 
between DETI and the other 
investors. Finance is gradually 
drawn down into the fund over a 
period of five years. In the first 
part of this period finance is 
mainly provided by the DETI, 
thereafter, with the public sector 
commitment fully invested, the 
remaining drawdowns come 
from the other investors. Monies 
will be initially returned to the 
private investors, until they have 
realised a full return of their 
investment plus a return of 10% 
a year. It is only thereafter that 
any further realisations from the 
portfolio will be made to the 
public sector. 
At this stage the Commission 
considers that the proposed 
scheme involves aid to the 
private investors of the Fund and 
to the recipient SMEs that falls 
under Article 87(1) EC and 
Article 61(1) of the EEA 
Agreement in so far as it may 
distort competition and affect 
trade between Member States. 
The Commission is also 
considering whether the limited 
partnership, which is the vehicle 
for the Fund's operation, should 
also be considered to be an 
undertaking which is a 
beneficiary of the aid. 
The Commission has assessed 
whether one of the exemptions 
provided for in Article 87 EC 
can apply to the aid. 
It notes, first, that the aid to 
SMEs involved does not. on the 
basis of the information at hand, 
meet the conditions set out in the 
Community guidelines on State 
aid for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (OJ C 213, 
23.7.1996, p.4), the Guidelines 
for national regional aid (OJ C 
74, 10.3.1998,"p. 9) or in any 
other of the Commission's 
communications and frame-
works, and may assimilate to so-
called operating aid. 
Operating aid can only be 
allowed in regions qualifying for 
an exemption under Article 
87(3)(a) EC, and if the aid is 
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progressively 
limited in time. 
reduced and 
These conditions do not seem to 
be met in this case, as Northern 
Ireland does not qualify as an 
exemption under Article 87(3)(a) 
EC and the aid scheme does not 
seem to provide for the aid to be 
progressively reduced. 
Second, the different terms for 
public and private invested 
monies in the Fund constitute 
state aid to the private investors 
of the Fund, which cannot be 
found compatible under any of 
the communications and 
frameworks which the 
Commission has adopted, and 
which can also not be 
determined to be the minimum 
necessary to achieve its 
objective. Furthermore, the 
scheme may distort competition 
between venture capital funds. 
Because the Commission at this 
stage nourishes serious doubts as 
to the compatibility of the 
scheme with the common 
market, it is obliged to initiate 
investigations pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the Treaty. Under this 
procedure all interested parties 
will have the opportunity to 
comment. The Commission will 
thereafter take a final decision. 
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Séminaire euro-méditerranéen sur le 
droit et la politique de concurrence à 
Casablanca (Maroc) les 18 et 19 juillet 
2000 
Jean-François PONS, Directeur Général adjoint 
Le Gouvernement marocain a 
organisé les 18 et 19 juillet 2000, 
avec le concours de la 
CNUCED, un séminaire 
particulièrement intéressant 
destiné: 
- d'une part à présenter à une 
assistance marocaine, mais 
aussi à des représentants 
d'autres pays de la 
Méditerranée et d'Europe, la 
loi marocaine instituant la 
liberté des prix et la 
protection de la concurrence, 
qui entrera en vigueur en 
2001 et qui découle 
notamment des accords euro-
méditerranéens; 
- d'autre part à débattre des 
conditions dans lesquelles la 
concurrence doit trouver sa 
place dans les pays en 
développement et face à la 
mondialisation, en particulier 
en s'appuyant sur la 
coopération internationale. 
La discussion sur la nouvelle loi 
marocaine, qui a été présentée 
par M. Alhamí, Ministre des 
Affaires générales, a été 
particulièrement riche. Les 
intervenants ont dans l'ensemble 
salué les progrès que cette loi 
apporte à l'économie et aux 
consommateurs marocains, 
notamment à travers la création 
du Conseil de la Concurrence, 
qui sera une autorité 
indépendante. Plusieurs 
représentants d'entreprises ou de 
consommateurs ont souhaité que 
le rôle de ce Conseil 
(formellement instance 
consultative) puisse être renforcé 
dans la pratique, notamment à 
travers un suivi aussi 
systématique que possible par le 
Gouvernement des avis du 
Conseil. De nombreux 
participants (y compris 
d'autorités de concurrence 
étrangères) ont aussi souhaité 
que la saisine du Conseil, qui ne 
peut être effectuée que par 
l'administration, soit fréquente et 
que l'administration lui 
transmette les plaintes que les 
entreprises et les associations de 
consommateurs déposeraient 
auprès d'elles. 
Le second thème "concurrence, 
développement et mondiali-
sation" a été développé dans des 
discussions où sont notamment 
intervenus MM. Brusick 
(CNUCED), Gallot (Ministère 
français de l'Economie, des 
Finances et du Budget), 
Anderson (OMC), Pons 
(Commission européenne), 
Heimlet" (Autorita Garante) et 
Mme Knoll (Bundeskartellamt) 
et M. Kheimany (Banque 
Mondiale). 
Les conclusions de ces 
discussions peuvent être 
résumées ainsi: 
- il est dans l'intérêt des PVD 
(et en particulier de leurs 
consommateurs) d'avoir un 
droit protégeant la 
concurrence; 
- ce droit peut être adapté à 
leur situation, notamment 
couvrir des zones 
économiques regroupant 
plusieurs pays et se 
développer de façon 
progressive; 
- la coopération entre autorités 
nationales de concurrence 
doit s'intensifier en bilatéral 
(y compris par de l'assistance 
technique vers les PVD), 
mais aussi en multilatéral via 
l'OMC. 
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Accords euro-méditerranéens et 
concurrence une réponse aux 
problèmes de développement et de 
mondialisation - Casablanca, 18-19 
juillet 2000 
Jean-François PONS, Directeur Général adjoint 
CONCURRENCE ET DÉVELOP-
PEMENT 
1) La politique de concur-
rence n'est pas faite que 
pour les pays développés 
• Les tendances 
anticoncurren-tielles 





• Laisser ces tendances 
sans les combattre 
aboutirait à pénaliser les 
consommateurs, les 
PME, l'innovation, 
l'économie nationale (y 
compris l'emploi). 
• Les évolutions récentes 
dans les anciens pays 
communistes, comme en 
Asie du sud-est, 
témoignent qu'une 
absence de concurrence 
interne aboutit à une 
Cette présentation a été faite à 
titre personnel et ne saurait donc 
engager la Commission 
européenne. 
sclérose économique ou 
à des crises. 
2) La politique de concur-
rence dans les pays en 
développement doit être 
adaptée 
• Les priorités doivent être 
la répression des 
ententes les plus graves 
(cartels de prix), 
répartitions de marché 
ainsi que les abus de 
position dominante et 
éviter les concentrations 
économiques excessives 
(notamment au moment 
des privatisations ou 
démonopolisations). 
• Les secteurs à surveiller 
sont avant tout ceux liés 
à l'import/export (ex. 
cartel transport maritime 
Afrique de l'Ouest) parce 
que fort impact pour ces 
pays, ainsi que celui des 
biens de consommation, 
car les consommateurs 
doivent adhérer et 
soutenir cette politique 
ainsi que les PME. 
• Exceptions/limites: 
l'exemple le plus courant 
est celui des services 
publics, mais les 
exceptions à la 
concurrence doivent être 
toujours justifiées et 
transparentes, y compris 
sur leur coût. 
• Les zones économiques 
pour un développement 
harmonieux de la 
concurrence doivent être 
d'une certaine taille, ce 
qui doit inciter à la 
création de zones 
regroupant plusieurs 
pays (dont le Marché 
commun européen a été 




1) La tendance à la 
mondialisation de nom-
breux secteurs industriels 
et de services signifie que 
les problèmes de 
concurrence prennent de 
façon croissante une 
dimension mondiale. 
Les comportements anti-
concurrentiels qui prennent 
place en dehors d'un pays, 
par exemple un cartel ainsi 
que les opérations 
structurelles impliquant des 
entreprises étrangères 
(illustrées par la vague 
actuelle des grandes fusions 
et des alliances stratégiques 
mondiales) peuvent avoir un 
impact important sur la 
concurrence au sein de ce 
pays. La mise en oeuvre 
d'une politique de 
concurrence efficace dans le 
monde et la coopération 
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entre autorités de 
concurrence sont devenues 
nécessaires afin de faire 
face à ces nouveaux défis. 
2) La Commission euro-
péenne a pris plusieurs 
initiatives ces dernières 
années pour développer la 
coopération bilatérale avec 
ses principaux partenaires 
commerciaux, tout en 
présentant des propositions 
pour une nouvelle approche 
multilatérale, dans la ligne 
du rapport Van Miert de 
1996. Aujourd'hui, la 
Commission est engagée 
dans une coopération 
bilatérale active avec les 
autorités de concurrence des 
Etats-Unis, elle s'implique 
dans les progrès d'une 
politique de concurrence 
dans les pays candidats à 
l'élargissement de l'union 
européenne et dans les 
autres pays voisins et 
partenaires de l'Europe. 
Enfin, l'union a proposé le 
développement des règles 
de concurrence au sein de 
l'OMC, visant à faire 
progresser la politique de 
concurrence partout dans le 
monde et la coopération 
entre autorités de 
concurrence. 
3) Pour un pays comme le 
Maroc, le développement 
d'une politique de 
concurrence et la 
coopération avec d'autres 
autorités de concurrence 
permettent de ne pas subir 
des comportements 
anticoncurrentiels venant de 
l'extérieur, ni des décisions 
unilatérales d'autres 
gouvernements. Elles 
devraient faciliter aussi 
l'accueil d'investissements 
étrangers concurrentiels et 
bénéfiques. 
CONCURRENCE ET ACCORDS 
EURO-MEDITERRANEENS 
L'introduction de règles de 
concurrence dans les accords 
euro-méditerranéens est une 
réponse aux questions relatives 
au développement et à la 
mondialisation qui viennent 
d'être évoquées. 
1) Les accords euro-
méditerranéens, signés par 
l'union européenne avec les 
autres pays riverains de la 
Méditerranée, ont pour but 
de resserrer les liens 
économiques et politiques, 
de favoriser les échanges de 
biens et de services et de 
soutenir le développement 
des pays partenaires. 
L'accord avec le Maroc a 
été signé le 26 février 1996. 
Ces accords s'accompagnent 
d'un effort financier sans 
précédent de la part de 
l'union européenne 
(programmes MEDA) et 
d'une réduction progressive 
des barrières au commerce. 
2) Les règles de concurrence 
figurant dans ces accords 
Les pays signataires 
s'engagent à appliquer des 
règles inspirées de celles de 
l'union européenne: 
• Lutte contre les accords 
anticoncurrentiels entre 
entreprises et contre 
l'abus de position 
dominante; 
• Lutte contre les aides 
publiques qui faussent la 
concurrence en faveur de 
certaines entreprises ou 
production. 
Les parties s'engagent à 
lutter contre ces pratiques 
dès lors qu'elles sont 
susceptibles d'affecter les 
échanges entre la 
Communauté et le Maroc 
et qu'elles ne peuvent être 
exemptées sur la base des 
critères découlant des 
articles 81, 86 et 87 du 
Traité d'Amsterdam/an-
ciens articles 85, 86 et 92 
du Traité de Rome. 
Le conseil d'association 
adopte les réglementations 
nécessaires à la mise en 
oeuvre de ces articles, qui 
vont s'appliquer dès le 
début de 2001. 
3) L'application des règles 
de concurrence conver-
gentes autour de la 
Méditerranée 
• Vise à faciliter le 
développement des 
échanges et à simplifier 
la vie des entreprises, et 
ainsi à permettre le 
développement des pays 
du sud dans un marché 
élargi. 
• Va nécessiter une plus 
grande coopération entre 
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autorités de concurrence, 
ce qui présente la 
meilleure réponse aux 
risques posés par la 
mondialisation. 
C'est un grand chantier, 
mais qui devrait se traduire 
par des bénéfices pour les 
consommateurs, les entre-
prises (et particulière-ment 
les PME), l'innovation et 
finalement la croissance 
économique et la création 
d'emplois. 
LA POLITIQUE DE CONCUR-
RENCE AU MAROC 
L'adoption de la loi n° 06/99 sur 
la liberté des prix et de la 
concurrence s'inscrit 
parfaitement dans le cadre des 
accords euro-méditerranéens. 
Elle s'inspire de principes 
proches de ceux du Traité de 
l'union européenne et des règles 
de concurrence définies dans ces 
accords. Certains pourraient 
regretter que l'autorité 
indépendante créée par cette loi, 
le Conseil de la Concurrence : 
• ne soit qu'une instance 
consultative, 
• ne puisse être saisie 
directement par les 
entreprises ou les consom-
mateurs. 
Mais, le plus important à mon 
sens pour les autorités 
marocaines en charge de la 
concurrence, le Gouvernement et 
le Conseil de la Concurrence, 
c'est de réussir la mise en œuvre 
de cette loi et de passer avec 
succès l'examen de crédibilité 
qui s'attache à toute nouvelle 
autorité dans un domaine aussi 
important. Pour réussir cet 
examen, il me semble que : 
• le Gouvernement devra 
transmettre systématiquement 
au Conseil les plaintes qu'il 
recevra des entreprises et des 
consommateurs ; 
• le Conseil devra rendre des 
avis forts et publics au 
Gouvernement, notamment 
en recommandant des 
décisions avec amendes 
lorsque cela sera nécessaire ; 
• le Gouvernement devra 
s'efforcer de suivre aussi 
systématiquement que 
possible les avis du conseil. 
Par ailleurs, je rappelle que le 
Gouvernement doit aussi 
organiser un système et des 
règles de contrôle des aides 
d'Etat, en application des accords 
euro-méditerranéens, dès lors 
que ces aides ont un impact sur 
les échanges entre le Maroc et 
l'union européenne. 
Pour sa part, la Commission 
européenne est prête à apporter 
son concours à la mise en œuvre 
de cette loi (ainsi qu'au contrôle 
des aides d'Etat) et, dans la 
limite de ses possibilités, à 
développer une coopération, que 
nous espérons fructueuse avec 
les autorités en charge de la 
concurrence. 
86 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 
INFORMATION SECTION 
COMPETITION DG staff list 
Directeur général 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Conseiller pour les réformes 
Conseiller auditeur 
Conseiller auditeur 
Assistants du Directeur général 
directement rattaches au Directeur général : 
1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information 
2. Questions informatiques 
DIRECTION A 
Politique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires 
Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
1. Politique générale de la concurrence. 
aspects économiques et juridiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Projets législatifs et réglementaires ; 
relations avec les Etats membres 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Politique et coordination des Aides d'Etat 
4. Affaires internationales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
DIRECTION Β 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 
Conseiller 








Irène SOU KA 
Javier Juan PUIG SAQUES 
Kirtikumar MEHTA 
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Unité opérationnelle 1 
Unité opérationnelle 11 
Unité opérationnelle III 
Unité opérationnelle IV 
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Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/2962368 
Francisco Enrique GONZALEZ DIAZ a. i. 2965044 
¡Vol/gang MEDERER 2953584 
Paid MALRIC SMITH 
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DIRECTION D 
Services 
1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2. Transports et infrastructures des transports 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Commerce et autres services 











Cartels, industries de base et énergie 
1. Cartels 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Industries de base 
3. Energie, eau et acier 
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et de consommation Sven NORBERG 
1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
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et construction mécanique connexe 
3. Produits agricoles et alimentaires, produits pharmaceutiques Luc GYSELEN 
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Conseiller 
1. Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
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Aides d'Etat II 
1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction 
navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique et 
électronique, construction mécanique et autres 
secteurs manufacturiers 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
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Documentation.. 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given 
by Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of these 
are available from Competition DG's home page on the World 
Wide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details of 
conferences on competition policy which have been brought to out 
attention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this 
facility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG's 
Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
L'application des règles de 
concurrence ¿ι l'offre de lignes de 
télécommunications louées dans la 
Communauté européenne ­ Jean­
François PONS ­ Audition publique 
enquête de secteur "lignes louées" ­
Bruxelles ­ 22.09.2000 
Increasing competition in leased 
lines ­ the benefits for Europe's 
businesses and consumers ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ Telecommunications 
Sector Inquiry on Leased Lines 
Public Hearing ­ Brussels 
22.09.2000 
Competition and information 
technologies ­ Mario MONTI ­
"Barriers in Cyberspace" 
Kangaroo Group ­ Brussels ­
18.09.2000 
The main challenges for a new 
decade of EC Merger Control ­
Mario MONTI ­ EC Merger Control 
10th Anniversary Conference ­
Brussels­ 15.09.2000 
Competition and Media ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ University of Nijenrode ­
Ν ij enrodé­ 12.09.2000 
Cartels Why and How? Why 
should we be concerned with 
cartels and collusive behaviour? ­
Mario MONTI ­ 3rd Nordic 
Competition Policy Conference ­
Stockholm ­ 11.09.2000 
Internet and its effects on 
competition ­ Bernardo URRUTIA 
GARRO ­ Universidad 
Internacional Menendez Pelayo 
(UIMP) ­ Barcelona ­ 10.07.2000 
Il programma della Commissione 
per an 'economia europea 
competitiva e creatrice di 
occupazione ­ Mario MONTI ­
Convegno del CNEL ­ Roma ­
10.07.2000 
European Competition Policy for 
today and tomorrow ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ Conference jointly hosted 
by the Brookings Institution, the 
Antitrust Section of the American 
Bar Association, and the District of 
Columbia Bar Association 
Washington ­ 26.06.2000 
Cooperation between competition 
authorities ­ a vision for the future 
­ Mario MONTI ­ The Japan 
Foundation Conference 
Washington DC ­ 23.06.2000 
Access issues ander EU regulation 
and anti­trust law ­ The case of' 
telecommunications and Internet 
markets ­ Herbert UNGERER ­ The 
Japan Foundation Conference ­
Washington ­ 23.06.2000 
Competition Law Reform ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ CBI Conference on 
Competition Law Reform ­ London 
­ 12.06.2000 
European Competition Day 
Concluding Remarks ­ Alexander 
SCHAUB ­ European Competition 
Day ­ Lisbon ­ 09.06.2000 
Concurrence dans les professions 
libérales : quels avantages pour les 
consommateurs ? ­ Maria José 
BICHO ­ European Competition 
Day ­ Lisbon ­ 09.06.2000 
How does European competition 
policy contributes to the creation of 
a single market for car distribution 
which will benefit consumers ­ Eric 
VAN GINDERACHTER 
European Competition Day ­ Lisbon 
- 09.06.2000 
European competition policy and 
the citizen ­ Mario MONTI ­
European Competition Day ­ Lisbon 
- 09.06.2000 
Competition Day for European 
Citizens ­ Alexander SCHAUB ­
Portuguese DGCC's magazine ­
Lisbon­01.06.2000 
Competition Policy Reform ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ UNICF. Conference on 
Competition Policy Reform 
Brussels­ 11.05.2000 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ON 
COMPETITION 
Except if otherwise indicated, these 
publications are available through 
the Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities or its 
sales offices (see last page). 
Use Catalogue number to order. 
A lot of those publications are also 





Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IA­Rules 
applicable to undertakings 
Situation at 30 june 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
85, 86 and 90. 
Catalogue No: CM­29­93­A01­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Addendum to 
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Volume ΙΑ­Rules applicable to 
undertakings 
Situation at 1 March 1995. 
Catalogue No: CM­88­95­436­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIA­Rules 
applicable to State aid 
Situation at 30 June 1998; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. 
Catalogue No: PD­15­98­875­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE; 
EL, EN, FR" IT. NL, PT, SV, FI) 
Competition law in the EC­
Volume II B­Explanation of rules 
applicable to state aid 
Situation at December 1996 
Catalogue No: CM­03­97­296­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FPL IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIIA­Rules 
in the international field­
Situation at 31 December 1996 
(Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CM­89­95­858­xx­C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, Fl, SV) 
Merger control law in the 
European Union­Situation in 
March 1998 
Catalogue No: CV­15­98­899­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Brochure concerning the 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings as contained in the 
EEA agreement and their 
implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority. 
Catalogue No: CV­77­92­118­EN­C 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
Competition policy in Europe and 
the citizen 
Catalogue No: KD­28­00­397­xx­C 
(xx=language code: FR, IT, SV et 
PT; the other versions will be 
available later). 
Application of EC State aid law 
by the member state courts 
Catalogue No: CM­20­99­365­EN­C 
Dealing with the Commission 
(Edition 1997)­Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact­
finding, powers under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Catalogue No: CV­95­96­552­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI.SV) 
Green paper on vertical restraints 
in EC competition policy ­COM 
(96) 721­(Ed. 1997) 
Catalogue No: CB­CO­96­742­xx­C 
(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL 
PT SV FI) 
Final report of the multimodal 
group ­ Presented to 
Commissioner Van Miert by Sir 
Bryan Carsberg, Chairman of the 
Group (Ed. 1997). 
Catalogue No: CV­11­98­803­EN­C 
The institutional framework for 
the regulation of 
telecommunications and the 
application of EC competition 
rules ­ Final Report (Forrester 
Norall & Sutton). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­9Ó­590­EN­C 
Competition aspects of access 
pricing­Report to the European 
Commission 
December 1995 (M. Cave, P. 
Crowther, L. Handier). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­582­EN­C 
Community Competition Policy in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March 
1997)­volume II Β a compedium 
prepared by DG IV­C­1; it 
contains Directives under art 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 
and under the Merger Regulation 
as well as relevant Judgements of 
the Court of Justice. 
­ Copies available through DG 
COMP­C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 
2968622. fax +322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) No 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories d' accords de 
distribution et de service de vente 
et d'après vente de véhicules 
automobiles ­ Copies available 
through DG COMP­F­2 (tel. +322­
2951880. 2950479, lax. +322­
2969800) EN. FR, DE 
COMPETITION DECISIONS 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matière d'aides 
d'Etat ­Article 93, paragraphe 2 
(Décisions finales négatives)­
1964­1995 
Catalogue No: CM­96­96­465­xx­C 
[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT ( 1964­1995): 
EN et DA (73­95); EL (81­95): (ES 
et PT (86­95); FI et SV (95)) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
94/98 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES. DA, DE. 
EL, EN.^ FRU IT, NL. PT, FI. SV) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
93/94 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE. EL. EN. FR, IT. 
NL. PT) 
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Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
90/92 
Catalogue No: CV-84-94-387-xx-C 
(xx=ES. DA. DE, EL, EN. FR. IT, 
NL. PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
89/90 
Catalogue No: CV-73-92-772-xx-C 
(xx=ES. DA. DE. EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL. PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
86/88 
Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C 
(xx=ES. DA. DE. EL. EN. FR. IT. 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
81/85 
Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C 
(xx=DA, DE, EL. EN. FR, IT, NL.) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
73/80 
Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C 
(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR. IT, NL.) 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matièrre de 
concurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90 
du traité CEE-64/72 
Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C 
(xx=DE. FR. IT. NL.) 
COMPETITION REPOR TS 
European Community 
competition policy 1999 
(xx=ES, DA, DE. EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL. PT, FI, SV ). Copies available 
through Cellule Information DG 
COMP. 
XXVIII Report on Competition 
Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV-20-99-785-xx-C 
(xx= ErS, DA. DE. EL. EN, FR. IT. 
NL. PT. FI. SV) 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV-20-99-301-xx-C 
(xx= E^ S. DA, DE, EL, EN. FR, IT. 
NL, PT, FI SV 
XXVII Report on Competition 
Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: Cv-"l2-98-263-XX-C 
(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE. NL, IT. PT. 
SV. DA, FI) 
XXVI Report on Competition 
Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA. DE. EL, EN, FR, IT. 
NL, PT,FI. SV) 
XXV Report on Competition 
Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL. EN, FR, IT. 
NL, PT. FI, SV) 
XXIV Report on competition 
policy 1994 
Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE. 
EL. EN, FR.ÌT.NL, PT, FI, SV) 
XXIIIe Report on competition 
policy 1993 
Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN. FR, IT. 
NL, PT) 
XXIIe Report on competition 
policy 1992 
Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA. DE. EL, EN, FR. IT, 
NL, PT 
XXIe Report on competition 
policy 1991 
Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE. EL. EN. FR. IT. 
NL. PT) 
Fifth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors 
Catalogue No: CV-06-97-901-XX-C 
(xx= ES. DA. DE. EL. EN. FR. IT. 
NL, PT. FI. SV ) 
Sixt survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors 
Catalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C 
Septième rapport sur les aides 
d'Etat dans le secteur des 
produits manufacturés et certains 
autres secteurs de l'Union 
européenne [COM (1999) 148 
finall 
Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN. FR. IT, 




Buyer power and its impact on 
competition in the food retail 
distribution sector of the 
European Union 
Cat. No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C 
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The application of articles 85 & 
86 of the EC Treaty by national 
courts in the Member States 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx= 
FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT) 
Examination of current and 
future excess capacity in the 
European automobyle industry -
Ed.1997 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C 
Video : Fair Competition in 
Europe-Examination of current 
Cat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx= 
ES. DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI, SV) 
Communication de la 
Commission: Les services 
d'intérêt général en Europe (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx= 
DE, NL, GR, SV 
Study of exchange of confidential 
information agreements and 
treaties between the US and 
Member States of EU in areas of 
securities, criminal, tax and 
customs (Ed. 1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C 
Survey of the Member State 
National Laws governing vertical 
distribution agreements (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C 
Services de télécomunication en 
Europe: statistiques en bref, 
Commerce, services et transports, 
1/1996 
Cat. No: CA-NP-96-OOl-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Report by the group of experts on 
competition policy in the new 
trade order [COM(96)284 fin.] 
Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European 
merger control: New lessons 
about collective dominance ? (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C 
Proceedings of the European 
Competition Forum (coédition 
with J. Wiley)-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C. 
Bierlieferungsverträge in den 
neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten 
Österreich, Schweden und 
Finnland-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C 
Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport 
1995 
Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C 
Information exchanges among 
firms and their impact on 
competition (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long term 
competitiveness (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C 
Competition policy in the new 
trade order: strengthening 
international cooperation and 
rules (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C 
Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions 
publiques (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C 
Study on the impact of 
liberalization of inward cross 
border mail on the provision of 
the universal postal service and 
the options for progressive 
liberalization (Ed. 1995) Final 
report, 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector (Ed. 
1994) 
Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy 
(Ed.1994)' 
Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C 
(xx=ES, DA. DE, GR, EN, FR. IT. 
NL, PT) 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 
PartC 
Cat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European 
single market (Ed. 1993) 
Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C 
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International transport by air, 
1993 
Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-C 
x.\=EN, FR. DE 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Enquête 1992 
(Ed. 1993)-9 languages 
Cat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C 
EG Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) 
Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C 
Green Paper on the development 
of the single market for postal 
services, 9 languages 
Cat. No: CD-NA-M- 858-EN-C 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st June 2000 to 
30s* September 2000 
ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONS 
AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIO 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
23.09.2000 
C 273 2000/C 273-0011 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 6 July 2000 in Case 
T-62/98: Volkswagen AG ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition -
Distribution of motor vehicles -
Partitioning of the market -
Article 85 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 81 EC) -
Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 -
Disclosure to the press 
Business secrets - Good 
administration - Fines - Gravity 
of the infringement) 
C 273 2000/C 273-0001 
Judgment of the Court (Fourth 
Chamber) of 8 June 2000 in 
Case C-258/98 (reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the 
Pretore di Firenze): criminal 
proceedings against Giovanni 
Carra and Others (Dominant 
position - Public undertakings -
Placement of workforce 
Statutory monopoly) 
C 273 2000/C 273-0012 Order 
of the President of the Court of 
First Instance of 28 June 2000 
in Case T-191/98 R II, Clio 
Yang Shipping Co. Ltd ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition -
Payment of fine - Bank 
guarantee - Urgency - Balance 
of interests) 
21.09.2000 
L 237 2000/L 237-0060 
Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee No 49/2000 of 31 
May 2000 amending Annex 
XIV (Competition) to the EEA 
Agreement 
06.09.2000 
C 255 2000/C 255-0008 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-3/37.732) 
C 255 2000/C 255-0007 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-2/37.949) 
12.08.2000 
C 233 2000/C 233-0011 Order 
of the Court (Fourth Chamber) 
of 11 May 2000 in Case C-
428/9 P: Deutsche Post AG ν 
International Express Carriers 
Conference (1ECC), 
Commission of the European 
Communities, La Poste, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and The Post 
Office (Appeal - Competition -
Abuse of a dominant position -
Postal services - Remail) 
11.08.2000 
C 231 2000/C 231-0005 
Commission notice pursuant to 
Article 19(3) of Council 
Regulation No 17 concerning 
case COMP/37.462 - Identrus 
C 231 2000/C 231-0002 Notice 
pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 -
Case COMP/37.557 - Eurex 
09.08.2000 
C 227 2000/C 227-0016 
Notification of Cooperation 
Agreements (Case 
COMP/37.920 - "3G Patent 
Platform") 
C 227 2000/C 227-0006 Notice 
published under Article 19(3) 
of Council Regulation No 17 -
Case 34.950 - Eco-Emballages 
08.08.2000 
C 225 2000/C 225E-0027 
Written question P-1845/99 by 
Umberto Bossi to the 
Commission 
Subject: Products of protected 
designation of origin (PDI) and 
protected geographical 
indication (PGI) - private 
certification bodies - freedom 
of competition 
01.08.2000 
L 195 2000/L 195-0049 
Commission Decision of 29 
June 2000 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 
81 of the EC Treaty (Cases 
IV/36.456/F3 - Inntrepreneur 
and IV/36.492/F3 - Spring) 
(notified under document 
number C(2()00) 1591) 
29.07.2000 
C 217 2000/C 217-0035 Notice 
pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 
concerning Case COMP/36.841 
- Unisource (Review of the 
Commission Decision of 
29.10.1997) 
26.07.2000 
L 187 2000/L 187-0047 
Commission Decision of 24 
January 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty and Article 53 of 
the EEA Agreement (Case 
IV.F.1/36.718. CECED) 
(notified under document 
numberCd 999/ 5064/ 
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13.07.2000 ' 
L 174 2000/L 174­0055 
Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee No 44/2000 of 19 
May 2000 amending Protocol 
21 to the EEA Agreement, on 
the implementation of 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings 
11.07.2000 
C 193 2000/C 193­0007 Notice 
pursuant to Article 5 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 
of" 14 December 1987 
concerning case IV/37.730 ­
Austrian Airlines 
Österreichische Luftverkehrs 
AG/Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
C 193 2000/C 193­0008 Notice 
pursuant to Article 5 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 
of" 14 December 1987 
concerning case IV/37.749 ­
Austrian Airlines 
Österreichische Luftverkehrs 
AG and Scandinavian Airlines 
System 
24.06.2000 
L 151 2000/L 151­0018 
Commission Decision of 10 
May 2000 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 
81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/32.150 ­ Eurovision) 
(notified under document 
number C(2()()0) 1171) 
C 176 2000/C 176­0002 
Judgment of the Court of 11 
April 2000 in Joined Cases C­
51/96 and C­191/97 (references 
for a preliminary ruling from 
the Tribunal de Première 
Instance de Namur): Christelle 
Deliège ν Ligue Francophone 
de Judo et Disciplines 
Associées ASBL and Others 
(Freedom to provide services ­
Competition rules applicable to 
undertakings ­ Judokas ­ Sports 
rules providing for national 
quotas and national federations' 
selection procedures for 
participation in international 
tournaments) 
20.06.2000 
C 170 2000/C 170­0008 
Notification of a Cooperation 
Agreement (Case 
COMP/37.889 ­ Fiat 
SpA/General Motors 
Corporation) 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0134 
Written question P­1989/99 by 
Norbert Glanteto the 
Commission 
Subject: Commission measures 
to prepare a decision on price­
fixing for books 
C Í70 2000/C 170E­0137 
Written question E­2013/99 by 
Antonio Tajani and Enrico Ferri 
to the Commission 
Subject: Breach of the rules on 
competition and on the freedom 
to supply services by Italian 
legislation on public and private 
health care 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0136 
Written question E­1995/99 by 
Paul Rübig to the Commission 
Subject: Guidelines on vertical 
restraints 
10.06.2000 
C 163 2000/C 163­0003 
Judgment of the Court (Fifth 
Chamber) of 30 March 2000 in 
Case C­266/97 P: Coöperatieve 
Vereniging De Verenigde 
Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer 
BA (VBA) ν Vereniging van 
Groothandelaren in 
Bloemkwekerijproducten 
(VGB), Florimex BV (Appeal ­
Competition ­ Closure of 
procedure on a complaint in the 
absence of a response by the 
complainants within the time­
limit notified to them 
Compatibility with Article 
85(1) of the Treaty of a fee 
levied on suppliers who have 
concluded agreements relating 
to the delivery of floricultural 
products to undertakings 
established on the premises of a 
cooperative auction society ­
Compatibility with Article 
85(1) of the EC Treaty of an 
exclusive purchase obligation 
accepted by certain wholesalers 
reselling such products to 
retailers in a specific trading 
area forming part of the same 
premises ­ Discrimination ­
Effect on trade between 
Member States ­ Assessment by 
reference to a body of rules 
taken as a whole ­ Lack of 
appreciable effect) 
C 163 2000/C 163­0003 
Judgment of the Court (Fifth 
Chamber) of 30 March 2000 in 
Case C­265/97 P: Coöperatieve 
Vereniging De Verenigde 
Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer 
BA (VBA) ν Florimex BV and 
Others (Appeal ­ Competition ­
Decision rejecting a complaint ­
Compatibility with Article 2 of 
Regulation No 26 of a fee 
charged to external suppliers on 
floricultural products supplied 
to wholesalers established on 
the premises of a cooperative 
society of auctioneers 
Statement of reasons) 
C 162 2000/C 162­0025 Notice 
pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 
concerning an application for 
negative clearance or 
exemption under Article 81(3) 
of the EC Treaty (Cases 
COMP/34.657 ­ Sammelrevers 
and COMP/35.245 to 35.251 ­
Einzelreverse) 
CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS / 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
27.09.2000 
C 275 2000/C 275­0009 Non­
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C 275 2000/C 275-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2123 - Banco 
Comercial Português/Banco de 
Sabadell/Ibersecurities) 
Candidate case for simplified 
procedure 
C 275 2000/C 275-0007 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.2033 
Metso/Svedala) 
C 275 2000/C 275-0009 Non-





C 274 2000/C 274-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1951 - BT/Japan 
Telecom/Vodafone 
Airtouch/J V) 
C 274 2000/C 274-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2101 - General 
Mills/Pillsbury/Diageo) 
C 274 2000/C 274-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2072 - Philip 
Morris/Nabisco) 
C 274 2000/C 274-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2134 
Avnet/Veba Electronics) 
C 274 2000/C 274-0006 Prior 




C 271 2000/C 271-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2137 
SLDE/NTL/MSCP/Noos) 
C 271 2000/C 271-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(CaseCOMP/M.2061 -Airbus) 
C 271 2000/C 271-0009 Non-




C 271 2000/C 271-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2162 
Mopla/Deutsche Bank/Trevira) 
Candidate case for simplified 
procedure 
21.09.2000 
C 270 2000/C 270-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2025 - GE 
Capital/BTSP/MEPC) 
C 270 2000/C 270-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1867 
Volvo/Telia/Ericsson - Wireless 
Car) 
C 270 2000/C 270-0002 Prior 




C 269 2000/C 269-0007 Non-





C 269 2000/C 269-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2070 
TietoEnator/EDB Business 
Partner/.IV) Candidate case for 
simplified procedure 
19.09.2000 
C 267 2000/C 267-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2158 - Crédit 
Suisse Group/Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette) 
C 267 2000/C 267-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2135 
NCR/4Front) Candidate case 
for simplified procedure 
C 267 2000/C 267-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2037 - BNP 
Paribas/PHH) 
16.09.2000 
C 266 2000/C 266-0013 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2000 - WPP 
Group/Young & Rubicam) 
C 266 2000/C 266-0014 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1937 - Skandia 
Life/Diligentia) 
15.09.2000 
C 265 2000/C 265-0011 Prior 




case for simplified procedure 
C 265 2000/C 265-0012 Prior 




C 265 2000/C 265-0013 Prior 




C 265 2000/C 265-0015 Non-





C 265 2000/C 265-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2039 
HVB/Commerzbank/DB/Dresd 
ner/JV Trust Center) Candidate 
case for simplified procedure 
C 265 2000/C 265-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2151 
Alos/Origin) Candidate case for 
simplified procedure 
14.09.2000 
C 264 2000/C 264-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2146 - SHV 
Holdings/NPM Capital) 
Candidate case for simplified 
procedure 
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13.09.2000 
C 262 2000/C 262-0005 Non-





C 262 2000/C 262-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1901 - Cap 
Gemini/Ernst & Young) 
12.09.2000 
C 261 2000/C 261-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2016 - France 
Telecom/Orange) 
C 261 2000/C 261-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2110 
Deutsche Bank/SEI/JV) 
C 261 2000/C 261-0004 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2050 
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram) 
C 261 2000/C 261-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2116 
Flextronics/Italdata) 
C 261 2000/C 261-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1949 - Western 
Power Distribution 
(WPD)/Hyder) 
C 261 2000/C 261-0005 Prior 




C 258 2000/C 258-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2153 
BHP/Mitsubishi/QCT) 
Candidate case for simplified 
procedure 
C 258 2000/C 258-0011 Non-




C 258 2000/C 258-0011 Non-




C 258 2000/C 258-0012 
Inapplicability of the regulation 




C 257 2000/C 257-0004 Non-





C 256 2000/C 256-0007 Non-




C 256 2000/C 256-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2147 
VNU/Hearst/Stratosfera) 
C 256 2000/C 256-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1853 
EDF/ENBW) 
C 256 2000/C 256-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1916 - RTL 
Newmedia/Primus-Online) 
06.09.2000 
C 255 2000/C 255-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2118 
Telenor/Procuritas/ISAB/JV) 
C 255 2000/C 255-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2084 
CSM/European Bakery 
Supplies Business (Unilever)) 
C 255 2000/C 255-0009 Non-




C 255 2000/C 255-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1938 - BT/Telfort) 
C 255 2000/C 255-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 




C 254 2000/C 254-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2107 - TXU 
Germany/Stadtwerke Kiel) 
C 254 2000/C 254-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1329 -
Corus/Wuppermann/JV) 
C 254 2000/C 254-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2094 - HT-
Troplast/Kömmerling) 
C 254 2000/C 254-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2136 
Schroder Ventures/Memec) 
C 254 2000/C 254-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2027 - Deutsche 
Bank/SAP/JV) 
02.09.2000 
C 252 2000/C 252-0020 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2138 
SAP/Siemens/JV) 
C 252 2000/C 252-0021 
Corrigendum to notice of non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1564 - Astrolink) (OJ 
C 237 of 19.8.2000) 
01.09.2000 
C 251 2000/C 251-0003 Non-




C 251 2000/C 251-0002 Prior 
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C 251 2000/C 251-0003 
Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2067 - ABB/UMOE) 
31.08.2000 
C 250 2000/C 250-0004 Prior 





C 250 2000/C 250-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2062 - Rio 
Tinto/North) 
C 250 2000/C 250-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COM P/M.2029 - Tate & 
Lyle/Amylum) 
C 250 2000/C 250-0003 Non-






C 249 2000/C 249-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2128 - ABB 
Lummus/Engelhard/Equistar/N 
ovolen) 
C 249 2000/C 249-0006 Prior 




C 246 2000/C 246-0005 Prior 





C 244 2000/C 244-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2069 
Alstom/Fiat Ferroviaria) 
C 244 2000/C 244-0013 Prior 




C 242 2000/C 242-0003 Prior 




C 239 2000/C 239-0012 





C 238 2000/C 238-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2097 
S C A/M etsä Tissue) 
C 238 2000/C 238-0010 Prior 




C 238 2000/C 238-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2008 - AOM/Air 
Liberté/Air Littoral) 
C 238 2000/C 238-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1925 - Scottish & 
Newcastle/Groupe Danone) 
C 238 2000/C 238-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1936 - Siemens 
Business Services/Lufthansa 
Systems/Synavion) 
C 238 2000/C 238-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 




C 237 2000/C 237-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1947 - ABN Amro 
Lease Holding/Dial Group) 
C 237 2000/C 237-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 




C 237 2000/C 237-0006 Non-




C 237 2000/C 237-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2113 
Cinven/McKechnie) 
C 237 2000/C 237-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1564-Astrolink) 
C 237 2000/C 237-0006 Non-





C 236 2000/C 236-0003 Non-





C 236 2000/C 236-0003 Non-





C 235 2000/C 235-0005 Prior 




C 235 2000/C 235-0006 Non-




C 235 2000/C 235-0006 Non-




C 235 2000/C 235-0007 
Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case 
COM P/M. 1646 
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C 234 2000/C 234-0006 Non-




C 234 2000/C 234-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2120 - Toyota 
Motor Corporation/Toyota GB) 
C 234 2000/C 234-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2122 
BAT/Cap Gemini/Ciberion) 
C 234 2000/C 234-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2076 
Ifil/Alpitour) 
C 234 2000/C 234-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2087 - Feu 
vert/Carre four/Autocenter 
Delauto) 
C 234 2000/C 234-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1954 - ACS/Sonera 
Vivendi/Xfera) 
12.08.2000 
C 232 2000/C 232-0011 Prior 




C 232 2000/C 232-0012 Prior 




C 232 2000/C 232-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2033 
Metso/Svedala) 
C 232 2000/C 232-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2045 
Salzgitter/Mannesmann-
Röhrenwerke, ECSC. 1336 -
Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke) 
11.08.2000 
C 231 2000/C 231-0009 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1783 - ZF 
Gotha/Graziano 
Trasmissioni/JV) 
C 231 2000/C 231-0010 Prior 





C 229 2000/C 229-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1913 
Lufthansa/Menzies/LGS/JV) 
C 229 2000/C 229-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1987 
BASF/Bayer/Hoechst/DyStar) 
C 229 2000/C 229-0005 Prior 




C 229 2000/C 229-0006 Prior 





C 225 2000/C 225-0023 Prior 




C 225 2000/C 225-0020 Prior 




C 225 2000/C 225-0021 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Cases COMP/ECSC.1340 and 
COMP/M.2071 - Riva/Acciaio) 
C 225 2000/C 225-0022 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2057 
Randstad/VNU/JV) 
C 225 2000/C 225-0019 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2077 
Clayton. Dubilier & 
Rice/Italtel) 
05.08.2000 
C 224 2000/C 224-0022 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2015 
Total fina/Saarberg/M MII ) 
04.08.2000 
C 223 2000/C 223-0004 Prior 




C 221 2000/C 221-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2035 
Doughty Hanson/Ranks Hovis 
McDougall) 
C 221 2000/C 221-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1915 - Post 
Office/TNT Group/Singapore 
Post) 
C 221 2000/C 221-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 220 2000/C 220-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2021 
Snecma/Labinal) 
C 220 2000/C 220-0006 Prior 




C 217 2000/C 217-0030 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2063 
Sei/Mitsubishi Electric) 
C 217 2000/C 217-0030 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1952 - RWE 
Energie/Iberdrola/Tarragona 
Power) 
C 217 2000/C 217-0031 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
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C 217 2000/C 217­0032 
Commission notice on a 
simplified procedure for 
treatment of certain 
concentrations under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
C 217 2000/C 217­0029 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2000 
WPP/Young & Rubicam) 
28.07.2000 
C 216 2000/C 216­0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2011 ­ Aria 
Foods Hellas SA/Delta 
Selections SA) 
C 216 2000/C 216­0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 212 2000/C 212­0017 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2056 ­ Sonera 
Systems/ICL Invia/Data­
Info/JV) 
C 212 2000/C 212­0015 Non­





C 212 2000/C 212­0016 Prior 




C 210 2000/C 210­0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2059 
Siemens/Dematic/Sachs/VDO) 
C 210 2000/C 210­0009 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1575 ­ Thyssen 
Krupp/VDM Evidal/KME 
Schmöle) 
C 210 2000/C 210­0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2050 
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram) 
C 210 2000/C 210­0009 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1878 
Ρ ti zer/W amer­ Lambert) 
C 210 2000/C 210­0007 Prior 




C 209 2000/C 209­0006 Non­





C 205 2000/C 205­0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2016 ­ France 
Télécom/Orange) 
C 205 2000/C 205­0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1926 
Telefonica/Tyco/.IV) 
C 205 2000/C 205­0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2032 ­ SCA 
Packaging/Metsä Corrugated) 
18.07.2000 
C 203 2000/C 203­0006 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.2052 ­ Industri 
Kapital/Alfa Laval Holding) 
C 203 2000/C 203­0007 "Prior 





C 202 2000/C 202­0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP'M.1979 
CDC/Banco Urquijo) 
C 202 2000/C 202­0005 Non­




C 202 2000/C 202­0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2029 ­ Tate & 
Lyle/Amylum) 
14.07.2000 
C 201 2000/C 201­0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2047 




C 198 2000/C 198­0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2054 
Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor) 
C 198 2000/C 198­0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2037 ­ BNP­
Paribas/PHH) 
C 198 2000/C 198­0006 Prior 




C 198 2000/C 198­0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2051 ­ Nordic 
Capital/HIAG/Nybron/Bauwerk 
) 
C 198 2000/C 198­0008 Non­




C 198 2000/C 198­0003 Prior 




C 196 2000/C 196­0010 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1898 ­ TUI 
Group/GTT Holding) 
C 196 2000/C" 196­0010 




C 196 2000/C 196­0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2044 
Interbrew/Bass) 
C 196 2000/C 196­0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
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(Case 'COMP/M.2053 
Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon) 
C 196 2000/C 196-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2062 - Rio 
Tinto/North) 
11.07.2000 
C 193 2000/C 193-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2046 
Valeo/Robert Bosch/JV) 
C 193 2000/C 193-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2023 
Brambles/Ermewa/.IV) 
C 193 2000/C 193-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2046 
Valeo/Robert Bosch/JV) 
C 193 2000/C 193-0010 Prior 




C 190 2000/C 190-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.50 - Callahan 
Invest/Kabel Baden-
Württemberg) 
C 190 2000/C 190-0015 Non-




C 190 2000/C 190-0014 Prior 




C 188 2000/C 188-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1954 
ACS/Sonera/Vivendi/Xfera) 
C 188 2000/C 188-0004 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1819/ECSC. 20 
Rheinbraun/OMV/Cokowi) 
C 188 2000/C 188-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2025 - GE 
Capital/BTPS/MEPC) 
C 188 2000/C 188-0002 Prior 




C 187 2000/C 187-0008 Non-




C 187 2000/C 187-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1944 - HSBC/CCF) 
05.07.2000 
C 186 2000/C 186-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2052 - Industri 
Kapital/Alfa Laval Holding) 
C 186 2000/C 186-0006 "Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2008 
AOM/Air Liberté/Air Littoral) 
04.07.2000 
C 185 2000/C 185-0005 Prior 





C 184 2000/C 184-0029 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1982 
Telia/Oracle/Drutt) 
C 184 2000/C 184-0028 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1884 - Mondi/ 
Frantschach/Assi Domän ) 
30.06.2000 
C 183 2000/C 183-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 183 2000/C 183-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1875 
Reuters/Equant - Project 
Proton) 
C 183 2000/C 183-0008 Non-




C 183 2000/C 183-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2020 - Metsä 
Serla/Modo) 
29.06.2000 
C 182 2000/C 182-0005 Non-




C 182 2000/C 182-0005 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M. 1845 - AOL/Time 
Warner) 
28.06.2000 
C 180 2000/C 180-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1993 
Rhodia/Raisio/JV) 
C 180 2000/C 180-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1331 -
Anglo American/Shell Coal) 
C 180 2000/C 180-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2012 
CGNU/Aseval) 
C 180 2000/C 180-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1949 
Western Power 
Distribution/Hyder) 
C 180 2000/C 180-0010 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M. 1852 - " Time 
Warner/EMI) 
27.06.2000 
C 177 2000/C 177-0010 




C Ì77 2000/C 177-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2034 
Hagemayer (UK) Limited/WF 
Electrical pic) 
24.06.2000 
C 175 2000/C 175-0022 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
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(Case COMP/M. 1949 
Western Power 
Distribution/Hyder) 
C 175 2000/C 175-0021 Prior 




C 173 2000/C 173-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1847 - GM/SAAB) 
C 173 2000/C 173-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 




C 171 2000/C 171-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1799 - BSCH/Banco 
Totta Y C PP/A. 
Champalimaud) 
C 171 2000/C 171-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1629 - Knorr 
Bremse/Mannesmann) 
20.06.2000 
C 170 2000/C 170-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1943 
Telefónica/Endemol) 
C 170 2000/C 170E-0131 
Written question E-1956/99 by 
Gerhard Hager to the 
Commission 
Subject: Amendment of 
European competition law 
C 170 2000/C 170-0007 Non-





C 170 2000/C 170-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1885 - Babcock 
Borsig/VA Technologie/Pipe-
Tec) " 
C 170 2000/C 170-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1846 - Glaxo 
Wellcome/Smithkline 
Beecham) 
C 170 2000/C 170-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1895 - Ocean 
Group/Exel (NFC)) 
C 170 2000/C 170E-0142 
Written question P-2070/99 by 
Concepció Ferrer to the 
Commission 
Subject: Situation in the 
European distribution sector 
following the merger of 
Promodes and Carrefour 
17.06.2000 
C 169 2000/C 169-0007 Non-




C 169 2000/C 169-0007 Non-




C 169 2000/C 169-0008 Non-




C 169 2000/C 169-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1925 - Scottish 
& Newcastle/Groupe Danone) 
C 169 2000/C 169-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1839 
Halbergerhütte/Bopp & 
Reuther/Muffenrohr) 
C 169 2000/C 169-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 167 2000/C 167-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1964 - Planet 
Internet/Fortis Bank/M ine.be 
.IV) 
C 167 2000/C 167-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 167 2000/C 167-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COM P/M.2002 
Preussag/Thomson) 
15.06.2000 
C 165 2000/C 165-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/.IV.48 
Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal+) 
C 165 2000/C 165-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1939 - Rexam 
(PLM)/American National Can) 
14.06.2000 
C 164 2000/C 164-0005 Non-




C 164 2000/C 164-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2024 
Ivensys/Baan) 
C 164 2000/C 164-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1892 - Sara 
Lee/Courtaulds) 
10.06.2000 
C 162 2000/C 162-0030 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1996 
SCA/Graninge/JV) 
C 162 20007c 162-0029 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1783 - ZF 
Gotha/Graziano 
Trasmissioni/.IV) 
C 162 2000/C 162-0028 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1991 
Trelleborg/Icopal) 
09.06.2000 
C 161 2000/C 161-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
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(Case COMP/M. 1972 
Granada/Compass) 
08.06.2000 
C 159 2000/C 159-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1900 
Solvay/Plastic Omnium) 
C 159 2000/C 159-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1887 - Credit Suisse 
First Boston/Gala Group) 
C 159 2000/C 159-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1877 
Boskalis/HBG) 
07.06.2000 
C 157 2000/C 157-0003 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M. 1879 
Boeing/Hughes) 
C 157 2000/C 157-0002 Prior 




C 155 2000/C 155-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 




C 153 2000/C 153-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2003 
Carlyle/Gruppo Riello) 
C 153 2000/C 153-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1859 
ENI/GALP) 
C 153 2000/C 153-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1958 
Bertelsmann AG/Groupe 
Bruxelles Lambert SA 
(GBL)/Pearson Television) 
C 153 2000/C 153-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1998 
Ford/Land Rover) 
C 153 2000/C 153-0008 Non-




C 153 2000/C 153-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 





C 272 2000/C 272-0042 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty - Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 272 2000/C 272-0040 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty - Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 272 2000/C 272-0030 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning Case C 36/2000 (ex 
NN 135/99) - aid in favour of 
Graf von Henneberg Porzellan 
GmbH - Germany 
C 272 2000/C 272-0022 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning Case C 4/2000 (ex 
NN 53/99) - State aid in favour 
of manure processing projects -
the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
C 272 2000/C 272-0017 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning Case C 64/98 (ex 
NN 95/97) - yearly grants to 
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca 
dello Stato 
C 272 2000/C 272-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning Case C 28/2000 (ex 
NN 52/99) - Aid in favour of 
Hirschfelder Leinen und Textil 
GmbH (Hiltex), Saxony 
Germany 
C 272 2000/C 272-0044 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty - Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
22.09.2000 
L 238 2000/L 238-0050 
Commission Decision of 11 
April 2000 on the State aid 
implemented by the Federal 




(notified under document 
number C(2000) 1063) 
16.09.2000 
C 266 2000/C 266-0028 
Corrigendum to the 
authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections (OJ C 258 of 
9.9.2000) 
C 266 2000/C 266-0009 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid/measure C 
46/2000 (ex N 563/1999) -
Viridian Growth Fund 
C 266 2000/C 266-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty - Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 266 2000/C 266-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty - Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
12.09.2000 
L 230 2000/L 230-0013 
Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-
Romania Association Council 
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of 17 July 2000 extending by 
five years the period within 
which any public aid granted by 
Romania will be assessed 
taking into account the fact that 
Romania is to be regarded as an 
area identical to those areas of 
the Community described in 
Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty 
establishing the European 
Community 
09.09.2000 
L 229 2000/L 229­0044 
Commission Decision of 14 
March 2000 on State aid 
granted by Germany to El pro 
AG and its successor 
companies (notified under 
document number C(2000) 
808) 
C 259 2000/C 259­0016 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 29 June 2000 in 
Case T­234/95: DSG 
Dradenauer Stahlgesellschaft 
mbH ν Commission of the 
European Communities (ECSC 
­ Action for annulment ­ State 
aid ­ Meaning of aid ­ Criterion 
of the private investor 
Economic unit ­ Amount of the 
aid ­ Misuse of powers) 
C 258 2000/C 258­0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C' 258 2000/C 258­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C' 258 2000/C 258­0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C ' 258 2000/C 258­0005 
Amendments to the Guidelines 
on national regional aid 
C 258 2000/C 258­0006 Notice 
on the extension of the period 
of validity of the Community 
framework for State aid to the 
motor vehicle Industry 
C 258 2000/C 258­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
07.09.2000 
L 227 2000/L 227­0024 
Commission Decision of 2 June 
1999 concerning State aid 
granted by Italy to Seleco SpA 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 1524) 
02.09.2000 
C 252 2000/C 252­0021 
Corrigendum to authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty (Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections) (OJ C 232 of 
12.8.2000) 
C 252 2000/C 252­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
22.08.2000 
L 211 2000'L 211­0007 
Commission Decision of 18 
January 2000 on the State aid 
granted by Germany to Linde 
AG (notified under document 
number C(2000) 64) 
19.08.2000 
C 237 2000/C 237­0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
17.08.2000 
L 207 2000/L 207­0017 
Commission Decision of 22 
December 1999 on State aid 
which Italy plans to grant to 
Fiat Auto SpA for its Mirafiori 
Meccanica plant (Turin) 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 5211) 
15.08.2000 
L 206 2000/L 206­0006 
Commission Decision of 8 
September 1999 on aid granted 
by France to Stardust Marine 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 3148) 
12.08.2000 
C 233 2000/C 233­0008 
Judgment of the Court of 23 
May 2000 in Case C­106/98 P: 
Comité d'entreprise de la 
Société française de production 
and Others ν Commission of 
the European Communities 
(Appeal ­ Natural and legal 
persons ­ Directly and 
individually concerned by the 
measure ­ State aid ­ Decision 
declaring aid incompatible with 
the common market ­ Trade 
unions and works councils) 
C 233 2000/C 233­0003 
Judgment of the Court of 16 
May 2000 in Case C­83/98 P: 
French Republic ν Ladbroke 
Racing Ltd and Commission of 
the European Communities 
(Appeal ­ Competition ­ State 
aid) 
C 232 2000/C 232­0002 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning Case C 33/98 ­
Spain: Aid involved in the 
privatisation arrangements of 
Babcock Wilcox Espana SA 
(BWE) 
C 232 2000/C 232­0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C ' 232 2000/C 232­0010 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
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the Commission raises no 
objections 
C' 232 2000/C 232­0017 
Corrigendum to the Community 
guidelines for State aid in the 
agriculture sector (OJ C 28 of 
1.2.2000) 
08.08.2000 
C 225 2000/C 225E-0191 
Written question E­2681/99 by 
Luis Berenguer Fuster to the 
Commission 
Subject: Statements by the 
Spanish government on the 
unresolved issue of state aid to 
the electricity sector 
C 225 2000/C 225E­0191 
Written question E­2682/99 by 
Luis Berenguer Fuster to the 
Commission 
Subject: Decision on an 
unresolved case concerning 
state aids 
05.08.2000 
L 199 2000/L 199­0083 
Decision No 2/2000 of the EU­
Lithuania Association Council 
of 24 July 2000 extending by 
five years the period within 
which any public aid granted by 
Lithuania will be assessed 
taking into account the fact that 
Lithuania is to be regarded as 
an area identical to those areas 
of the Community described in 
Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty 
establishing the European 
Community 
C 224 2000/C 224­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
01.08.2000 
C 219 2000/C 219E­0057 
Written question E­1978/99 by 
Ursula Schleicher to the 
Commission 
Subject: Draft Commission 
communication on the 
application of Articles 92 and 
93 of the EC Treaty to state aid 
in the form of loan guarantees 
C 219 2000/C 219E­0144 
Written question P­2299/99 by 
Hanja Maij­Weggen to the 
Commission 
Subject: Tax arrangements 
which distort competition 
within the EU 
29.07.2000 
L 193 2000/L 193­0075 
Commission Directive 
2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000 
amending Directive 
80/723/EEC on the 
transparency of financial 
relations between Member 
States and public undertakings 
L 193 2000/L 193­0079 
Commission Decision of 8 July 
1999 on aid granted by France 
to the Crédit Agricole group in 
connection with the collecting 
and keeping of notaries' 
deposits in rural municipalities 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 2147) 
C 217 2000/C 217­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 217 2000/C 217­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 217 2000/C 217­0005 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 29/2000 (ex N 
457/99) ­ Ford Genk 
C 217 2000/C 217­0020 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning State measures C 
27/2000 (ex NN 84/98) ­ in 
favour of Deckel Maho 
Seebach GmbH ­ Germany 
C 217 2000/C 217­0010 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid measure C 
19/2000 (ex NN 147/98) ­ Aid 
in favour of Technische 
Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH ­
Germany 
27.07.2000 
L 191 2000/L 191­0030 
Commission Decision of 29 
March 2000 on the aid scheme 
implemented by Belgium under 
Article 29ter of the Economic 
Expansion Act of 30 December 
1970, as amended by the 
Decree of 25 June 1992 
(notified under document 
number C(2000) 1007) 
22.07.2000 
C 211 2000/C 211­0018 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 15 June 2000 in 
Joined Cases T­298/97. T­
312/97, T­3 13/97, T­3 15/97, T­
600/97 to T­607/97, T­l/97, T­
3/98 to T­6/98 and T­23/98: 
Alzetta Mauro and Others ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Transport of 
goods by road ­ State aid ­
Action for annulment ­ Whether 
trade between Member States 
affected and competition 
distorted ­ Conditions for a 
derogation from the prohibition 
laid down by Article 92(1) of 
the EC Treaty (now, after 
amendment, Article 87(1) EC) ­
New aid or existing aid ­
Principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations 
Principle of proportionality ­
Statement of reasons) 
C 211 2000/C 211­0017 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 13 June 2000 in 
Joined Cases T­204/97 and T­
270/97: EPAC ­ Empresa para a 
Agroalimentação e Cereais SA 
ν Commission of the European 
Communities (Action for 
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annulment ­ State Aid ­ Article 
92(1) and (3) of the EC Treaty 
(now, after amendment. Article 
87(1) and (3) EC)­Meaning of 
aid ­ State guarantee for the 
financing of a public 
undertaking ­ Suspension of aid 
­ No need to adjudicate) 
C 210 2000/C 210­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C' 210 2000/C 210­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
18.07.2000 
C 203 2000/C 203E­0166 E­
2353/99 by Raffaele Costa to 
the Commission 
Subject: State aid granted to 
RAI by Italy 
C 203 2000/C 203E­0028 Ε­
Ι 701/99 by Raffaele Costa to 
the Commission 
Subject: State aid and the RAI 
affair 
C 203 2000/C 203E­0111 E­
2004/99 by Luis Berenguer 
Fuster to the Commission 
Subject: State aid to the Terra 
Mítica theme park in Benidorm 
(Alicante) and its compatibility 
with the common market 
C 203 2000/C 203E­0093 Ε­
Ι 942/99 by Isidoro Sánchez 
García to the Commission 
Subject: Implementing specific 
measures for the ultraperipheral 
regions in the field of state aid 
15.07.2000 
C 202 2000/C 202­0016 
Corrigendum to authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections (OJ C 184 of 1 July 
2000) 
C 202 2000/C 202­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
08.07.2000 
C 190 2000/C 190­0009 State 
Aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
6(5) of Decision 
2496/96/ECSC, concerning aid 
C 24/2000 (ex Ν 215/99) ­
Voest Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH 
­ investment aid for water 
purification facilities 
C 190 2000/C 190­0004 State 
Aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the measure C 
14/2000 ~ (ex Ν 613/99) 
Netherlands ­ exemption from 
mineral levies under the manure 
law 
C 190 2000/C 190­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 190 2000/C 190­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
06.07.2000 
L 165 2000/L 165­0025 
Commission Decision of 16 
November 1999 on aid granted 
by France to Gooding 
Consumer Electronics Ltd in 
connection with the purchase of 
the former Grundig plant at 
Creutzwald (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
4230) 
L 165 2000/L 165­0018 
Commission Decision of 16 
November 1999 on aid which 
France is planning to grant to 
Cofidur to help it take over the 
former Gooding (ex Grundig) 
plant at Creutzwald (notified 
under document number 
C( 1999)4229) 
01.07.2000 
C 184 2000/C 184­0025 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 184 2000/C 184­0024 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 184 2000/C 184­0023 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 184 2000/C 184­0020 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C ' 184 2000/C 184­0018 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 184 2000/C 184­0010 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning measure C 15/2000 
(ex Ν 638/99) ­ Modified 
reduced social contributions aid 
scheme 
C 184 2000/C 184­0002 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
6(5) of Commission Decision 
No 2496/96/ECSC of 18 
December 1996 establishing 
Community rules for State aid 
to the steel industry, concerning 
aid C 25/2000 (ex Ν 145/99 and 
Ν 749/99) notified by Italy to 
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the ECSC steel companies, 
Lucchini SpA and Siderpotenza 
SpA 
C 184 2000/C 184­0025 
Extension of the validity of the 
Community guidelines on state 
aid for environmental 
protection 
29.06.2000 
L 156 2000/L 156­0039 
Commission Decision of 29 
March 2000 on state aid 
implemented by Germany in 
favour of Kvaerner Warnow 
Werft GmbH (1999) and 
amending Decision 
1999/675/EC (notified under 
document number C(2000) 
1008) 
28.06.2000 
L 155 2000/L 155­0052 
Commission Decision of 22 
December 1999 on the aid 
scheme which France is 
planning to implement in 
favour of the French port sector 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 5204) 
24.06.2000 
C 176 2000/C 176­0020 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 10 May 2000 in 
Case T­46/97: SIC ­ Sociedade 
Independente de Comunicação 
SA ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
(Financing of public television 
channels ­ Complaint ­ State 
Aid ­ Failure to open the 
procedure under Article 93(2) 
of the EC Treaty (now Article 
88(2) EC) ­ Action for 
annulment) 
C 175 2000/C 175­0020 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C ' 175 2000/C 175­0019 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 175 2000/C 175­0011 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid measure C 
16/2000 (ex Ν 792/99) ­ Italian 
regional aid map for the period 
2θ"θΟ­2006 in Italy 
C 175 2000/C 175­0006 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 22/2000 (ex Ν 
129/2000) ­ State aid in favour 
of Dutch manure transport 
companies 
23.06.2000 
L 150 2000/L 150­0064 
Commission Decision of 22 
December 1999 on State aid 
implemented by Germany in 
favour of Entstaubungstechnik 
Magdeburg GmbH (notified 
under document number 
C(1999)5205) 
L 150 2000/L 150­0050 
Commission Decision of 25 
November 1999 on aid to firms 
in Venice and Chioggia by way 
of relief from social security 
contributions under Laws Nos 
30/1997 and 206/1995 (notified 
under document number 
C( 1999)4268) 
L 150 2000/L 150­0038 
Commission Decision of 20 
July 1999 on State aid to be 
granted by Germany to CBW 
Chemie GmbH, Bitterfeld­
Wolfen (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
3272) 
L 150 2000/L 150­0001 
Commission Decision of 8 July 
1999 on a measure 
implemented by the Federal 
Republic of Germany for 
Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale (WestLB) 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 2265) 
20.06.2000 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0125 
Written question E­1925/99 by­
Luis Berenguer Fuster to the 
Commission 
Subject: Inclusion of specific 
data in the state aid proceedings 
relating to the Spanish 
electricity sector 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0073 
Written question E­1680/99 by 
Karl von Wogau to the 
Commission 
Subject: Distortion of 
competition resulting from 
European Union subsidies 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0095 
Written question P­l 889/99 by 
Luis Berenguer Fuster to the 
Commission 
Subject: Possible conflict of 
interests in proceedings in 
relation to state aid 
C 170 2000/C 170E­0095 
Written question E­1761/99 by 
Luis Berenguer Fuster to the 
Commission 
Subject: Proceedings opened in 
relation to state aid in the 
Spanish electricity sector 
17.06.2000 
L 144 2000/L 144­0027 
Decision No 1/2000 of the EU­
Bulgaria Association Council 
of 28 February 2000 extending 
by five years the period within 
which any public aid granted by 
Bulgaria will be assessed taking 
into account the fact that 
Bulgaria is to be regarded as an 
area identical to those areas of 
the Community described in 
Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty 
establishing the European 
Community 
C 169 2000/C 169­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 169 2000/C 169­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
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pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
10.06.2000 
C 163 2000/C 163­0008 Case 
C­61/00 P: Appeal brought on 
23 February 200(f by 
Volkswagen AG and 
Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH 
against the judgment delivered 
on 15 December 1999 by the 
Second Chamber (Extended 
Composition) of the Court of 
First Instance of the European 
Communities in Joined Cases 
T­132/96 and T­143/96 
between Freistaat Sachsen, 
Volkswagen AG and 
Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH, of 
the one part, and the 
Commission of the European 
Communities of the other part 
C 163 2000/C 163­0007 Case 
C­57/00 P: Appeal brought on 
23 February 2000 by Freistaat 
Sachsen against the judgment 
deliveredon 15 December 1999 
by the Second Chamber 
(Extended Composition) of the 
Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities in 
Joined Cases T­132/96 and Τ­
Ι 43/96 between Freistaat 
Sachsen, Volkswagen AG and 
Volkswagen Sachsen GmbFI, of 
the one part, and the 
Commission of the European 
Communities of the other part 
C 162 2000/C 162­0009 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid insert C 21/2000 
(ex NN 158/99) ­ Ojala­yhtymä 
Oy ­ Investment in Flaapajärvi 
C 162 2000/C 162­0023 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 162 2000/C 162­0004 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) (ex­Article 93(2)) of the 
EC Treaty concerning a number 
of aid measures C 71/98 (ex N 
693/97 and NN 130/98) ­ Italy ­
granted under the rules on the 
recovery and completion of 
serviced small business areas 
developed by Sirap SpA and 
the instructions issued to 
municipalities for the allocation 
of plots and industrial buildings 
C 162 2000/C 162­0022 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty ­ Cases where 
the Commission raises no 
objections 
C 162 2000/C 162­0015 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 20/2000 (ex 
NN 146/98) ­ Sniace SA ­
Spain 
08.06.2000 
L 137 2000/L 137­0028 EFTA 
Surveillance Authority 
Decision No 275/99/COL of 17 
November 1999 introducing 
guidelines on State aid elements 
in sales of land and buildings 
by public authorities and 
amending for the 20th time the 
Procedural and Substantive 
Rules in the field of State aid 
L 137 2000/L 137­0020 EFTA 
Surveillance Authority 
Decision No 149'99/COL of 30 
June 1999 introducing 
guidelines on the application of 
State aid rules to measures 
relating to direct business 
taxation and amending for the 
19th time the Procedural and 
Substantive Rules in the field of 
State aid 
L 137 2000/L 137­0011 EFTA 
Surveillance Authority 
Decision No 113/99/COL of 4 
June 1999 introducine 
guidelines on State aid for 
training and amending for the 
18th time the Procedural and 
Substantive Rules in the field of 
State aid 
L 137 2000/L 137­0001 
Commission Decision of 20 
July 1999 on aid granted by 
Italy to Sangalli Manfredonia 
Vetro (notified under document 
number C (1999) 2895) 
L 135 2000/L 135­0036 EFTA 
Surveillance Authority 
Decision No 276/99/COL of 17 
November 1999 including new 
guidelines on State aid to 
shipbuilding granted as 
development assistance to a 
developing country and 
amending for the twenty­first 
time the Procedural and 
Substantive Rules in the Field 
of State aid 
PRESS RELEASES 
1.6.2000­30.9.2000 
All texts are available from the 
Commission's press release 
database RAPID at: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start. 
Enter reference (e.g.: IP/00/544) 
in the "Reference" input box on 
the research form to retrieve text 
of a press release. Press releases 
on competition matters can be 
consulted daily from DG 
Competition's website at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pres 
sre.htm 
Note: languages available vary for 
different press releases. 
ANTITRUST 
IP/00/1064 Date: 2000­09­27 
Competition: Commission proposes 
regulation that extensively amends 
system for implementing Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty 
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IP/00/1043 Date: 2000-09-22 The 
prices of télécoms leased lines are 
still an obstacle to the creation of e-
Europe 
IP/00/1036 Date: 2000-09-21 
Commission opens an in-depth 
investigation into Metso's 
acquisition of Svedala 
IP/00/1030 Date: 2000-09-20 
Commission decides to reject wine-
production scheme in France 
IP/00/1028 Date: 2000-09-20 
Commission imposes a 43 million 
fine on Opel Nederland B.V. for 
obstruction of new car exports in the 
Netherlands 
IP/00/1014 Date: 2000-09-15 
Triumph's export ban for 
motorcycles brought to an end upon 
Commission's intervention 
IP/00/971 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission gives green light to 
Cofunds Ltd, an on-line 
supermarket for retail mutual funds 
IP/00/874 Date: 2000-07-27 
Commission acts against 
discriminatory landing fees at 
Spanish and Italian airports 
IP/00/846 Date: 2000-07-26 
Commission takes Spain to Court of 
Justice over failure to recover illegal 
tax credits to public shipyards 
IP/00/835 Date: 2000-07-25 
Commission acts to prevent 
discrimination between airline 
computer reservation systems 
IP/00/739 Date: 2000-07-18 EU and 
Japan reach mutual understanding 
on substantial elements of an 
envisaged co-operation agreement 
in the competition field 
IP/00/784 Date: 2000-07-14 
Commission releases list of banks in 
cartel investigation 
IP/00/781 Date: 2000-07-13 Car 
prices in the EU: price differentials 
remain high 
IP/00/766 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission adopts a draft 
Competition Directive consolidating 
existing Directives on competition 
in the telecommunications markets 
IP/00/765 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission asks incumbent 
operators to provide information on 
local loop access 
IP/00/763 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission approves rules on 
separation of accounts for public 
service providers 
IP/00/725 Date: 2000-07-06 
Commission decision of January 
1998 against Volkswagen is 
confirmed by the European Court of 
First Instance 
IP/00/713 Date: 2000-07-05 
Commission takes action against 
Editions Nathan to safeguard 
competition in educational material 
IP/00/709 Date: 2000-07-05 
Commission to recover 350.8 
million euro worth of CAP 
expenditure from Member States 
IP/00/704 Date: 2000-07-04 
Commission warns banks in four 
countries about euro-zone exchange 
charges 
IP/00/698 Date: 2000-07-03 
Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into the acquisition of 
Perstorp by Industri Kapital 
IP/00/684 Date: 2000-06-29 
Commission closes competition 
case after Saeco implements 
international guarantee for its 
products 
IP/00/651 Date: 2000-06-22 New 
German system of fixed booked 
prices does not violate EU 
competition rules as long as certain 
conditions are respected 
IP/00/591 Date: 2000-06-08 
Commission approves ticketing 
arrangements for Euro 2000 
IP/00/590 Date: 2000-06-08 Mario 
Monti launches "Competition day" 
in Lisbon on 9 June 
MERGERS 
IP/00/1067 Date: 2000-09-27 
Commission clears Boeing's 
acquisition of the satellite business 
of Hughes Electronics 
IP/00/1063 Date: 2000-09-27 
Commission opens in-depth probe 
into the proposed acquisition of 
Metsä Tissue by SCA Mölynlycke. 
IP/00/1058 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission authorises joint 
venture between PSA and Vivendi 
IP/00/1055 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission clears acquisition of 
joint control of Bravida by Telenor 
and Procuritas Capital Partners. 
IP/00/1054 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission authorises acquisition 
by Schroder Ventures of Veba's 
Memec 
IP/00/1053 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission clears acquisition of 
joint control over Johns Manville 
IP/00/1052 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission approves acquisition of 
Italdata's hardware business by 
Flextronics 
IP/00/1051 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission clears Deutsche Bank 
and Enel acquisition of joint control 
over Rio Nuovo 
IP/00/1050 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission clears Dutch mobile 
telephony venture between 
Belgacom, Tele Danmark and T-
Mobile 
IP/00/1049 Date: 2000-09-25 
Commission clears purchase of 
BASF's Novolen polypropylene 
technology business 
IP/00/1020 Date: 2000-09-19 
Commission clears way for 
Alstom's takeover of Fiat 
Ferroviaria 
IP/00/1017 Date: 2000-09-18 
Commission clears NovaBank 
venture between Banco Comercial 
Portugués and Interamerican 
IP/00/1013 Date: 2000-09-15 
Commission clears Salzgitter buy of 
steel tubes maker 
Mannesmannröhren- Werke 
IP/00/1002 Date: 2000-09-13 
Commission clears joint buy of 
Eutectic by Messer Industrie and 
Carlyle Europe partners 
IP/00/1001 Date: 2000-09-13 
Commission clears Unión Fenosa 
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stake in Spain's Cable i Televisio de 
Catalunya (Menta) 
IP/00/1000 Date: 2000-09-13 
Commission approves acquisition of 
sole control in Italian tour operator 
Alpitur by I fil 
IP/00/993 Date: 2000-09-12 
Commission clears takeover by 
Sanpaolo IMI and MWCR Lux of 
two Italian manufacturers 
IP/00/992 Date: 2000-09-12 
Commission clears creation of joint 
venture Ciberion by British 
American Ventures and Cap Gemini 
Ernst & Young 
IP/00/991 "Date: 2000-09-12 
Commission clears Swedish joint 
venture. Drutt, between Telia of 
Sweden and Oracle of the USA 
IP/00/990 Date: 2000-09-12 
Commission approves acquisition of 
McKechnie by Cinven 
IP/00/989 Date: 2000-09-12 
Commission clears France's Feu 
Vert stake in Spanish car repairer 
Autocenter Delauto 
IP/00/979 Date: 2000-09-06 
Commission authorises BASF to 
take stake in DyStar 
IP/00/972 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission clears the acquisition 
by Toyota Motor Corporation of its 
UK distributor Toyota (GB) PLC 
IP/00/970 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission authorises the creation 
of the joint venture BOL Italia by 
Bertelsmann AG and Mondadori 
S.p.A. 
IP/00/969 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission clears acquisition by 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice of Italtel 
IP/00/968 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission clears creation of a 
joint venture between BT, Japan 
Telecom and Vodafone in Japan 
IP/00/967 Date: 2000-09-05 
Commission authorises merger 
between ZF Gotha and Graziano 
Trassmissioni 
IP/00/962 Date: 2000-09-04 
Commission clears Volvo's 
acquisition of Renault's truck 
business subject to significant 
undertakings 
IP/00/960 Date: 2000-09-01 
Commission clears joint venture of 
Totalfina and Saarberg 
IP/00/957 Date: " 2000-08-31 
Commission approves 
NewMonday.com joint venture 
between Randstad and VNU (both 
NL) 
IP/00/955 Date: 2000-08-30 
Commission gives Siemens 
conditional go-ahead to take control 
of Mannesmann subsidiaries 
Dematic, VDO and Sachs. Bosch's 
acquisition of Rexroth is still under 
examination 
IP/00/954 Date: 2000-08-30 
Commission authorises joint 
venture between Sextant and Diehl 
IP/00/953 Date: 2000-08-30 
Commission authorises acquisition 
by Riva (Italy) of Société des Aciers 
d'Armature pour le Béton (France) 
IP/00/952 Date: 2000-08-30 
Commission clears acquisition by 
Menzies (UK) of joint control of 
Lufthansa Ground Services (UK) 
IP/00/951 Date: 2000-08-30 
Commission approves full take-over 
of Frosch Touristik (FTI) by 
Airtours pic. 
IP/00/949 Date: 2000-08-28 
Commission approves joint venture 
between Deutsche Bank and the 
Warburg banking group 
IP/00/948 Date: 2000-08-28 
Commission authorises SCA 
Packaging acquisition of Metsä 
Corrugated, subject to conditions 
IP/00/947 Date: 2000-08-28 
Commission authorises Snecma's 
acquisition of Labinal 
IP/00/945 Date: 2000-08-25 
Commission clears acquisition by 
Doughty Hanson & Co Limited of 
Ranks Hovis McDougall Group. 
IP/00/944 Date: 2000-08-25 
Commission clears joint venture of 
E.ON and Allianz Capital Partner 
IP/00/943 Date: 2000-08-25 
Commission clears acquisition of 
Young & Rubicam by WPP 
IP/00/940 Date: 2000-08-23 
Commission refers Interbrevv/Bass 
merger to the UK competition 
authorities 
IP/00/939 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission clears Sei and 
Mitsubishi Electric Europe joint 
venture for provision of facility 
management services in Italy. 
IP/00/938 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission clears acquisition by 
HSBC of sole control of part of the 
BBA Friction of the BBA Group, 
pic. 
IP/00/937 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission authorises joint 
venture between Aria Foods Hellas 
and Delta 
IP/00/936 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission clears a joint venture 
between Sonera Systems and ICL 
Invia 
IP/00/935 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission approves take-over of 
Heiploeg Shellfish International 
B.V. by UBS Capital B.V. 
IP/00/934 Date: 2000-08-22 
Commission approves joint venture 
of RWE and Iberdrola 
IP/00/905 Date: 2000-08-02 
Commission clears acquisition by 
Callahan of a second Deutsche 
Telekom regional cable TV network 
IP/00/904 Date: 2000-08-02 
Commission clears Rio Tinto 
takeover bid for Australia's North 
TXT: FR 
IP/00/903 Date: 2000-08-02 
Commission clears acquisition of 
joint control of COKOWI by OMV 
and Rheinbraun 
IP/00/901 Date: 2000-08-01 
Commission clears mobile 
telephony joint venture in Spain. 
IP/00/900 Date: 2000-08-01 
Commission authorises acquisition 
of Assidomän paper and packaging 
companies by Mondi/Frantschach 
IP/00/896 Date: 2000-07-31 
Commission approves the 
Volbroker.com electronic brokerage 
joint venture between six major 
banks 
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IP/00/895 Date: 2000-07-31 
Commission approves acquisition of 
PHH Europe Companies by BNP-
Paribas 
IP/00/894 Date: 2000-07-31 
Commission clears joint venture 
between Andersen Consulting and 
British Telecommunications 
IP/00/893 Date: 2000-07-31 
Commission authorises two Asian 
joint ventures between Valeo and 
Robert Bosch GmbH. 
IP/00/884 Date: 2000-07-28 
Commission clears AOM buy of Air 
Liberté and TAT European Airlines 
IP/00/883 Date: 2000-07-28 
Commission clears acquisition of 
joint control of UK real estate 
company MEPC 
IP/00/864 Date: 2000-07-27 
Commission clears Preussag's 
acquisition of Thomson travel 
IP/00/844 Date: 2000-07-26 
Commission clears merger of 
agrochemical businesses of 
AstraZeneca and Novartis, subject 
to substantial divestitures. 
IP/00/843 Date: 2000-07-26 
Commission clears joint venture 
between ABB, BILFINGER and 
M W ENERGIE 
IP/00/825 Date: 2000-07-24 
Commission clears acquisition of 
Shell Coal Moldings by Anglo 
American 
IP/00/824 Date: 2000-07-24 
Commission authorises joint 
venture between Rhodia and Raisio 
IP/00/823 Date: 2000-07-24 
Commission clears acquisition by 
CGNU of Aseguradora Valenciana 
in insurance sector 
IP/00/821 Date: 2000-07-24 
Commission clears Vizzavi Internet 
portal venture between Vodafone, 
Vivendi and Canal+ subject to 
conditions 
IP/00/814 Date: 2000-07-20 
Commission clears merger between 
beverage cans producers Rexam and 
American National Can, subject to 
commitments 
IP/00/808 Date: 2000-07-19 
European Commission approves 
conditional funding for 
Trasmediterránea 
IP/00/800 Date: 2000-07-19 
Commission clears Pirelli's 
acquisition of BICC's power cables 
plants 
IP/00/795 Date: 2000-07-18 
Commission clears acquisition of 
WF Electrical by Hagemeyer 
IP/00/790 Date: 2000-07-17 
Commission clears purchase of SFX 
Entertainment by Clear Channel 
Communications 
IP/00/788 Date: 2000-07-14 
Commission clears Western Power 
Distribution acquisition of Hyder 
IP/00/783 Date: 2000-07-14 
Commission approves e-commerce 
joint venture between Deutsche 
Bank and SAP 
IP/00/764 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission fines Mitsubishi for 
failing to supply information on 
Kvaerner/Ahlström joint venture 
IP/00/755 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission clears Telefónica buy 
of Endemol 
IP/00/754 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission clears acquisition of 
Danone's beer businesses by 
Scottish & Newcastle 
IP/00/753 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission clears acquisition of 
Dyno by Industri Kapital subject to 
commitments 
IP/00/743 Date: 2000-07-11 
Commission clears Belgian joint 
venture between Planet Internet and 
Fortis Bank 
IP/00/734 Date: 2000-07-10 
Commission clears Invensys 
purchase of Dutch software 
company Baan 
IP/00/733 Date: 2000-07-07 
Microsoft gives up joint control 
over Telewest as Commission 
objects to deal 
IP/00/730 Date: 2000-07-07 
Commission approves setting up of 
Synavion by Siemens and Lufthansa 
IP/00/724 Date: 2000-07-06 
Commission clears joint venture 
between Svenska Cellulosa and 
Graninge 
IP/00/712 Date: 2000-07-05 
Commission clears German 
construction joint venture between 
Saint Gobain and IWKA 
IP/00/711 Date: 2000-07-05 
Commission clears Enron's takeover 
bid for metals trader MG 
IP/00/710 Date: 2000-07-05 
Commission clears merger between 
Dutch dredgers Boskalis 
Westminster and Hollandse Beton 
Groep 
IP/00/697 Date: 2000-07-03 
Commission clears BASF's 
acquisition of American Cyanamid. 
subject to conditions 
IP/00/695 Date: 2000-06-30 
Commission clears joint control of 
Stream by Telecom Italia and News 
Television 
IP/00/694 Date: 2000-06-30 
Commission clears merger between 
Granada and Compass Group 
IP/00/693 Date: 2000-06-30 
Commission clears purchase of 
Land Rover by Ford 
IP/00/692 Date: 2000-06-30 
Commission clears ENI stake in 
Portuguese oil and gas company 
GALP 
Document Number: IP/00/691 Date: 
2000-06-30 Commission clears the 
acquisition of Pearson TV by 
Bertelsmann and GBL 
IP/00/690 Date: 2000-06-30 
Commission clears joint venture 
between Phillips and Chevron 
IP/00/681 Date: 2000-06-29 
Commission clears Solvay's joint 
venture with Plastic Omnium 
IP/00/680 Date: 2000-06-29 
Commission clears purchase by 
Schröders of Liberty International 
Pensions 
IP/00/671 Date: 2000-06-28 
Commission launches review of 
Merger Regulation and simplifies 
procedure for unproblematic 
mercers 
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IP/00/668 Date: 2000­06­28 
Commission prohibits merger 
between MCI WorldCom and Sprint 
IP/00/667 Date: 2000­06­28 
Commission clears sale of Viag's 
glass packaging and tubing unit 
ÏP/00/666 " Date: 2000­06­28 
Commission clears Carlyle Europe 
Partners stake in heating equipment 
manufacturer Gruppo Riello 
IP/00/655 Date: 2000­06­23 
Commission clears merger between 
Canal+. Lagardère and Liberty 
Media 
IP/00/654 Date: 2000­06­23 
Commission approves takeover of 
Raab Karcher by Saint­Gobain 
IP/00/650 Date: 2000­06­22 The 
European Commission has 
approved the acquisition by British 
Telecommunications pic (BT) of 
control of the whole of the Dutch 
undertaking Telfort Holding N.V 
("Tel fort" )Γ 
IP/00/644 Date: 2000­06­21 
Commission clears the acquisition 
by RTL Newmedia of a stake in 
PrimusPower 
IP/00/642 Date: 2000­06­21 
Commission clears the acquisition 
of Babcock's power transmission 
equipment unit by CVC 
IP/00/637 Date: 2000­06­20 
Commission clears Deutsche 
Telekom's first sale of a regional 
cable TV network in Germany 
IP/00/634 Date: 2000­06­19 
Commission opens full 
investigation into AOL/Time 
Warner merger 
IP/00/630 " Date: 2000­06­16 
Commission clears the acquisition 
by Toyoda Automatic Loom Works 
of Sweden's BT Industries 
IP/00/629 Date: 2000­06­16 
Commission clears acquisition of 
Dial Group by ABN vehicle leasing 
subsidiary 
IP/00/628 Date: 2000­06­16 
Commission clears the acquisition 
by Thomson­CSF of Racal 
IP/00/627 Date: 2000­06­16 
Commission clears creation of 
Greek real estate joint venture 
IP/00/622 Date: 2000­06­15 
Commission approves telephone 
directory joint venture between 
Telenor Media and Viag Interkom 
IP/00/618 Date: "2000­06­15 
Commission opens full probe into 
Swissair's acquisition of a stake in 
Portuguese airline Portugalia 
IP/00/617 Date: "2000­06­14 
Commission opens full 
investigation into Time 
Warner/EMI merger 
IP/00/613 Date: 2000­06­13 
Commission allows merger of 
VEBA and VIAG subject to 
stringent conditions 
IP/00/603 Date: 2000­06­13 
Commission clears the acquisition 
of Colonial by Winterthur Life 
IP/00/594 Date: 2000­06­09 
Commission clears Johnson & 
Johnson venture with Mercury 
Asset Management 
IP/00/589 " Date: 2000­06­07 
Commission fines ADM, 
Ajinomoto, others in lysine cartel 
IP/00/574 Date: 2000­06­05 
Commission clears merger between 
Arvin and Meritor 
STATE AID 
IP/00/1040 Date: 2000­09­21 Aids 
in favour of tobacco producers in 
Italy 
IP/00/1039 Date: 2000­09­21 
Measures to compensate farmers for 
adverse climat events in Italy 
IP/00/1033 Dale: 2000­09­20 The 
Commission authorises FF 26 
billion (4 billion) in State aid to the 
French coal industry 
IP/00/1027 Date: 2000­09­20 
Commission approves State aid in 
connection with electricity reform in 
Denmark 
IP/00/1026 Date: 2000­09­20 
Commission takes decisions on 
three state aid cases in the motor 
vehicle sector in the United 
Kingdom 
IP/00/1025 Date: 2000­09­20 
Commission opens investigation 
procedure on State aid granted by 
France to Mines et Potasses 
d'Alsace 
IP/00/1024 Date: 2000­09­20 
Commission brings its review of 
regional aid in the Community to a 
successful conclusion with the 
approval of the maps for Italy and 
Belgium 
IP/00/1023 Date: 2000­09­20 
Commission revokes previous 
decision ordering recovery of aid 
from SNIACE S.A., Spain 
IP/00/852 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commssion clears aid to glass joint 
ventures in France 
IP/00/851 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commission clears aid for new 
Motorola plant in Scotland 
IP/00/850 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commission investigates 
restructuring aid to German engine­
maker 
IP/00/849 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commission approves UK regional 
aid map 
IP/00/848 Date: 2000­07­26 State 
aid ­ Commission investigates 
venture capital fund in Northern 
Ireland 
IP/00/847 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commission seeks partial recovery 
of aid to German micro­electronics 
group. 
ÏP/00/845 Date: 2000­07­26 
Commission relaxes its policy on 
state aid in the outermost regions 
IP/00/804 Date: 2000­07­19 
Commission investigates aid in a 
management contract between 
German Georgsmarienhütte and 
Gröditzer 
IP/00/803 Date: 2000­07­19 
Commission approves Luxembourg 
regional aid map regional 
development scheme 
IP/00/802 Date: 2000­07­19 
Commission investigates aid to 
IVECO 
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IP/00/801 Date: 2000-07-19 
Commission approves State aid to 
Lenzing Lyocell, Austria 
IP/00/770 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission uses injunction to 
obtain details of aid to Italian ports 
IP/00/768 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission approves investment 
aid for new chemical plant at BASF 
Schwarzheide (Germany) 
IP/00/762 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission approves Swedish 
State aid scheme to improve 
conditions in houses, schools and 
workplaces 
IP/00/761 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission takes partially negative 
decision on state aid to Fiat 
Mirafiori 
IP/00/760 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission opens state aid 
investigation into further 
restructuring of public shipyards in 
Spain. 
IP/00/759 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission decides to investigate 
restructuring aid for two companies 
of former Lintra holding 
IP/00/758 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission approves regional aid 
map for the Netherlands 
IP/00/757 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission gives green light to 
investment aid scheme (Law 488) 
targeting less favoured regions of 
Italy 
IP/00/7S6 Date: 2000-07-12 
Commission approves state aid 
contained in UK's High Technology 
Fund for early stage enterprises 
IP/00/702 Date: 2000-07-03 
Yugoslavia financial sanctions: 
Commission adopts 'White List' of 
companies excluded 
IP/00/676 Date: 2000-06-28 
Extension of the validity of 
guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection 
IP/00/675 Date: 2000-06-28 
Commission declares the aid 
granted to the steel company 
Salzgitter (Germany) illegal 
IP/00/674 Date: 2000-06-28 
Commission launches investigation 
into a financial and tax aid scheme 
for the Madeira free zone (Portugal) 
IP/00/672 Date: 2000-06-28 The 
Commission approves the part of 
the regional aid map for the "Lisboa 
e Vale do Tejo" region in Portugal 
IP/00/670 Date: 2000-06-28 
Commission approves a tax 
reduction scheme to promote 
investment in Madeira 
IP/00/669 Date: 2000-06-28 
Commission approves a French 
training aid scheme. 
IP/00/661 Date: 2000-06-27 
Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro : 
Commission approves humanitarian 
aid worth 61 million Euro 
IP/00/646 Date: 2000-06-21 
Commission decides that State aid 
in favour of Manufacture 
Corrézienne de Vêtements is not 
compatible with the EC Treaty 
IP/00/645 Date: 2000-06-21 
Commission rules that State aid to 
German CD producer was illegal 
and must be recovered 
IP/00/611 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission approves aid scheme 
of French SME Development Fund 
IP/00/610 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission decides that no aid was 
involved in the disposal of the 
remaining State participation in Kali 
und Salz GmbH 
IP/00/609 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission approves aid to 
Wildauer Kurbelwelle (Germany) 
IP/00/608 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission extends existing 
investigation on aid to Babcock 
Wilcox España SA to include the 
aid elements involved in its 
privatisation 
IP/00/607 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission approves State aid 
schemes for German shipbuilding 
for year 2000 
IP/00/605 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission investigates aid to Graf 
von Henneberg Porzellan GmbH 
(Thüringen) 
IP/00/604 Date: 2000-06-13 
Commission extends the period of 
validity of the existing car 
framework State aid rules to the 
automobile industry 
COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT 
OF FIRST INSTANCE 
DEVANT LE TRIBUNAL 
Aff. T-92/00 
Diputación Foral de Alava / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C( 1999)5203 final de la 
Commission, du 22 décembre 1999, 
relative à l'aide accordée par les 
autorités espagnoles à la société 
Ramondin S.A. dans la mesure où 
celle-ci déclare aides incompatibles 
avec le marché commun les 
avantages fiscaux octroyés par la 
«Diputación Forai de Alava« 
Aff. T-98/00 
Linde AG / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission K(2000)64 def, du 18 
janvier 2000, déclarant aide d'Etat 
une partie de la subvention aux 
investissements accordée par les 
autorités allemandes à Linde AG 
Aff. T-103/00 
Ramondin SA et Ramondin 
Capsulas SA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C( 1999)5203 final de la 
Commission, du 22 décembre 1999, 
relative à l'aide accordée par les 
autorités espagnoles aux sociétés 
Ramondin S.A. et Ramondin 
Cápsulas S.A. dans la mesure où 
celle-ci déclare aides incompatibles 
avec le marché commun les 
avantages fiscaux octroyés par la 
«Diputación Foral de Alava» 
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Aff. Τ­107/00 
Consorzio industrie fiammiferi 
(CIF) / Commission 
Annulation du rejet implicite de la 
demande visant à ce que la 
Commission réexamine la décision 
refusant de communiquer au 
requérant certains documents 
transmis à «l'Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza» aux fins d'une 
enquête relative à l'application des 
articles 81 et 82 du traité CE menée 
par ladite autorité 
Aff. T­114/00 
Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und 
Eigentum eV / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission SG(2000)D/100623, 
du 22 décembre 1999, d'autoriser les 
aides octroyées par les autorités 
allemandes dans le cadre d'un 
programme d'acquisition de terres 
ayant pour objectif la privatisation 
de terres et la restructuration de 
l'agriculture dans les nouveaux 
Länder 
Aff. T­l24/00 
Federazione Associazioni Imprese 
Distribuzione (FAID 
Federdistribuzione) e.a. / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission 2000/128/CE, du 11 
mai 1999, concernant les régimes 
d'aide mis à exécution par l'Italie 
portant mesures pour l'emploi, en ce 
qu'elle déclare incompatibles avec le 
marché commun les aides accordées 
pour l'embauche de travailleurs par 
des contrats de formation et de 
travail et les aides pour la 
transformation de contrats de 
formation et de travail en contrats à 
durée indéterminée qui ne 
remplissent pas certaines conditions 
Aff. T­l34/00 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C 46/99, du 15 février 
2000, concernant une aide accordée 
par les autorités allemandes à la 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH 
Aff. T­l50/00 
Groupement Européen des 
Producteurs de Verre Plat / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 20 juillet 1999, 
C( 1999)2895 def, concernant l'aide 
accordée par le gouvernement 
italien en faveur de Sangalli 
Manfredonia Vetro dans le cadre de 
la construction d'une usine de verre 
plat à Manfredonia (Italie 
méridionale) 
Aff. T­l56/00 
Titan Cernent Company SA / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
2000/199/CE de la Commission, du 
17 mars 1999, concernant une aide 
d'Etat accordée par la Grèce à la 







(ARD) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 21 mars 2000, 
déclarant compatible avec le marché 
commun et le fonctionnement de 
l'accord EEE l'opération de 
concentration visant à l'acquisition 
par BSkyB (British Sky 
Broadcasting Group pic) de 24 
pour­cent de KirchPayTV GmbH & 
Co. KGaA, sur base du règlement 
(CEE) n. 4064/89 du Conseil 
Aff. T­l65/00 
Consorzio industrie fiammiferi 
(CIF) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision du 7 avril 
2000, rejetant la demande visant à 
ce que la Commission réexamine la 
décision refusant de communiquer 
au requérant certains documents 
transmis à «l'Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza» aux lins d'une 
enquête relative à l'application des 
articles 81 et 82 du traité CE menée 
par ladite autorité 
DEVANT LA COUR 
Aff. C­113/00 
Espagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C(2000)5207 final de la 
Commission concernant le régime 
d'aides de l'Espagne en faveur des 
productions horticoles destinées à la 
transformation industrielle dans la 
région Extremadura pendant la 
campagne de 1997/1998 
Aff. C­114/00 
Espagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C( 1999)5201 final de la 
Commission concernant le régime 
d'aides de l'Espagne au financement 
des fonds de roulement pour le 
secteur agricole de la région 
Extremadura 
Aff. C­137/00 
The Queen ex parte: Milk 
Marque Ltd et The Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission 
Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry 
The Queen 
ex parte: National Farmers' 
Union et The Competition 
Commission 
Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry 
The Director General of Fair 
Trading 
Dairy Industries Federation (DIF) 
Préjudicielle ­ Fligh Court of Justice 
(Queen's Bench Division) 
Interprétation des art. 38 à 46 du 
traité CE (devenus art. 32 à 38 CE), 
du règlement n. 26 du Conseil 
portant application de certaines 
règles de concurrence à la 
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production et au commerce des 
produits agricoles et du règlement 
(CEE) n. 804/68 du Conseil" du 27 
juin 1968, portant organisation 
commune des marchés dans le 
secteur du lait et des produits laitiers 
- Possibilité pour les Etats membres 
d'appliquer des règles nationales de 
concurrence aux producteurs de lait 
ayant choisi de s'organiser en 
coopératives et disposant d'un 
pouvoir sur le marché 
Aff. C-181/00 
Flightline Ltd et Secretario de 
Estado dos Transportes e 
Comunicações 
Transportes Aéreos Portugueses 
SA (TAP) 
Préjudicielle - Supremo Tribunal 
Administrativo - Interprétation de 
l'art. 4 du règlement (CEE) n. 
2408/92 du Conseil, du 23 juillet 
1992, concernant l'accès des 
transporteurs aériens 
communautaires aux liaisons 
aériennes intracommunautaires 
Imposition d'obligations de service 
public sur les services aériens 
réguliers desservant une zone 
périphérique (comme Madère et les 
Açores) - Compatibilité avec la 
faculté des Etats-membres de 
restreindre jusqu'au 1er avril 1997 le 
cabotage - Interprétation de l'art. 1, 
sous d), de la décision 94/698/CE de 
la Commission, du 6 juillet 1994, 
concernant une augmentation de 
capital, des garanties de crédit et 
une exonération fiscale en faveur de 
la compagnie aérienne TAP -
Autorisation d'une aide d'Etat à la 
condition que Portugal accepte 
l'application de l'art. 4 du règlement 
(CEE) n. 2408/92 aux régions 
autonomes de Madère et des Açores 
dès le 1er janvier 1996 
Aff. C-209/00 
Commission / Allemagne 
Manquement d'Etat - Art. 189 du 
traité CE (devenu art. 249 CE), al. 4 
- Décision K(99)2265 de la 
Commission, du 8 juillet 1999, 
concernant une mesure de la 
République fédérale d'Allemagne en 
faveur de la banque Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale 
(«WestLB») - Absorption de la 
«Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen» 
par la WestLB - Rémunération de 
l'augmentation des fonds propres en 
résultant 
Aff. C-218/00 
Cisal di Battistello Venanzio et C. 
Sas et Istituto nazionale per 
l'assicurazione contro gli 
infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL) et 
Lauro Cantieri Valsesia SpA 
Préjudicielle - Tribunale Vincenza -
Interprétation des art. 85 et suivants 
du traité CE (devenus art. 81 et 
suivants CE) - Notion d'entreprise -
Organisme public pour l'assurance 
obligatoire des accidents du travail 
et des maladies professionnelles 
agissant en régime de monopole 
légal - Organisme sans but lucratif-
Organisme demandant le paiement 
de primes d'assurance à un artisan 
qui s'est déjà assuré, pour les mêmes 
risques, auprès d'une compagnie 
privée d'assurances 
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I M P O R T A N T M E S S A G E T O D G C O M P E T I T I O N ' S C O R R E S P O N D E N T S 
New Fax Numbers and Addresses for State aid and Antitrust correspondence 
DG Competition is overhauling its mail administration system in the areas of antitrust and State 
aid control. In this context, the receipt of case-related documents (both fax transmissions and 
mail) will be centralised at one entry point for antitrust and one for State aid. 
All correspondents of DG Competition are requested to send competition case-related documents 
only to the following: 
State aid: 
Faxes:+32-2-296.12.42. 
Mail: Commission of the European Communities 
DG Competition 
State aid Registry 
Rue Joseph II / Jozef II-straat 70 
B - 1049Bruxelles/Brussel 
In all your correspondence, please specif' the name of the case and the case number. 
Antitrust: 
Faxes:+32-2-295.01.28. 
Mail: Commission of the European Communities 
DG Competition 
Antitrust Registry 
Rue Joseph II / Jozef II-straat 70 
B- 1049Bruxelles/Brussel 
In all your correspondence, please specify' the name of the case and the case number. 
It is essential that the correspondents use only the above fax numbers and/or addresses for any 
official communication relating to competition cases. This will faciliate and accelerate the 
treatment of your correspondence. Fax communications sent to other numbers/addresses may 
inevitably be treated with delay. 
Please note that for merger-related correspondence everything remains the same, in particular the 
fax number: +32-2-296.43.01. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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